Criminal Justice & the Rule of Law Cybersecurity & Tech

Altering Voter Registration Databases to Tilt the Election

Herb Lin
Monday, September 5, 2016, 3:12 AM

The recent penetrations of state voter registration databases in Arizona and Illinois have, so far, been limited to data exfiltration. Much of the information contained in voter registration databases is public anyway, so the primary concern is whether voter intimidation on a large scale is possible because personal information such as addresses is now collected in one place.

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The recent penetrations of state voter registration databases in Arizona and Illinois have, so far, been limited to data exfiltration. Much of the information contained in voter registration databases is public anyway, so the primary concern is whether voter intimidation on a large scale is possible because personal information such as addresses is now collected in one place.

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But a scenario in which improper access enables hackers to selectively manipulate voter registrations, such as by deleting 10% of the registration records associated with Democrats, is far more worrisome. Voter registration databases often do contain party affiliation, and it could be a simple matter to preferentially deprive members of a particular party of the ability to cast a ballot on Election Day. If the election is close (as many expect it to be), it would not take a large number of selective deletions to tilt the election.

How will we know if that happens? What could be done about it even if it were proven? And what nation-state has the motive, means, and opportunity to conduct such a hack, and on which side?

Voters will have to be extra-diligent this year about making sure their voter registrations are active, and be prepared to challenge assertions that they are not properly registered to vote.


Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. His research interests relate broadly to policy-related dimensions of cybersecurity and cyberspace, and he is particularly interested in and knowledgeable about the use of offensive operations in cyberspace, especially as instruments of national policy. In addition to his positions at Stanford University, he is Chief Scientist, Emeritus for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, where he served from 1990 through 2014 as study director of major projects on public policy and information technology, and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar and Senior Fellow in Cybersecurity (not in residence) at the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies in the School for International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. Prior to his NRC service, he was a professional staff member and staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986-1990), where his portfolio included defense policy and arms control issues. He received his doctorate in physics from MIT.

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