How to Think about the Fall of Assad

Bashar al-Assad, one of the world’s most brutal dictators, is about to fall.

After living through more than a decade of civil war, jubilant Syrians are toppling statues of Assad and freeing captives from his brutal prisons. On the other hand, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, and the group he leads, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Organization for the Liberation of Greater Syria, are designated as terrorists by the United States and may take over all or part of a state at the heart of the Middle East.

Should Americans, who may recall how the removal of a bloodthirsty dictator in Iraq opened the door for a range of terrorist groups there, rejoice or worry?

U.S. officials contend with increasing confidence that Assad’s regime will fall. Syrian rebels have made stunning advances in the past week, retaking major cities like Aleppo and Hama, as well as numerous other provincial capitals. They are liberating Homs and, in so doing, separating the heartland of Assad’s supporters along the Syrian coast from the capital in Damascus. Some rebels are on the outskirts of the capital itself, and many Syrian army soldiers are deserting. In other parts of the country, other rebel groups are seizing the day, taking more territory from the regime as its forces collapse. Russia, whose military support and air power helped the regime survive in the past, has urged its nationals to leave the country, and Iran, Syria’s most important ally, is evacuating some of its military leaders. Members of Bashar’s own family have fled to Russia.

Though the situation looks dire for Assad, his regime still has some fighting power, and the rebels are far from united and may succumb to infighting. The deployment of the regime’s most dependable military units may stem the flood of desertion, and even if it falls the result may be cantonization rather than the victory of one particular rebel group. However, the regime faces tremendous setbacks, and the possibility of complete collapse of the government and its replacement by an HTS-led regime in much of the country is significant. Americans should both rejoice at his end yet recognize that his fall opens up new dangers for the region and for U.S. interests there.

An Unfrozen Conflict

The Syrian civil war began in 2011 after the regime cracked down on widespread peaceful protests. These were part of the broader Arab spring that had led to the fall of dictators in Egypt, Tunisia, and other countries. In Syria, the regime faced a massive uprising that engulfed much of the country but eventually clawed back power. The war claimed over 500,000 Syrian lives and displaced more than half the country’s population. Although hatred of the regime was high, the Syrian opposition was fragmented. It included a wide range of groups: some nationalistic, some with local ambitions, and a few tied to al-Qaeda and the broader global jihadist movement.

Russia, Iran, and Iran’s paramilitary ally, the Lebanese Hezbollah, all played important roles in providing military power that helped the Assad regime survive. The opposition received support at times from Turkey, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other countries, though the opposition’s allies were not as united or committed as those bolstering the Assad regime.

In recent years, the conflict seemed stalemated, with the Assad regime in the better position. Turkey, working with local Syrian rebels, controlled Syrian territory along its border. The predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) also controlled territory near the Turkish border, a constant concern for Ankara, which saw the SDF as tied to Turkey’s own Kurdish rebel group. The SDF, however, proved skilled fighters, and they worked closely with the United States to fight the Islamic State, which for several years controlled large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria but was steadily beaten back by an international coalition led by the United States along with local Iraqi and Syrian (primarily SDF) forces. Yet the Assad regime controlled Damascus as well as most major cities, leaving much of the world with the impression that it had won the civil war.

In reality, the conflict was never frozen in terms of actual fighting and lethality. Syria and the different rebel groups regularly attacked each other, Turkey attacked Kurdish forces, Israel attacked Iranian and Hezbollah forces in Syria, and the United States, working with local groups, regularly struck at Islamic State forces. Yet the frontlines seemed to barely move. 

All that changed, dramatically, in the past week. Syrian regime forces, which seemed strong, turned out to be brittle and collapsed in the face of the HTS-led offensive. The Israeli destruction of Hezbollah, Iran’s own conflict with Israel, and Russia’s war in Ukraine meant that the foreign props to the Assad regime were largely gone. The regime had stagnated in a mire of corruption and state-sponsored narcotics trafficking, while HTS in particular invested in military performance. As the respected Syria analyst Charles Lister notes in Foreign Policy:

HTS, in particular, has established entirely new units that have arguably changed the game on the battlefield in recent days. The group’s special forces-type unit, known as Asaib al-Hamra (or Red Bands), has been the tip of the spear of daytime operations, while its Saraya al-Harari (or Thermal Brigade) has made consequential gains every night for a week, with every one of its roughly 500 fighters carrying weapons equipped with night-vision scopes, according to the group.

