Governing a Distributed Network: Common Goods and Emergence

In May I will be participating in a conference at the Hague Institute for Global Justice.  Part of the Global Governance Reform Initiative, the conference is entitled "The Future of Cyber Governance" and will address questions relating to the internationalization of network governance questions.  My own contribution builds on some of the thoughts I've already expressed regarding the ICANN/IANA transition, and is now available on SSRN.  It's entitled: Governing a Distributed Network: Common Goods and Emergence.  This is a draft paper that will be subject to feedback at the conference and I welcome Lawfare readers' feedback as well -- and any Lawfare readers in Europe are, of course, welcome to attend the conference.  Here is the abstract of the paper:

The trend in the development of international internet governance is to focus on structures that foster greater centralized control of the domain. Issues for discussion typically revolve around how strongly new governance structures should enable the engagement of governmental institutions (both individual nations and multilateral organizations) and whether and the extent to which non-governmental stakeholders should have influence. The thesis of this paper is that the focus on centralization reflects an unfortunate misapprehension of the nature of the cyber domain – a misapprehension that, if acted upon can only lead to a cyber domain that is less open, less accessible, less transparent, and less transformative. A better instinct is to develop a governance architecture that is adapted to the distributed and dynamic nature of the network that we seek to govern. In architecture, form follows function.   Likewise, in governance, the structures of control ought to mirror the institutions subject to that control. Thus, this paper will examine the types of global cyber governance arrangements that are capable of providing effective guidance and standard setting within the context of a network that is inherently decentralized.   Only these sorts of structures will enable cyberspace as a domain of global innovation and opportunity. The examination of this issue will proceed in three parts:

• Part I of this paper will examine the nature of the cyber domain, demonstrating its fundamentally internationalized and decentralized nature.

• Part II examine relevant existing economic and social theoretical structures that deal with distributed networks. Drawing principally from theories of common pool resources and emergence we develop a better understanding of exactly what guidance and standards (if any) are appropriate for the cyber domain. The working hypothesis for this examination is that the domain is systematically fostering disintermediation – the degrading of traditional intermediary institutions that served as soft mechanisms for controlling human interactions. The result is an erosion of centralized authority and an empowerment of individual independence and capacity.

• Part III of this paper derives from this analysis concrete recommendations for improving internet governance. Again, the working hypothesis is that these recommendations will focus on enhancing non-regulatory frameworks, mostly outside the existing structures of sovereign state control.   Mechanisms for distributed decision-making and control will be considered as a means of increasing the openness of the network to information, increasing human access to the network, sustaining transparency of governance (both of the network itself and of non-network institutions), and enhancing economic development through increased innovation and technological evolution. The critical characteristics of successful network governance will be structures that foster serendipity and change.