Criminal Justice & the Rule of Law

Biometric Exit – It’s Groundhog Day All Over Again

Paul Rosenzweig
Tuesday, May 28, 2013, 10:00 AM
Those who are fans of the classic Bill Murray movie Groundhog Day will be forgiven if they see echoes of that story line in the immigration reform bill.  For much as Murray is seemingly doomed to repeat the same day over and over again until he realizes the need to modify his behavior, it seems that Congress, likewise, is intent on repeating itself endlessly, hoping against hope for a different result. I refer here to the recently reported “compromise” that the Senate has adopted about the development and deployment of a biometric visa

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Those who are fans of the classic Bill Murray movie Groundhog Day will be forgiven if they see echoes of that story line in the immigration reform bill.  For much as Murray is seemingly doomed to repeat the same day over and over again until he realizes the need to modify his behavior, it seems that Congress, likewise, is intent on repeating itself endlessly, hoping against hope for a different result. I refer here to the recently reported “compromise” that the Senate has adopted about the development and deployment of a biometric visa exit system.  According to the Washington Post, as part of strengthening American border security, the immigration reform bill would require the Department of Homeland Security to deploy fingerprint scanners at airports in the United States in phases over the next 5 years.   By the end of 5 years, foreigners leaving from the 30 busiest airports in America would be required to undergo outbound fingerprinting.  The Senate rejected an amendment that would have extended the fingerprint requirement to all outbound ports of entry/exit. But biometric exit has been American policy for 12 years – and not just at the top 30 airports but nationwide.  If we haven’t done it in the last dozen years, why do we think we will succeed in the next 5? [A brief word of explanation on two points:  First, this program is known as “biometric” exit because it relies on a biometric factor – a fingerprint – to conclusively identify and match an alien who is exiting this country to a record of his entry, for which a fingerprint is also taken.  Currently the outbound match is done by a “biographic” means – that is, by checking a name on an outbound manifest provided by the airlines and matching it against the name an alien provided (on his/her passport) at the time of entry to the United States.  Though biographic name matching is highly accurate (I have seen reports of over 90% effectiveness) it is quite clear that biometric exit matching is likely to be even more accurate. Second, an exit matching program is thought to be essential because visa overstays represent a significant fraction of those who are in the country illegally.  While many who are illegally present in the US entered illegally, roughly 40 percent first arrived in the US lawfully – with, say a tourist visa or a student visa, or in a situation where no visa was required – and then overstayed their welcome.  An effective exit matching program would help identify all of those who arrived lawfully but remained beyond the end of their lawful term in the US.  Hence Congress’s insistence on a biometric exit program.] So given that background, what could possibly be wrong with a biometric exit program?  Quite a lot as it turns out. To begin with, Congress and the 9/11 Commission have been asking for such a program for more than a dozen years.   We first mandated biometrics in U.S. visas in the Enhanced Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (PL 107-173, §202).  Despite this requirement, DHS has been unable (or unwilling) to fulfill the mandate.  As a GAO Report in May 2013 put it: “DHS faces challenges planning for a biometric exit system at air and sea ports of entry. Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation of an integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals. As of April 2013, DHS’s planning efforts are focused on developing a biometric exit system for airports, with the potential for a similar solution at sea ports. However, in October 2010, DHS identified key challenges as to why it has been unable to determine how and when to implement a biometric air exit capability, including challenges in determining what personnel should be responsible for the capture of biometric information.” As The Hill  has noted the reasons for this are pretty easy to understand.  A 2008 DHS study found that the cost of implementing the system in airports alone would be $3.1-6.4 Billion – even in Washington where such numbers are often thrown around with abandon, that’s a lot of Benjamins .  For perspective its roughly 10% of DHS’s entire annual budget.  