The Foreign Policy Essay: Wolves Who Are Lonely
Editor's Note: “Lone wolf” terrorists—those who strike on their own without links to an established organization—are a nightmare for counterterrorism officials. They have no ranks to be penetrated, and often the only time they appear on the radar screen is after they have launched a bloody attack. But Michael Becker, a Ph.D. student at Northeastern University, urges us all to take a deep breath. Becker contends that the threat is easily exaggerated and that most lone wolves, most of the time, pose at most a limited danger.
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Published by The Lawfare Institute
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Editor's Note: “Lone wolf” terrorists—those who strike on their own without links to an established organization—are a nightmare for counterterrorism officials. They have no ranks to be penetrated, and often the only time they appear on the radar screen is after they have launched a bloody attack. But Michael Becker, a Ph.D. student at Northeastern University, urges us all to take a deep breath. Becker contends that the threat is easily exaggerated and that most lone wolves, most of the time, pose at most a limited danger.
The concern about lone-wolf terrorism pervades much of the U.S. national security establishment. President Obama, former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, and current DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, among others, have cited lone wolves as one of the gravest potential threats to U.S. security. They point to the rise of social media and terrorist propaganda, like the sophisticated videos produced by the Islamic State, and express concern that socially isolated individuals can become radicalized with troubling ease.
It is true that lone-wolf terrorism against the United States has become more common in the past several years. And several lone-actor attacks—including the 2011 shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords, which left six dead, and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, which killed 13—have had deadly and tragic consequences. Concurrently, there has been little success in terms of identifying a lone wolf “profile.” They can be young or old; black or white; radical Islamists, right-wing extremists, anti-Semites, militant environmentalists, or of another ideological persuasion altogether. Given the diversity of their backgrounds, how can such a protean enemy be countered?
I recently undertook an analysis of 84 lone-wolf attacks that occurred in the United States between 1940 and 2012 in an effort to identify patterns in the targets that lone wolves chose. I came away with several findings that have important national security implications. First, similar to our recent experience with the Ebola outbreak, the fear of the thing is usually worse than the thing itself. Few lone-wolf attacks in the United States actually kill anyone, and many others only succeed in killing one person: the lone wolf himself (they are almost invariably men). Many lone wolves are incompetent loners with no experience discharging a bomb or firearm; oftentimes they exhibit behavior that, in retrospect, is more bizarre and sad than frightening. Take Dwight Watson, a.k.a. the “Tractor Man.” In 2003, Watson drove his tractor to Washington, D.C., and threatened to blow up explosives near the National Mall. After two days, he surrendered unceremoniously and it was revealed that he never had any weapons at all.
Part of the reason for the low casualty rate in lone-wolf attacks is that unlike groups such al-Qaeda that have significant resources at their disposal and, even more important, a sophisticated division of labor, lone wolves have to do all the work of terrorism themselves—finding a target, planning an attack, gathering supplies, doing reconnaissance, actually carrying out the attack, and possibly executing an escape plan. This disadvantage is reflected in the weapons most lone wolves choose: firearms. Globally, at the organizational level, most terrorist attacks are bombings, but lone wolves mainly choose guns. In part, this is because guns can more easily be attained than bombs in the United States, but lone wolves’ preference for firearms obtains globally as well, suggesting it is driven by their lack of facility with explosives. And a lone gunman—while still potentially able to cause multiple casualties—is likely to produce fewer fatalities than a well-made and well-placed bomb.
Another significant characteristic of lone wolves is their limited ability to select meaningful targets. The expertise needed to conduct a successful attack on a hardened target—not an easy task—is reflected in the targets most lone wolves choose and how they conduct themselves. Lone wolves tend to choose unhardened, undefended targets like college campuses, churches, and local government buildings. Only rarely do they opt for significant or symbolic targets like the National Mall. I suspect that this tendency is due to two factors: the more personal motives that—alongside their political ideologies—inform lone wolves’ violent tendencies; and the desire to carry out a successful attack, a task made easier by choosing a softer target. The targets lone wolves choose tend to be congruent with the ideologies that they say motivate them: so anti-abortion lone wolves go after clinics or doctors who perform abortions, while right-wing extremists target government buildings and officials. What is even more striking is that these small-ball targets tend to be found in or near places well known to perpetrators—the square in their hometown, the synagogue they pass on their way to work, etc. Their daily routines, in other words, are usually the scene of the crime.
What should all these patterns mean to counterterrorism officials? They indicate most notably that lone wolves are not as fearsome as they are often made out to be. Lone wolves are only rarely deadly. What is more, when they do manage to kill people, their incompetence and reliance on firearms usually limit the number of deaths. As a result, policymakers’ concern about lone wolves is probably overblown, and the allocation of resources for counterterrorism purposes should take account of this. In some sense, this requires us to learn to live with the existence of lone-wolf terrorism. Even if the threat were more severe, there are too many potential targets and too many potential lone wolves to expect law enforcement to monitor, detect, and interdict them all.
To the extent that lone-wolf terrorism can be contained, the focus must be local. Lone wolves tend to choose familiar, often personal targets that they identify based on their particular ideology. The result of these patterns is that traditional counterterrorism—target hardening, detection and interdiction, etc.—is of limited use against lone wolves, especially at the federal level. More relevant, given lone wolves’ local focus, are efforts by communities to monitor and preempt potentially radical individuals before they get a chance to carry out deadly attacks.