While another HTS brigade known as the Kataib Shaheen has taken out heavy regime weaponry across the front lines, the group has also made use of indigenously produced cruise missiles, whose explosive power is the equivalent to a suicide truck bomb. With fleets of reconnaissance drones in the air 24/7, HTS and its other allies have completely outperformed Syria’s military.

What Is HTS, and What Is Its Relationship to Jihadist Groups?

HTS grew out of Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliate tied to the group’s Iraq branch set up to exploit the civil war in Syria. The group began operating in Syria shortly after the civil war began, and when the United States first designated the group in 2012, it highlighted the organization's “violent, sectarian vision.” The jihadists divided repeatedly, most notably with the Islamic State splitting from Jabhat al-Nusra in 2013 and engaging in a bloody conflict with its al-Qaeda rival. The remnants of Nusra, including Jolani, stayed loyal to al-Qaeda initially but then, in 2016, publicly split with it. After a few name changes, in 2017 Jolani announced the formation of HTS. Although HTS’ split from al-Qaeda is real, the United States designated it again in 2018 under the umbrella of its Nusra designation.

HTS remains an extreme fundamentalist organization, but it has repeatedly tried to signal that it opposes external terrorist attacks and that it rejects an Islamic State-style caliphate. In areas HTS has controlled, it has fought against al-Qaeda and Islamic State remnants. Jolani has tried to reassure Christian and Druze leaders, claimed that terrorism only “brings nothing but destruction and failure,” denounced Islamic State atrocities against the Kurds, and noted that “diversity is a strength.” 

These and other examples illustrate Jolani’s serious commitment to portraying his organization as moderate. Yet his true agenda in power is unknown, and his background and the beliefs of the HTS rank-and-file remain concerning. The State Department reports that HTS has at times abused minorities, including seizing the property of displaced Syrian Christians, and some reporting indicates that Christians are tolerated but restricted: They can hold masses, for example, but they cannot ring church bells. 

In some ways, Jolani’s surface moderation is a U.S. policy success. HTS’s rejection of al-Qaeda and external operations was done in part due to U.S. pressure on all Syrian groups to reject any organization with ties to al-Qaeda. Jolani has sought to be removed from U.S. terrorism lists and engage with U.S. regional partners.

Jolani’s actual moderation is unclear. There are legitimate worries that he has a hidden agenda that may be revealed when the group controls Syria. In any event, HTS’s ideology is intolerant, and its control of Syria is authoritarian, with the group detaining journalists and others who criticize its rule. 

A Resurgent Islamic State?

A particular concern for the United States and many of its allies is the possibility of a stronger Islamic State. Before the rebel advances, the group was on pace to double the number of its operations in Iraq and Syria. It also had training camps in remote parts of Syria and is rebuilding its military power. It is important to recognize, however, that the Islamic State is still a shadow of what it was at its peak in 2014 and 2015 and that it has not been effective in conducting operations in the United States and Europe in recent years.

For now, it is unlikely that an HTS-led government would tolerate a major Islamic State presence in areas it controls. The internecine jihadist conflicts of the past have left bad blood, and HTS for now is focused on projecting an image of relative moderation to the world.

Nevertheless, the Islamic State may benefit from the latest upheaval. At the very least, HTS, the SDF, and other foes will be focused on seizing territory and making the best of the regime’s collapse, with less focus on stopping the Islamic State. The Islamic State may find new areas of operation where government control is weak or nonexistent.

The Changing Regional Balance of Power

The collapsing Assad regime and the triumph of HTS and other Syrian opposition groups is another blow against Iran and its allies. Although the immediate aftermath of the Hamas terrorist attacks of Oct. 7, 2023, bolstered Iran, which was able to portray itself and its allies as the leaders of the anti-Israel, anti-U.S. front, recent months have been a disaster for Tehran. Israel devastated Hamas, one of Iran’s allies, and then destroyed much of Hezbollah’s power, suffering relatively few losses against this once-vaunted group, which accepted a ceasefire against Israel despite its previous pledge to remain in the fight as long as Hamas was under attack. Iran launched several large drone and missile salvos against Israel to little effect, while Israel’s response—precise and understated—highlighted Iran’s military vulnerabilities.

