An Additional Thought on Defeating Al Qaeda Core
I have one thought to add to Bobby's observations yesterday about the legal implications of finishing off the Al Qaeda core in Pakistan. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon has taken a beating for his supposedly radical idea of updating the AUMF. But if you take Bobby's point seriously, and I do, the real problem with McKeon's proposal may not be that--as the administration, Democrats, and many opinion leaders all insist--it is too extreme. It may be, rather, that it's not radical enough.
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I have one thought to add to Bobby's observations yesterday about the legal implications of finishing off the Al Qaeda core in Pakistan. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon has taken a beating for his supposedly radical idea of updating the AUMF. But if you take Bobby's point seriously, and I do, the real problem with McKeon's proposal may not be that--as the administration, Democrats, and many opinion leaders all insist--it is too extreme. It may be, rather, that it's not radical enough. That under McKeon's proposal, the United States would continue to define the war--as it does now--according to the authority to fight the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and forces associated with them. If you imagine the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda, that authorization begins to look a little hollow. What does it mean to be a force associated--in the present tense--with a force that no longer meaningfully exists?
Benjamin Wittes is editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of several books.
