Improving U.S. Intelligence Sharing With Allies and Partners

The Trump administration’s recent decision to cut off intelligence sharing with Ukraine will get less attention than its halting of military aid, but it will also be consequential. If anything, the United States should be increasing intelligence cooperation not only with Ukraine, but also with other key partners.

Intelligence sharing is a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to ensure its own security and that of key allies and partners. Effective sharing enhances strategic coordination, enables timely responses to threats, and strengthens trust between nations. Despite its importance, intelligence sharing does not live up to its potential. As Sean Corbett and James Danoy—former senior British and U.S. intelligence officials, respectively—have written, “With few exceptions, and despite the best of intentions, intelligence sharing is uneven, remains the exception rather than the norm, and the prospect of simultaneity at the point of need is remote.” Drawing on a larger research project that drew heavily on interviews with U.S. and allied officials and experts, this piece critically examines the current state of U.S. intelligence sharing, identifies key challenges, and proposes solutions to improve the effectiveness of these partnerships.

As a former head of the U.K. Secret Intelligence Service put it, intelligence is “a team sport.” The U.S. intelligence community operates within a complex web of alliances, including the Five Eyes (composed of the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom). The Five Eyes, however, are an exception: Bilateral cooperation is the preferred form of intelligence liaison, primarily for security reasons. The more widely information is disseminated, the more likely it is to be revealed through spying, media leaks, or other unauthorized disclosures.

Intelligence relationships help preempt threats ranging from terrorism to cyber and conventional war. Intelligence collaboration allows for resource pooling, which reduces individual states’ intelligence burdens. Sharing also lays the groundwork for shared threat perceptions, which in turn makes cooperation and planning easier. Sharing also expands collection opportunities. For example, some partner states have a presence in countries like Iran, which gives them intelligence reach where it is denied to any official Americans. Further, intelligence-sharing agreements reinforce alliances and serve as instruments of diplomatic engagement, signaling commitment and trust.

The impact of sharing failures, though difficult to measure, can be felt in several pernicious ways. Allies and partners may be slow to realize dangers posed by revisionist powers such as China, Russia, and Iran. Advanced planning based on varied intelligence assessments can hinder cooperation in a crisis. As one European official told me, “All plans depend on intelligence. Bad intelligence means bad plans.” An ineffective division of labor may cause collection and analysis to suffer from both gaps and overlap. Information may be shared too slowly to matter, especially in a rapidly changing situation. Intelligence sharing can bolster overall diplomacy between allies; without it, an important pillar of that relationship is weakened.

Intelligence sharing, however, is governed by a labyrinth of policies, laws, and bureaucratic frameworks that can hinder timely information exchange. U.S. prioritization in both collection and sharing is often unclear, confusing both U.S. and allied officials. The classification system, such as the U.S. marking of “NOFORN” (not releasable to foreign nationals), often prevents intelligence dissemination, even to close allies. The United States, as one U.S. official put it, “does not have any info sharing policies at all. It has information security policies and information sharing exceptions to these policies.” In addition, the system itself has uneven and confusing standards and much harsher penalties for over-sharing than for under-sharing, making the default to NOFORN even more likely and “wild overclassification” common, as one U.S. official told me.

Trust is the bedrock of intelligence collaboration. Henry Kissinger once remarked that “there is no such thing as friendly intelligence agencies. There are only the intelligence agencies of friendly powers.” Beyond spying, concerns over leaks, misuse, or politicization of shared intelligence can also erode trust. The Snowden disclosures in 2013, for example, strained relations between the U.S. and some of its closest allies, highlighting vulnerabilities in intelligence handling. Another problem is the global nature of U.S. interests: European officials worry that the United States will focus too much on Asia, and Asian partners worry the United States will focus too much on Europe.

Intelligence sharing is increasingly dependent on secure and interoperable technical systems. However, technological disparities among allies, coupled with differing cybersecurity standards, create significant interoperability challenges. As one Five Eyes official told me, “Just because we have an intelligence sharing agreement doesn’t mean we have intelligence sharing systems.” The absence of standardized data-sharing protocols and encrypted communication systems further exacerbates inefficiencies in real-time intelligence dissemination.

Differences in intelligence cultures and bureaucratic structures across nations complicate collaboration. While the U.S. intelligence community operates under a relatively centralized framework, despite the bureaucratic weakness of the director of national intelligence, other countries have even more balkanized systems, and many services are politicized. Divergent priorities and intelligence methodologies can hinder seamless integration and coordination. Sir Stephen Lander, the former director general of the U.K. Security Service, remarked in 2004 that some countries “collect haystacks and store them, while others collect hay and store needles, while others again only ever collect needles and not very many of them. The risk of sharing haystacks with needle keepers is that they would not be able to use the material effectively or would be swamped.”

Balancing security and sharing is perhaps the most difficult task and one with no easy answer. China and Russia have excellent intelligence services, and allies and partners (and the United States) are vulnerable to penetration as well as leaks and other accidental releases. Intelligence sharing necessitates a delicate balance between protecting sensitive sources and methods while ensuring that actionable intelligence reaches key partners. Overclassification, often driven by risk aversion, limits the utility of shared intelligence and delays critical decision-making processes. Conversely, excessive transparency risks exposing intelligence assets and compromising national security interests.

Modernizing classification policies is imperative, recognizing that the skill of Russian and Chinese intelligence agencies is a serious challenge and that more sharing entails more risk. The U.S. should implement a tiered classification system that facilitates selective sharing with trusted allies, reducing the use of NOFORN and ensuring that crucial intelligence is not unnecessarily withheld. Additionally, expanding training for U.S. and allied officials, increasing preapproved intelligence-sharing agreements, and establishing clear pathways for automatic and real-time intelligence exchange can reduce bureaucratic delays.

Building stronger institutional mechanisms to foster trust and reciprocity is essential. The U.S. can establish standing intelligence-sharing committees within existing partnerships, which would steadily build both the capacity of partners and the procedures and trust necessary for intelligence sharing, recognizing that even clear successes like the Five Eyes have regularly had security and other problems. However, given the reality that China is likely to be the focus of U.S. intelligence for many years, it is imperative that the United States deepen its partnerships with Japan, South Korea, and other countries in Asia. Starting with less sensitive information and building security procedures and trust from there is a logical way to begin. So too is sharing more open-source information with countries where the risk is high and security procedures are weak.

Cultural and procedural differences can be addressed through joint training programs and intelligence personnel exchanges. More foreign disclosure officers and others dedicated to sharing are vital. It is also important to increase the number of U.S. liaison officers who can speak the languages of key U.S. partners and thus function more effectively within their systems.

Addressing policy constraints, building trust-based mechanisms, and harmonizing intelligence standards are critical to improving intelligence collaboration. While significant progress has been made, intelligence sharing must be upgraded against emerging security threats if the United States and its allies and partners are to remain secure.

Editor’s Note: Funding for this research was provided by the Smith Richardson Foundation.