Syria is one of Iran’s most important allies. It’s also one of Iran’s only allies. The relationship goes back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the shared animosity toward the United States and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In the decades that have followed, they have worked together against Israel, including supporting Hezbollah, and otherwise see themselves as aligned against the United States and its regional partners. The loss of Syria would also make it harder for Iran to exert influence next door in Lebanon and help Hezbollah rebuild.

Turkey may be one of the geopolitical winners from Assad’s collapse. It is influential with most of the Syrian opposition groups, and it would be able to act against Syria’s Kurds or others in the country with little counterweight. Although HTS and Turkey have different ideologies, the pragmatic Jolani likely recognizes the need to work with Ankara.

The collapse of Assad, for now, benefits Israel—but this may change in the long term. Although Assad was often a cautious dictator and his father pursued serious peace negotiations, the regime was nevertheless an Israeli enemy. Its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon helped the group remain one of Israel’s most dangerous foes, and Damascus’s close ties to Iran allowed Tehran to have a military presence near the border with Israel. HTS, however, is no friend of Israel, and its leaders may prove more aggressive than the more cautious Assad.

What Is Best for the United States?

The United States is choosing between bad options in Syria. On the one hand, the Assad regime is a brutal dictatorship that supports terrorist groups like Hezbollah and has close ties to Iran and Russia. It’s hard to feel any regret at its collapse. On the other hand, HTS is at best authoritarian with an extremist, anti-U.S. ideology, even if it opposes terrorist attacks on the United States, cracks down on al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in areas it controls, and is pragmatic in its overall foreign policy. 

Of the two, the bigger danger to U.S. interests, for now, is the Assad regime with its close ties to Tehran and Moscow. Jolani’s pragmatism, moreover, suggests he can adjust his foreign policy and understands the nature of U.S. red lines.

This initial assessment may be wrong, however, and the situation requires constant monitoring and testing. The United States should share information on any al-Qaeda or Islamic State activity in HTS-controlled areas with the expectation that the group will crack down on them. It should also constantly monitor HTS to make sure that opposition to terrorism and a modicum of respect for Syria’s Christian and other minority communities continue. The United States should keep HTS on its terrorism list for now but make clear that this could change depending on how the group behaves in the areas it controls.

The U.S. military presence of around 2,500 troops in Iraq and 900 in Syria remains vital for U.S. interests at this turbulent time. Part of their purpose is simply to be an instrument against currently unknown dangers—the Syrian conflict could morph in numerous, unpredictable ways, and having some capability in the region and local connections may prove invaluable. The forces are also necessary to help local allies against an Islamic State resurgence and to remind HTS that the United States can wield a stick if necessary.

The United States, however, should also recognize that its own influence is limited. The troop presence in Syria is small, and their reach and overall combat power are limited. Among the opposition, the United States has influence over only the SDF, with the other main factions likely to go their own ways.

Because of this limited influence, it is vital for the United States to work closely with Israel, Turkey, and other key regional partners. These countries have different interests and influence, but groups like HTS are far more likely to heed concerted pressure. 

In its last days, the Biden administration should increase the intelligence prioritization of the Syria conflict, reach out to regional partners—especially Turkey, where relations have been strained—to lay out common interests and expectations, and make clear its commitment to a continued U.S. military presence in the region. 

President Trump has already tweeted, “THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT. LET IT PLAY OUT. DO NOT GET INVOLVED!” Doing nothing, however, would be a mistake. Presidents Obama and Biden, and Trump in his first term, all tried to reduce U.S. involvement in the Middle East, only to be sucked in over concerns about Iran, terrorism, the threat to Israel, and general instability. The United States cannot control events in Syria, but it should use what influence it has to try to reduce the threats to its interests.

The chaotic situation, however, will require constant revisions to U.S. policy. There may be genuine opportunities with the fall of the brutal, anti-U.S. dictatorship. But the Middle East, both when the United States is involved and when it tries to avoid involvement, has a history of bad situations becoming even worse.