The Foreign Policy Essay: The Trouble With Nation-Building

Editor's Note: As Iraq collapses into yet another bloody civil war and chaos sweeps across the Middle East, Americans are once again hearing calls for rebuilding the institutions and societies of the Middle East echoing through the halls of Washington. However, the U.S. record of success when it comes to nation-building is less than stellar, and it is not clear if the United States has the will or the skill to do it any better in the future. Dov Zakheim, who served as civilian coordinator for Afghan reconstruction and as a senior Department of Defense official in the George W. Bush administration, questions whether U.S. military forces should be involved in nation-building and calls instead for U.S. allies to play a leading role going forward.

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Nation-building as a concept has a history that dates back at least to the creation of the United States. The nineteenth-century revolutions against Ottoman rule in the Balkans, followed by the emergence of European nation-states in the aftermath of the First World War, all called for, and led to, what is today termed "nation-building" (and is actually state-building, as the latter focuses on primarily on supporting central governments). Nation-building was also attempted in the Ottoman Empire’s Middle Eastern territories, which obtained their independence during the decades after the Great War. In most of these cases—Israel being a notable exception—the states were the artificial creation of European officials, notably the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement. In other words, in the aftermath of Sykes-Picot there was a real need to create nations where none—other than the notions of the umma (the community of Muslims), the remnants of the Ottoman order, and pan-Arabism—had existed within the boundaries that emerged from that agreement. Nation-building became the subject of political debate in the 1990s, when it took on a specific connotation in the aftermath of the Balkan wars. The emergence of six new states from the ashes of the former Yugoslavia was accompanied by a need for outside support to foster good governance; ensure civilian control of the military; provide for the rule of law; encourage free enterprise; expand educational opportunity for men and women; and nurture civil society, such as trade and professional unions and a free press. At issue was whether, and to what extent, the Clinton administration should undertake such efforts, and, more particularly, whether military forces stationed in the Balkans were the appropriate vehicles for doing so. The American defeat of the Taliban, followed by the invasion of Iraq, added more urgency to these debates. In both cases, the Bush administration undertook, with the support of many governments but with America clearly in the lead, to rebuild both states. Washington met with some initial success in Afghanistan, though in fact nation-building was a misnomer with respect to that country. Afghanistan had been an independent state several decades before the United States came into being. What Afghanistan required, and its leadership requested, was support for the central government’s attempts to assert its authority throughout the country. In addition, Kabul sought help in its efforts to bolster its economy and educate its populace. Initially, American-led efforts met with success. Moreover, the relatively small military presence in the country ensured that it was traditional aid organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, as well as other civilian agencies, such as Save the Children and Oxfam, that took the lead in helping to put Afghanistan back on its feet. The war in Iraq diverted American attention from Afghanistan, as Washington sought to stabilize and then “rebuild” that troubled country. Once again it was Washington that led an international coalition, smaller and less capable than that in Afghanistan, first to defeat Saddam’s forces, and then to reconstruct the country. In Iraq, however, the large American military presence led those in uniform to take the lead in the nation-building effort. In addition to the difficulties that the military faced in carrying out missions for which they had not actually trained, Washington had to confront the reality that, after nearly 70 years of independence, Iraqis remained more loyal to their tribes, ethnic groups, and co-religionists than to what was, after all, an artificially created state. Finally, security issues overshadowed development programs, and both in Iraq, and increasingly in Afghanistan once a revived Taliban threatened that country’s stability, the results were poorly planned projects that led to tens of billions of dollars in waste, fraud, and abuse. To be fair, despite the Taliban’s resurgence and the presence of tens of thousands of American and coalition troops in Afghanistan, Washington and its partners achieved considerable progress in some areas, notably education for men and women. Far less success was achieved with respect to economic development, where drugs once again became the country’s major export; good governance, where corruption was rampant; rule of law (as understood in the West), where in many parts of the country Shari'a (Islamic law) and/or tribal law was very much in force; and civilian control of the military, when in fact private armies continued to function. Washington achieved even less in Iraq, which currently is on the verge of returning to the pre-World War I boundaries that divided the country into three Ottoman provinces. In light of recent experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and to some extent in Bosnia, where stability remains fragile, it is worth asking once again whether the United States is best suited to lead international efforts to build nations—or more accurately, states—that may or may not be nation-states. Certainly, in the case of artificial creations such as former Ottoman provinces and some African states, the answer should be a resounding “no.” Americans are notorious for their lack of a sense of history and inability to acquire foreign languages; both are critical to understanding the dynamics of any society. In addition, many Americans are of the view that what is good for them is ipso facto good for others. A prime example of this misapprehension, for that is what it is, is the notion of spreading democracy worldwide. For most in the developing world, other than Western-educated elites, democracy is a lower priority than security, housing, food, and educational opportunities for the next generation. Similarly, while Americans and other Westerners might recoil at the thought, Shari'a law is the rule of law; indeed, Shari'a antedates the Magna Carta by centuries. For this reason, it should come as no surprise that societies that long have lived under Shari'a in full or partial form do not necessarily respond well when Americans speak of imparting to them notions of the rule of law. Moreover, while it is understandable that the U.S. military often takes on civil missions when operating in societies threatened by civil strife, that does not necessarily mean that it should. To the extent that host governments welcome outside assistance, whether for economic or other forms of development, Washington should take a back seat to other states—such as Britain, France, and Turkey—whose personnel have greater historical, linguistic, and/or cultural familiarity with the needs of those they seek to assist, or states like Sweden and Australia that are not perceived to have an ideological agenda. Taking a back seat in development might be something akin to “leading from behind,” a concept that many argue has been misapplied in the military sphere. In any event, letting others lead does not equate with “nation-building at home.” The latter is neither more nor less than prettified isolationism. America has too many interests, too many commitments, and too many allies and friends worldwide to allow itself the luxury of turning away from the needs of those in other regions and states. At the same time, it should recognize its own limitations; America has many strengths, but nation-building is not one of them.

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Dov S. Zakheim was the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) from 2001-2004 and civilian coordinator for Afghan reconstruction from 2002-2004. He is a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.