Lawfare Daily: Minna Ålander on Finland, NATO, and the Russian Threat

[Intro]

Minna Ålander: So there's a lot of those things that Finland kept in place because that was sort of like the expectation. Obviously everything that is happening in Ukraine in terms of the automatic systems is like a novelty and that there's like a lot of lessons for Finland to learn as well, but like on the more sort of like traditional side of things, Finland is pretty well prepared for this type of warfare.

Anastasiia Lapatina: It's The Lawfare Podcast. I'm Anastasiia Lapatina, Ukraine Fellow at Lawfare, with Minna Ålander, an associate fellow at Chatham House Europe program.

Minna Ålander: One could hope that there is some level of uncertainty about, like, a possible U.S. response left, although it looks increasingly unlikely that they would really do anything to help their European allies in, in case of war.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I spoke to Minna about Russia's buildup of military infrastructure along Europe's borders and what the European countries are doing to prepare for a potential clash with Russia.

[Main podcast]

So there's been some really interesting reporting in the past few weeks about the potential confrontation between Russia and NATO. The Wall Street Journal published a piece called “The Russian Military Moves that Have Europe On Edge” describing how Russia has been expanding military bases and infrastructure along its border with Finland, Norway, and the Baltic states, and the Economist published a few pieces analyzing Russian capabilities and maybe Russia's intent to challenge NATO in the coming years.

And you analyzed this and wrote about this as well in your Substack column called the Europe Dispatch. So I wanted to bring you on to kind of unpack all of it. So could you just summarize a bit of, of this reporting and developments, what kind of buildup are we seeing, you know, in Russia near, near Europe?

Minna Ålander: First of all, thanks a lot for having me again on, on the podcast. And maybe just to give a little bit of background why this is relevant, basically why this is a sign of something potentially sort of brewing on the Russian side of the border.

The background is that, that Russia has actually, in the past years since its full scale invasion of Ukraine, pulled most of its troops and equipment away from, for example, the Finnish border, out of those spaces that are close to the Finnish border and into Ukraine. So in, in July 2024, it was reported by the Finnish public broadcaster that according to estimates of the Finnish intelligence service, as much as 80% of troops and equipment were pulled away from the Finnish border. So there was like 80% less military capability at the Finnish border.

So this was interesting for especially the reason that Russia, by doing this basically called its own bluff on this whole narrative that NATO is a threat because like obviously all of this happened after Finland applied for the NATO membership and became a member. So if there was such an acute threat by NATO, posed by NATO, Russia would hardly have like emptied its border near NATO border.

Anyway, so this was the, the situation last year in the summer. What we are now seeing is as you rightly mentioned infrastructure buildup. So this has been observed, for example, by the, by the Finnish Intelligence Services and, and the Finnish Defense Forces and other analysts, also analysts sort of following, following the situation through satellite imagery.

And how it looks like is that Russia has, on the one hand started building partly completely new railway infrastructure. And this is taking place really from all the way up north close to the Norwegian border, down the Finnish border, and to like Estonia and, and the Baltic states. Russia has been also in the south, for example, been sort of like connecting and integrating its logistics, meaning roads and railways, with Belarus, and it has been generally improving the, the existing infrastructure as well.

And then we have seen also that military bases in the vicinity of the border have also seen some improvements, like, for example, new storage halls which make it also harder to assess like what's in there potentially, because like Russians used to be very sort of like, relaxed about like just leaving their tanks and other stuff out in the open, so you could really nicely see the number of tanks in a base, like from satellite pictures. So this is obviously like also one thing that, that they're now doing that they, they're not so, so openly giving away the information and it also means that they are sort of like building something new. It was also reported that the new equipment that they are now producing is not primarily going to Ukraine, but to the new, or like the, the refurbished bases, I would say.

And then one more element to this is also that, that Russia has been really ramping up their efforts to recruit more people into the military. So there are various estimates, but it's somewhere around 30-40,000 per month according to this Wall Street Journal article that people refer to, and that estimate is from a number of Western intelligence services.

So, so that's not great in the sense that this all sounds like Russia is now more seriously starting to work towards the goals that then Defense Minister Shoigu already announced in December 2023. So back then, these two new, old-new military districts were sort of like reestablished in western Russia, so the, the Moscow Military District and the Leningrad Military District. So, so far this has been mainly on paper and, and Finland didn't observe a lot of developments, but now it's like clearly sort of like something's starting to happen.

Anastasiia Lapatina: As you've mentioned, a lot of this is happening along the Finnish border, and I wanna devote some attention and some time to discussing that border. You are from Finland and you, you've worked there and you know the history of this country exceptionally well.

