Armed Conflict Criminal Justice & the Rule of Law Terrorism & Extremism

9/20 Session #3: In Which a Course of Action is Discussed

Wells Bennett
Friday, September 20, 2013, 12:16 PM

James Connell III, Al-Baluchi’s Learned Counsel, cross-examines Bechtold and asks about the way forward---in particular, about our pair of much-discussed, would-be IT fixes, or “courses of action” intended to resolve the defense’s concerns about confidentiality.  The lawyer wants to nail down Bechtold’s views about the two plans, which counsel and witness abbreviate as “COA1” and “COA2.”

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James Connell III, Al-Baluchi’s Learned Counsel, cross-examines Bechtold and asks about the way forward---in particular, about our pair of much-discussed, would-be IT fixes, or “courses of action” intended to resolve the defense’s concerns about confidentiality.  The lawyer wants to nail down Bechtold’s views about the two plans, which counsel and witness abbreviate as “COA1” and “COA2.”

Precisely what will Bechtold support, solutions-wise?  A physical commitment of servers?  Bechtold could accept that, but doesn’t love it from a financial standpoint. High-end, separate encryption keys?  Yes to that, too; the witness would opt for something different, himself, but can understand and accept that the defense wants the most powerful sorts of encryption   The attorney clarifies an evident distinction between encryption standards.  One of these encrypts individual files; another encrypts a whole network.  These are not interchangeable, but different approaches to the same problem, right?  Right.  Still, the witness confirms when asked, he is willing to commit to the defense’s proposal. One last piece of the path forward: provision of dedicated IT folks for defense counsel, and even the augmentation of the Chief Defense Counsel’s IT complement.  So, Connell summarizes, any new IT staff would have the skills to sort through audit logs of defense systems?   Yup.  Bechtold says he wants staff---an Information Assurance Officer---to be able to give Col. Mayberry a detailed, daily and comprehensible accounting of who has sought access. The attorney’s takeaway, he says, is that either of the two pending solutions, or courses of action, would comprehensively resolve the defense’s complaints.  Bechtold agrees with that---but he disagrees with Connell’s suggestion that encryption or audit logging, in the interim, wouldn’t sufficiently help to ensure the confidentiality of defense files and communications. Lawyer and witness then march through documents describing the “COAs.”  One exhibit compares the defense’s needs to each of the proposed solutions.  The two men discuss the details, but the gist is this: Bechtold suspects that there may be more defense security needs, beyond what he understood previously, and beyond what is reflected in the materials displayed by Connell---he’s essentially picking up on the significance of confidentiality to the defense.  On that point, the witness says he is eager to interface more, personally, with Connell and company, so far as concerns IT workarounds.  The court: you just need to know more about the defense’s objectives, and you’ll supply a means?  Well, do you know what they want?  Bechtold says he generally understands the defense’s intent, but confesses to being somewhat in the dark as to exactly what its needs are. Our need: lunch.  We’ll break until 1300.

Wells C. Bennett was Managing Editor of Lawfare and a Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings Institution. Before coming to Brookings, he was an Associate at Arnold & Porter LLP.

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