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In a recently published piece for the Hoover Institution's Aegis Paper Series, I argue that the “going dark” debate ought to be considered in the context of the larger debate over government access to data. Encryption is not the only game in town: just as law enforcement can pursue a number of different alternatives to mandating encryption backdoors, so too can privacy advocates take steps beyond encrypting their data to ensure their privacy. Acknowledging these substitutes—both for law enforcement and for privacy seekers—generates a number of insights. For example, comprehensive reform may make more sense than serial reforms, since it would allow for issue linkage and deal-making.

Encryption Substitutes by Hoover Institution on Scribd


Andrew Keane Woods is a Professor of Law at the University of Arizona College of Law. Before that, he was a postdoctoral cybersecurity fellow at Stanford University. He holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School and a Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Cambridge, where he was a Gates Scholar.

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