A few hours ago, the United States and five world powers reached an agreement with Iran to freeze and even roll back aspects of its nuclear program. Iran pops up on
Lawfare from time to time, in part because of its intervention in Syria, but also because its support for terrorist groups, its nuclear program, and regional ambitions make it a top target for U.S. intelligence. The Treasury and State Department have orchestrated sanctions and targeted financial pressure on Iran, and the U.S. military is presumed to have prepared targeting options should the President seek to use force to stop Iran’s nuclear program.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, is often portrayed as the point of Iran’s spear, taking the lead on Iran’s efforts to support militants in Iraq, the Lebanese Hizballah, and now the Syrian regime, among many other sordid sorts. This piece, based on
Afshon Ostovar's forthcoming book on this subject, is meant to give some background on the IRGC and context for its activities.
Ostovar is a senior analyst at
CNA, a non-partisan, not-for-profit research organization. He writes on politics and armed groups in the Middle East:
The IRGC has a hand in almost all of Iran’s strategic affairs, from supporting Bashar Assad in Syria to the nuclear issue. The organization’s involvement in these areas—as well as its role in suppressing political dissent in Iran—has made the IRGC a lightning rod for criticism and commentary. Yet, despite its prominence, the IRGC remains a poorly understood organization. So here are seven things you should know about the IRGC, offering up some basic information and correcting common misconceptions.
What are the origins of the IRGC?
The IRGC was originally intended to be a popular, “Islamic” replacement for the Western-trained, and mostly secular, military of the Shah. It brought together various pro-Khomeini militias under one banner and was initially used to crush opposition to Khomeini, fighting particularly violent campaigns against revolutionary competitors such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq. The IRGC was still a rag-tag organization when Iran’s brutal war eight year war with Iraq began and in no way a proper military. Consequently Iran’s revolutionary leaders decided to also maintain the regular military (artesh), which was responsible for complex military matters, and used the IRGC as a mostly frontline infantry force. Today, the IRGC and artesh have their own purviews and distinct organizational cultures, but also overlap in certain functional areas. Both organizations maintain separate air, land, and naval forces, and both play some role in defending Iran’s borders. For instance, the IRGC navy is in charge of Iranian territorial waters in the Persian Gulf, while the regular navy holds command over the Caspian Sea and Gulf of Oman. The IRGC is officially responsible for “safeguarding the revolution”, which has given it a role in Iranian domestic politics, whereas the artesh is largely responsible for protecting Iran’s territorial sovereignty and has remained outside of political matters.
So the IRGC is Iran’s elite military?
Not really. The IRGC is elite in terms of its influence within Iran’s ruling regime, but it’s not elite relative to Iran’s other armed forces in terms of training or operational capability. The Qods Force, which is responsible for operations outside of Iran’s borders is the only branch of the IRGC that could be considered “elite” by that metric. This branch is in charge of Iran’s covert operations and has been linked to activities such as weapons smuggling in Africa (weapons likely headed to Gaza), the bombing attack on an Israeli official in New Delhi, and a plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Washington. It is the lead agency responsible for coordinating with groups like Hezbollah and Iraq’s Badr Organization, and manages Iran’s on-the-ground support to Assad in Syria. Requiring a diverse skillset, Qods Force officers and soldiers receive much more robust instruction than rank-and-file IRGC soldiers (particularly in tradecraft, foreign languages, and explosives) and tend to be the cream of the crop of what the IRGC has to offer.
Is the IRGC as bastion of hardline supporters?
Yes and no. The IRGC’s top officers are vigorous supporters of hardline politics in Iran. They are chief backers of the supreme leader and leading opponents of democratic reforms. However, the IRGC is a large organization, the vast majority of which is made up of conscripts who serve between 17 and 20 months. In Iran’s system of conscription, individuals have virtually no control over what branch of service they end up in. This means that those critical of the regime are just as likely to end up in the IRGC as committed supporters. Consequently, there is far more political and ideological diversity among the IRGC’s rank-and-file than among its top officers, who (like the leaders of Iran’s other armed forces) gained their positions through ideological orthodoxy and loyalty to the supreme leader.
