Published by The Lawfare Institute
in Cooperation With
Brookings

You’re next, AE133N.

That’s a defense motion to compel discovery into the court’s audio system, itself filed in connection with AE133, the defense’s motion to bar electronic monitoring of attorney-client meetings.  Everyone vividly recalls the monitoring mishaps that arose back in January and February.  But, according to J. Connell III, the defense still hasn’t been given a complete universe of information about the courtroom (though it has been given some things).  In particular, he’s interested in certain historical---he says “backward looking”---technical data.

There was, the lawyer notes, a substantial dispute about a third party’s ability to parse heard audio information. We can certainly guess who that is: the “button pusher,” or, more accurately, “ex-button pusher,” given that person’s disconnection from the audio feed, in the wake of Judge Pohl’s order.  Connell goes on: IT staff likewise had resisted defense attempts to inquire into certain audio flows---to where, we also can certainly guess.  Finally, schematics provided to the defense apparently don’t describe the courtroom’s audio gear as-built; this might well have described our button-pusher’s audio-censorship and monitoring capabilities.  The lawyer thus seeks the court’s help in investigating further.

The defense already has gotten boatloads of access to the audio gear in the court, certainly enough to establish that there hasn’t been any monitoring of privileged stuff inside the ELC.  Such is the essence of prosecutor Clay Trivett’s rebuttal.  He adds that the government isn’t required to create discovery, by digging back for as-built schematics on the courtroom audio capability.  Why?  Well, because there aren’t any such schematics.  And Connell’s efforts to cross-examine IT personnel have been rejected by the court already, on relevancy grounds.  So there’s nothing new here at all; we’re done, argues Trivett.

Wait, no we aren’t, according to Connell.  For example, there was definitely---whether contractors and planners reduced it to writing or not---audio programming code, at the time of the systems’ construction.  That information is surely out there.  Ditto information about Mr. or Ms. Button Pusher: he or she was employed for at least nine months prior to the incident giving rise to the defense motion.  All this, Connell emphasizes, is discoverable under military commission rules.

The court then pushes a button of his own---that calling for a lunch break.  See you at 1400.

Raffaela Wakeman is a Senior Director at In-Q-Tel. She started her career at the Brookings Institution, where she spent five years conducting research on national security, election reform, and Congress. During this time she was also the Associate Editor of Lawfare. From there, Raffaela practiced law at the U.S. Department of Defense for four years, advising her clients on privacy and surveillance law, cybersecurity, and foreign liaison relationships. She departed DoD in 2019 to join the Majority Staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, where she oversaw the Intelligence Community’s science and technology portfolios, cybersecurity, and surveillance activities. She left HPSCI in May 2021 to join IQT. Raffaela received her BS and MS in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2009 and her law degree from Georgetown University Law Center in 2015, where she was recognized for her commitment to public service with the Joyce Chiang Memorial Award. While at the Department of Defense, she was the inaugural recipient of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s General Counsel Award for exhibiting the highest standards of leadership, professional conduct, and integrity.
Wells C. Bennett was Managing Editor of Lawfare and a Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings Institution. Before coming to Brookings, he was an Associate at Arnold & Porter LLP.

Subscribe to Lawfare