The Foreign Policy Essay: It is Time to Fund Domestic Counter-Radicalization
Editor’s Note: Countering violent extremism (CVE) is as necessary for fighting terrorism as it is challenging. Both in concept and in practice, CVE programs are difficult to execute: radicalization remains varied and hard to anticipate, and countering it depends on many factors, some of which are outside the control of governments. Making all this harder is inconsistent funding. Quintan Wiktorowicz, a former senior White House official who is now a managing partner of Affinis Global, calls on the Obama administration to increase overall funding for CVE and improve the budget process.
Published by The Lawfare Institute
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Editor’s Note: Countering violent extremism (CVE) is as necessary for fighting terrorism as it is challenging. Both in concept and in practice, CVE programs are difficult to execute: radicalization remains varied and hard to anticipate, and countering it depends on many factors, some of which are outside the control of governments. Making all this harder is inconsistent funding. Quintan Wiktorowicz, a former senior White House official who is now a managing partner of Affinis Global, calls on the Obama administration to increase overall funding for CVE and improve the budget process.
In other words, CVE needed to be budget neutral. At the time, we faced an economic crisis and dwindling government resources, and the Office of Management and Budget was extremely sensitive to any new expenditures. In the start-up phase for domestic CVE, we were mostly focused on organizing departments and agencies and creating an architecture, so new funding was less necessary than simply maximizing and coordinating existing resources and programs. We had enough discrete, ongoing CVE activities to begin building momentum, and we included CVE as part of existing programs with overlapping missions to avoid new costs. Examples included incorporating CVE into ongoing law-enforcement training programs, National Institute of Justice grant opportunities, community outreach and engagement initiatives, international exchanges, and Internet safety programs.
More than three years after Mr. McDonough’s speech, we are beyond the start-up phase, and it is time to create a CVE-specific budget rather than require that agencies beg, borrow, and steal from existing resources. The method of limited initiatives coupled with piggy-backing off programs with other missions can only take us so far.
Without this budget, CVE will remain largely episodic and superficial for three key reasons. First, a priority without substantial funding is simply not a priority, and departments and agencies know this. Officials at several agencies have bluntly questioned White House requests to deepen and expand CVE activities for this very reason. Others have taken steps to address White House interests but have not fully committed personnel and resources in a way that will achieve the CVE mission. The FBI, for example, set up a Countering Violent Extremism Office more than three years ago, yet arguably has very little to show in terms of CVE-specific programs or impact. Despite the fact that the White House in late 2012 threw its weight behind deepening and expanding the FBI CVE Office as a top priority, personnel turnover, underfunding, and resistance from CVE skeptics in the Bureau undercut the office’s capabilities. Funding would have signaled tangible commitment to the workforce, helped attract top talent to the CVE mission in the FBI, and enabled the CVE Office to better achieve its mission. Agencies sometimes feel that everything is a White House priority and have to make hard choices about where to focus time and energy. The lack of a CVE budget makes that decision pretty easy.
Second, and related, requiring that agencies expand CVE activities within existing resources sets up a zero-sum game with other programs. More focus and resources devoted to CVE—including the increased availability of grants and training for CVE and the nascent Department of Homeland Security “envoy” program that places CVE specialists in key cities to help coordinate community engagement—necessarily means taking away from other initiatives and priorities. There have always been CVE skeptics in government, concerned about diverting resources away from traditional counterterrorism—investigations, prosecutions, and disrupting plots—to support as yet unproven preventive activities. They have a point. If forced to choose, most Americans probably would choose disrupting plots and arresting terrorists over expanding CVE programs like community engagement and training. If we want to counter radicalization, we can’t set up that kind of trade-off.
Third, the framework for pursuing CVE is in place, but there are critical areas that require an increase in funding to build capacity and effectively execute the SIP. For example, we have asked our U.S. Attorneys (USAs) throughout the country to help organize and drive engagement and partnerships with communities to prevent violent extremism without providing them with the necessary resources to do so. To their credit, the USAs have stepped up and are doing their best. But their offices simply aren’t equipped to take on this critical role without additional resources. Many USAs are personally leading the local outreach and engagement effort, but they have myriad law enforcement (and other) responsibilities and aren’t specialists, making it highly unlikely that they have the bandwidth to make a significant difference on the ground. Something as basic as funding full-time CVE positions in key U.S. Attorneys Offices, staffed by trained specialists, would be a good starting point and could make a world of difference.
The lack of a CVE-specific budget reflected fiscal realities in 2011 and was never intended as some kind of core principle about how we counter radicalization. The administration and Congress should consider whether CVE is enough of a priority to warrant new appropriations and additional funding. In a speech in Boston in April, Lisa Monaco, assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, echoed the points made by Mr. McDonough nearly three years ago, reiterating the president’s commitment to CVE and calling for a “comprehensive prevention model.” The success of this vision will depend, to a large extent, on making sure that departments and agencies are appropriately funded and set up to succeed.