What is the Basij?
The Basij is a paramilitary that falls under the command of the IRGC’s top general. It’s a massive organization with an estimated 5-10 million members. The Basij has a broad-based mission that emphasizes religious and ideological promotion, social activism, and includes certain domestic security functions such as morals policing. It serves as the regime’s ideological base and its members are routinely mobilized for all sorts of pro-regime activism, from taking part in pro-regime demonstrations to violently breaking up pro-democracy protests (such as during the 2009 post-election unrest). Unlike the IRGC proper, the Basij doesn’t accept conscripts and all who volunteer to join the organization are vetted along ideological, political, and religious lines before they can join. It concentrates on recruiting young people, especially among the urban poor, and tries to inculcate within them a religious devotion to Iran’s theocratic system. Because of the ideological clarity of its ranks, basijis are given preference for service in IRGC military divisions and are often recruited into specialized units (such as in the Qods Force and IRGC intelligence) and groomed for leadership positions.
Why should I care?
Outside of its role in supporting militant groups abroad, the IRGC is the chief backer of Iran’s supreme leader. This relationship has given the organization a prominent role in Iranian strategic affairs. The IRGC is also an economic powerhouse, benefiting from lucrative state contracts and involved in everything from large-scale industrial construction to telecommunications. Its combined power has made the IRGC one of the most influential elements in Iranian decision-making. However, this doesn’t mean it calls the shots. The organization still defers to the supreme leader and has not openly opposed him on any major issue. Strategic policy is made through consensus building in Iran, and while the supreme leader seeks input from top IRGC officials, he considers their views alongside those of other important constituencies, such as the president and leading clergy. But because of its standing in the regime, the IRGC’s buy-in would be needed for any significant shift in policy to take place (such as making a nuclear compromise with the West).
What about sanctions, are they hurting the IRGC?
Probably. Many of its economic enterprises, such as its industrial construction business and countless other front companies, rely on doing business outside of Iran. Although we can’t measure it, the banking sanctions that have made it almost impossible for Iranian entities to do business abroad is almost certainly having a negative impact on the IRGC. However, the IRGC has long been involved in numerous black market activities including the smuggling of everything from air conditioners and cigarettes (for resale in Iran) to military hardware and weapons. Some of its commanders are rumored to have become incredibly wealthy due to these activities. Sanctions have probably increased the money to be made through illicit networks, but it is unlikely that such grift (even if expanded) could replace the billions in petro-dollars Iran has been losing. With less money, Iran will have to cut back on all its expenditures, which at some point will include military investment and general defense spending. Although sanctions do not appear to have forced the IRGC to curtail its operations, it is only a matter of time before they will.
So would the IRGC support a nuclear deal?
Although the IRGC explored limited engagement with the U.S. during the Bush years (mostly regarding Iraq and Afghanistan), it has opposed improving ties. However, outside of some boilerplate warnings against trusting America, the IRGC has been a mostly silent observer to the latest rounds of talks with the P5+1. I take this as tacit support for current deliberations and possibly for a first stage agreement, but not necessarily for a far-reaching, end-state accord. The IRGC probably sees signs that Iran’s regional position, like its economy, is in decline, and that something needs to change for Iran to regain a position of strength. When feeling cornered, the IRGC has generally preferred pro-active deterrence measures (e.g., using proxies to harass U.S. forces in Iraq) to engagement. But Iran’s current troubles are not something that can be managed through force. Its economy is in a tailspin due to sanctions, and support for Assad has increased its alienation and drawn it into a simmering conflict with Saudi Arabia and Sunni Islamists. A deal to end or at least lessen sanctions would alleviate some of this pressure while leaving the IRGC’s other strategic initiatives (such as its relationship with Hezbollah and current operations in Syria) intact. It would also reduce the likelihood of U.S. military action against Iran. So, if the IRGC were confident that there was more deterrent value in a deal than in the status quo, it would probably support a nuclear accord. That’s a big if.