Or as a 2010 GAO report put it: “[I]n October 2010, DHS identified three primary reasons why it has been unable to  determine how and when to implement a biometric air exit solution: (1) the methods of collecting biometric data could disrupt the flow of travelers through air terminals; (2) air carriers and airport authorities had not allowed DHS to examine mechanisms through which DHS could incorporate biometric data collection into passenger processing at the departure gate; and (3) challenges existed in capturing biometric data at the point of departure, including determining what personnel should be responsible for the capture of biometric information at airports” Put another way: “ significant questions remained regarding (1) the effectiveness of current biographic air exit processes and the error rates in collecting or matching data, (2) methods of cost effectively integrating biometrics into the air departure processes (e.g., matching arrival and departure records based on biometric information like fingerprints rather than based on biographic information, such as names and dates of birth), (3) the additional value biometric air exit would provide compared with the current biographic air exit process, and (4) the overall value and cost of a biometric air exit capability.” So let me put this policy-speak into simple terms.  Biometric hasn’t been implemented because it would cost a huge amount of money and it wouldn’t work any better than the current biographic exit system in practice.  If you want a colloquial understanding of that proposition here’s why:
  • We aren’t built for it.  In the US (unlike almost every other country) there is NO border exit control.  When you leave, you just … leave.  International exit gates are next to domestic ones, and you don’t need to show a passport to a US border agent on the way out.  Implementing biometric exit would, in effect, require completely reconfiguring American airports so that international departures were in a separate terminal where you cleared exit customs on the way out OR, alternatively, that CBP deployed fingerprint scanners at airport gates as part of the boarding process (just imagine those lines!).
  • If it isn’t comprehensive it isn’t worth doing.  The original Congressional plan was to do biometric exit at EVERY US port of exit.  If you want to check foreigners “out” in the same way they “check in” that has to be right – after all, there is no rule that says a visitor from, say, Morocco, has to enter at JFK airport and leave from the same airport.  He might very well drive to Toronto.  So a real exit program has to be everywhere.
  • But if you think the reconstruction of Dulles airplane departure architecture would be expensive, just imagine what it would be like to do biometric exit at the San Ysidro land port in California.  A 2006 GAO Report put it this way: "US-VISIT has concluded that, for various reasons, it cannot currently implement a biometric US-VISIT exit capability without incurring a major impact on land POE facilities. According to officials, implementing a biometrically based exit recording system like that used to record those entering or re-entering the country is potentially costly (an estimated $3 billion), would require new infrastructure, and would produce major traffic congestion because travelers would have to stop their vehicles upon exit to be processed—an option officials consider unacceptable."
  • That cost is one of the reasons why the “new” Congressional requirement for biometric exit at 30 airports is actually a retreat from earlier, comprehensive plans – we simply can’t imagine implementing full biometric border exit.  [An aside:  One novel solution under development is for the US to use Canadian biometric entry records as our exit records.  If implemented that would be a significant cost saver.]
  • And, finally, even if it were to work it wouldn’t be worth it.  Right now, with our biographic exit system in place, the rate of verified overstays outstrips our capacity to search out those who remain in the US and deport them.  As Secretary Napolitano put it in 2013 testimony, DHS “vet[s] all overstays for national security concerns, [and] also leverage[s] existing capabilities to close out overstay leads. We now vet all potential overstays and refer leads to ICE based on national security and public safety priorities for further review.”  In other words, we don’t have the resources right now to track everyone who overstays – so what would be the value of an even more comprehensive list.
The immigration debate is mostly a topic outside the bounds of this blog.  But border security seems to fall squarely within our ambit.  And if the “new” biometric  exit mandate is what passes for “enhancing” border security, then I am deeply skeptical.  It is no more than a promise to do within 5 years, a portion of what has not been done in the last 12 – and that seems like an empty promise to me. One final note:  Thanks to Rafaella Wakeman  who was kind enough to take some time to find some of the older GAO reports and testimony to which I refer.  I appreciate the help.

Paul Rosenzweig is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company and a Senior Advisor to The Chertoff Group. Mr. Rosenzweig formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security. He is a Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University, a Senior Fellow in the Tech, Law & Security program at American University, and a Board Member of the Journal of National Security Law and Policy.

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