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During the Obama administration’s first major speech about countering violent extremism (CVE) in the homeland in March 2011, then-Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough noted that the president “has been focused on this since he took office. Behind closed doors, he has insisted that his national security team make this a priority.” Mr. McDonough, my boss at the time, put his own passion and personal capital behind the issue on behalf of the president, chairing senior-level meetings and volunteering to deliver speeches, make phone calls, and do whatever was necessary to catalyze action. Five months after his speech, we released the president’s National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, followed four months later by a Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) outlining more than 75 current and planned activities and actions. Both Democrats and Republicans recognize the importance of protecting the United States by preventing al-Qa‘ida and other terrorist groups from radicalizing and recruiting American citizens and residents. Recent statements by administration officials that dozens of Americans have traveled to Syria to fight and are beginning to trickle back into the United States underscore the concern. Despite its importance and the fact that domestic CVE was declared a presidential priority, there has never been a CVE-specific budget. During interagency negotiations, in fact, the following carefully crafted language was inserted into the SIP:The SIP outlines ongoing, as well as planned, activities to counter violent extremism, which will be accomplished through existing funding and by prioritizing within the resources available to relevant departments and agencies.
In other words, CVE needed to be budget neutral. At the time, we faced an economic crisis and dwindling government resources, and the Office of Management and Budget was extremely sensitive to any new expenditures. In the start-up phase for domestic CVE, we were mostly focused on organizing departments and agencies and creating an architecture, so new funding was less necessary than simply maximizing and coordinating existing resources and programs. We had enough discrete, ongoing CVE activities to begin building momentum, and we included CVE as part of existing programs with overlapping missions to avoid new costs. Examples included incorporating CVE into ongoing law-enforcement training programs, National Institute of Justice grant opportunities, community outreach and engagement initiatives, international exchanges, and Internet safety programs.
More than three years after Mr. McDonough’s speech, we are beyond the start-up phase, and it is time to create a CVE-specific budget rather than require that agencies beg, borrow, and steal from existing resources. The method of limited initiatives coupled with piggy-backing off programs with other missions can only take us so far.
Without this budget, CVE will remain largely episodic and superficial for three key reasons. First, a priority without substantial funding is simply not a priority, and departments and agencies know this. Officials at several agencies have bluntly questioned White House requests to deepen and expand CVE activities for this very reason. Others have taken steps to address White House interests but have not fully committed personnel and resources in a way that will achieve the CVE mission. The FBI, for example, set up a Countering Violent Extremism Office more than three years ago, yet arguably has very little to show in terms of CVE-specific programs or impact. Despite the fact that the White House in late 2012 threw its weight behind deepening and expanding the FBI CVE Office as a top priority, personnel turnover, underfunding, and resistance from CVE skeptics in the Bureau undercut the office’s capabilities. Funding would have signaled tangible commitment to the workforce, helped attract top talent to the CVE mission in the FBI, and enabled the CVE Office to better achieve its mission. Agencies sometimes feel that everything is a White House priority and have to make hard choices about where to focus time and energy. The lack of a CVE budget makes that decision pretty easy.
Second, and related, requiring that agencies expand CVE activities within existing resources sets up a zero-sum game with other programs. More focus and resources devoted to CVE—including the increased availability of grants and training for CVE and the nascent Department of Homeland Security “envoy” program that places CVE specialists in key cities to help coordinate community engagement—necessarily means taking away from other initiatives and priorities. There have always been CVE skeptics in government, concerned about diverting resources away from traditional counterterrorism—investigations, prosecutions, and disrupting plots—to support as yet unproven preventive activities. They have a point. If forced to choose, most Americans probably would choose disrupting plots and arresting terrorists over expanding CVE programs like community engagement and training. If we want to counter radicalization, we can’t set up that kind of trade-off.
Third, the framework for pursuing CVE is in place, but there are critical areas that require an increase in funding to build capacity and effectively execute the SIP. For example, we have asked our U.S. Attorneys (USAs) throughout the country to help organize and drive engagement and partnerships with communities to prevent violent extremism without providing them with the necessary resources to do so. To their credit, the USAs have stepped up and are doing their best. But their offices simply aren’t equipped to take on this critical role without additional resources. Many USAs are personally leading the local outreach and engagement effort, but they have myriad law enforcement (and other) responsibilities and aren’t specialists, making it highly unlikely that they have the bandwidth to make a significant difference on the ground. Something as basic as funding full-time CVE positions in key U.S. Attorneys Offices, staffed by trained specialists, would be a good starting point and could make a world of difference.
The lack of a CVE-specific budget reflected fiscal realities in 2011 and was never intended as some kind of core principle about how we counter radicalization. The administration and Congress should consider whether CVE is enough of a priority to warrant new appropriations and additional funding. In a speech in Boston in April, Lisa Monaco, assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, echoed the points made by Mr. McDonough nearly three years ago, reiterating the president’s commitment to CVE and calling for a “comprehensive prevention model.” The success of this vision will depend, to a large extent, on making sure that departments and agencies are appropriately funded and set up to succeed.
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Dr. Quintan Wiktorowicz is the managing partner of Affinis Global and served in two senior positions at the White House from 2011-2013, where he led efforts to build national security partnerships and counter violent extremism. He has published three books, an award winning audio book, and dozens of articles and book chapters on terrorism, Islamic movements, democratization, civil society, and nongovernmental organizations in the Muslim world.