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Militants from the group known as the Islamic State recently called for individuals not directly affiliated with the organization to carry out attacks against targets in Western countries. This call for “lone wolf” attacks echoes those issued in the past by al-Qaeda exhorting “one brother or a few of the brothers” to strike the United States “here and there.” In one sense, these calls-to-arms represent a sign of weakness on the part of terrorists. Thanks to U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have been unable to directly orchestrate an attack on the U.S. homeland since September 11, 2001. They have been trying instead to inspire Americans sympathetic to their cause to carry out attacks. In another sense, though, lone wolves pose a frightening specter to Americans: such attackers can potentially manifest as anyone, they can strike anywhere, and since by definition they don’t communicate with other terrorists, they are much harder to detect or stop. But much of the fear surrounding lone wolves is unwarranted and based on ignorance of how they operate. My research shows that lone-actor terrorists tend to conform to certain distinct patterns that can be useful in preventing future attacks. Perhaps more important, my findings indicate that lone wolves are not nearly as threatening as either their name or the hype around them suggest.
The concern about lone-wolf terrorism pervades much of the U.S. national security establishment. President Obama, former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, and current DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, among others, have cited lone wolves as one of the gravest potential threats to U.S. security. They point to the rise of social media and terrorist propaganda, like the sophisticated videos produced by the Islamic State, and express concern that socially isolated individuals can become radicalized with troubling ease.
It is true that lone-wolf terrorism against the United States has become more common in the past several years. And several lone-actor attacks—including the 2011 shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords, which left six dead, and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, which killed 13—have had deadly and tragic consequences. Concurrently, there has been little success in terms of identifying a lone wolf “profile.” They can be young or old; black or white; radical Islamists, right-wing extremists, anti-Semites, militant environmentalists, or of another ideological persuasion altogether. Given the diversity of their backgrounds, how can such a protean enemy be countered?
I recently undertook an analysis of 84 lone-wolf attacks that occurred in the United States between 1940 and 2012 in an effort to identify patterns in the targets that lone wolves chose. I came away with several findings that have important national security implications. First, similar to our recent experience with the Ebola outbreak, the fear of the thing is usually worse than the thing itself. Few lone-wolf attacks in the United States actually kill anyone, and many others only succeed in killing one person: the lone wolf himself (they are almost invariably men). Many lone wolves are incompetent loners with no experience discharging a bomb or firearm; oftentimes they exhibit behavior that, in retrospect, is more bizarre and sad than frightening. Take Dwight Watson, a.k.a. the “Tractor Man.” In 2003, Watson drove his tractor to Washington, D.C., and threatened to blow up explosives near the National Mall. After two days, he surrendered unceremoniously and it was revealed that he never had any weapons at all.
Part of the reason for the low casualty rate in lone-wolf attacks is that unlike groups such al-Qaeda that have significant resources at their disposal and, even more important, a sophisticated division of labor, lone wolves have to do all the work of terrorism themselves—finding a target, planning an attack, gathering supplies, doing reconnaissance, actually carrying out the attack, and possibly executing an escape plan. This disadvantage is reflected in the weapons most lone wolves choose: firearms. Globally, at the organizational level, most terrorist attacks are bombings, but lone wolves mainly choose guns. In part, this is because guns can more easily be attained than bombs in the United States, but lone wolves’ preference for firearms obtains globally as well, suggesting it is driven by their lack of facility with explosives. And a lone gunman—while still potentially able to cause multiple casualties—is likely to produce fewer fatalities than a well-made and well-placed bomb.
Another significant characteristic of lone wolves is their limited ability to select meaningful targets. The expertise needed to conduct a successful attack on a hardened target—not an easy task—is reflected in the targets most lone wolves choose and how they conduct themselves. Lone wolves tend to choose unhardened, undefended targets like college campuses, churches, and local government buildings. Only rarely do they opt for significant or symbolic targets like the National Mall. I suspect that this tendency is due to two factors: the more personal motives that—alongside their political ideologies—inform lone wolves’ violent tendencies; and the desire to carry out a successful attack, a task made easier by choosing a softer target. The targets lone wolves choose tend to be congruent with the ideologies that they say motivate them: so anti-abortion lone wolves go after clinics or doctors who perform abortions, while right-wing extremists target government buildings and officials. What is even more striking is that these small-ball targets tend to be found in or near places well known to perpetrators—the square in their hometown, the synagogue they pass on their way to work, etc. Their daily routines, in other words, are usually the scene of the crime.
What should all these patterns mean to counterterrorism officials? They indicate most notably that lone wolves are not as fearsome as they are often made out to be. Lone wolves are only rarely deadly. What is more, when they do manage to kill people, their incompetence and reliance on firearms usually limit the number of deaths. As a result, policymakers’ concern about lone wolves is probably overblown, and the allocation of resources for counterterrorism purposes should take account of this. In some sense, this requires us to learn to live with the existence of lone-wolf terrorism. Even if the threat were more severe, there are too many potential targets and too many potential lone wolves to expect law enforcement to monitor, detect, and interdict them all.
To the extent that lone-wolf terrorism can be contained, the focus must be local. Lone wolves tend to choose familiar, often personal targets that they identify based on their particular ideology. The result of these patterns is that traditional counterterrorism—target hardening, detection and interdiction, etc.—is of limited use against lone wolves, especially at the federal level. More relevant, given lone wolves’ local focus, are efforts by communities to monitor and preempt potentially radical individuals before they get a chance to carry out deadly attacks.
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Michael Becker is a Ph.D. student in political science at Northeastern University. His research focuses on international security, conflict, and terrorism. He can be reached at becker.m@husky.neu.edu.
