The Foreign Policy Essay: Ceci n’est pas une guerre
Editor’s Note: The recent terrorist attacks in France prompted mass rallies and statements of support from around the world. In the United States, President Obama is convening the leaders of concerned states to discuss ways to fight global extremism. Yet a look at the last decade suggests that Europe’s terrorism problem may be more manageable than the rhetoric surrounding the latest attack suggests.
Published by The Lawfare Institute
in Cooperation With
Editor’s Note: The recent terrorist attacks in France prompted mass rallies and statements of support from around the world. In the United States, President Obama is convening the leaders of concerned states to discuss ways to fight global extremism. Yet a look at the last decade suggests that Europe’s terrorism problem may be more manageable than the rhetoric surrounding the latest attack suggests. In this essay, my Brookings colleague Jeremy Shapiro warns that an overreaction in the name of counterterrorism could cause far more harm to France than the attacks themselves.
***
The mind reels at the horror of the terrorist attacks in France. The body politic demands a reaction. And so a reaction there will be. But we have learned to our cost (or should have) that societies often overreact to such outrages, to disastrous effect. The terrorist threat is to the lives of individual citizens. As the massive solidarity marches in Paris remind us, terrorists cannot undermine the core values of a free society. Only the society itself can do that. And an exaggerated sense of national peril is perhaps to the fastest route to societal self-destruction. France should be well prepared to avoid this fate. The French have often looked back over the long arc of American counterterrorism errors and excesses—from Guantanamo, to the war in Iraq, to the torture scandal—and congratulated themselves on their relative prudence. This self-perception ignores some of the ugly history of counterterrorism in France, but it does accurately reflect a remarkable process of learning. France has always been on the “bleeding edge” of terrorism, confronting the menace in all its guises—from bomb-throwing anarchists to transnational Islamist networks to lone wolf madmen. From this long and bloody struggle, France has developed an enormously effective, if at times controversial, system for fighting terrorism. As the threat of Islamist terrorism has risen around the world—and as France in particular has been publicly singled out as a target numerous times by terrorist groups from Algeria to Afghanistan—France has been largely immune from terrorist attacks by Islamist groups, foiling dozens of plots in the past 15 years. That immunity was severely compromised last week when gunmen attacked a satirical magazine and a kosher butcher in Paris. The 17 deaths that resulted are a tragedy and a travesty. But they are not necessarily an indictment of France’s counterterrorism efforts. Perfection was never the standard for success. French counterterrorism officials, in contrast to many of their American colleagues, have long held that terrorism is a feature of modern life. Like crime, it cannot be eradicated, only managed and controlled. In the days after 9/11, French officials recoiled from the language of the “War on Terror,” even as they acknowledged the threat. “War” implies military means and a quest for ultimate victory. But for the French, fighting terrorism has never been a war, but rather an endless struggle largely waged using law enforcement and intelligence tools. This approach has had its drawbacks, as judicial processes can be cumbersome and frustratingly unpredictable. But a succession of failures and scandals, particularly in the 1960s and ’70s, convinced French policymakers that only through such an approach could they manage the threat of terrorism without sacrificing the very values they so desperately desire to protect. And they were right. Maintaining that approach after outrages such as those in Paris is always politically fraught. There is no easy formula, but past experience demonstrates that in the wake of such outrages, democratic societies tend to make certain mistakes, including:- Overestimating the degree of central coordination of the terrorists
- Overestimating the foreign influence on the terrorists
- Blaming the security services for failures by using retrospective analysis
- Establishing excessive protection measures in the name of reassurance that ultimately increase fear, inhibit resilience, and do more to engender long-term alienation in target populations than to prevent terrorism
***
Jeremy Shapiro is a fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy and the Center on the United States and Europe in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. Prior to re-joining Brookings, he was a member of the U.S. State Department’s policy planning staff. Follow him on Twitter @JyShapiro.