And so, you know, I, I've read in your writing before you mentioned that it seems like no one really knows anything substantial about the country and its history, especially with the Russians. So could you do a bit of a refresher on Finland and its security dynamics and how you know it's been approaching its security since World War II?

Minna Ålander: Yeah, I mean, like, I have to say that I would say that the, the level of knowledge about Finland has like significantly improved over the past three years, but especially in the spring of 2022 when Finland all of a sudden decided to join NATO, like, reporting wasn't always so accurate because people had sort of like no basis on which to sort of like assess whether something can potentially be true about Finland or not, because Finland is obviously like only relevant every hundred years or something.

But, so from the Finn perspective there's like three things that really explain why Finland has the kind of defense system—this whole of society, whole of governmental total defense, comprehensive security, what you wanna call it. And those three things are basically the history of the country, the geography, and the demography.

So the history is obviously that, that Finland has been at war with Russia many times in, in the course of history, not only as an independent country, but also when it was a part of the Kingdom of Sweden for about 6700 years. So, so those two powers were sort of like always at war with each other, the Russian Empire and, and the Kingdom of Sweden, because they were like two sort of regional powers and Finland is between Sweden and Russia. So like we got our fair share of the divorce.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I know how that feels.

Minna Ålander: Yep, exactly. So, yeah, that, that's basically the, the very sort of like history, like when you go far back.

But the more relevant part of this is that. Finland was the only country in the Second World War that was supposed to become a part of the Soviet Union, according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union concluded between each other and where they sort of like, divided central and eastern Europe between themselves, but Finland managed to actually fight back and avoid the destiny of being occupied by the Soviet Union.

So, so it was first the Winter War and then the Continuation War that, that Finland fought during that the Second World War against the Soviets. Those wars are still really like defining for the Finnish identity and, and, and the overall system, because then when we get to the geography and the demography, like those are things that don't change so much.

The geography is still pretty much the same. I mean, we lost some territory back then, but apart from that not that much has changed. Also, the demographic situation, I mean, Finland has now a larger population than, than 80 years ago, but the sort of in relation to Russia today, it's still like a very, very sort of underdog kind of situation in the sense that Finland has a population of only 5.5 million.

So that has sort of like led to this development of total defense system over the course of the past 80 years, and, and what makes Finland a little bit special in the European comparison is that Finland never dismantled it after the Cold War either. So the idea is basically that when you have a large territory like Finland's, only a few square kilometers smaller than Germany, but Germany has 83 million people and Finland, 5.5. So that sort of like gives you an impression of like what a challenge it is then to make sure that you can provide an efficient and sufficient national defense, like for the whole territory.

So that's why Finland has, for example, the conscription system still in place with the large reserve army and sort of like one could say this kind of old school territorial defense force that most European countries dismantled after the Cold War because they thought that war would, wars would now take place somewhere else and somewhere further away and you can sort of like choose the time and place of when you go to war. And in Finland, one could say that the Cold War never ended in the sense that this threat assessment never really significantly changed.

So that sort of like explains why Finns are so focused or the Finnish national security is so focused on the eastern border because like, you know, being between Sweden and Russia, Sweden isn't much of a threat, you know, so, so there's like a very obvious threat direction from the Finnish point of view.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I imagine all of this history, as you said, affects how Finland is thinking through its security to this day. Is there anything that has been happening recently, like since Russia's full-scale invasion that kind of shows Finland being even more aware of its security and even more kind of focusing on preparedness in the recent years?

Minna Ålander: I think that it's been a really interesting situation for Finland to observe Russia's way of warfare in Ukraine and, and sort of like what lessons we need to learn from Ukraine because so many things have gone exactly a, as sort of like expected from the the Finnish point of view. And it's also crazy like when you read sort of like accounts from the Winter War or the Continuation War, Russia was also back then like primarily targeting civilians, you know.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I read that these quotes that like, they were expecting the Finns to welcome them with flowers and I thought like a Ukrainian joke, but it's like the same to the T.

Minna Ålander: Shostakovich, I think it was, who had already like, you know, composed like a victory march because they expected to be marching in Helsinki like after two weeks later or something.

And, and it's also really like, it, it's crazy how also already then it was this sort of like Russian way of warfare to target the civilian population, trying to make it hard for like civilians to live like in, in, in Lapland. It's very sparsely populated and like. The Soviet Union was sometimes bombing like single civilians, if they could spot them there, so it it's like crazy.

So in that, in that sense, there's like, it was sort of like macabre how spot on the Finnish sort of assessment had been in the sense that Finland had invested into all the capabilities that, that Ukraine was also asking its partners to, to help it out with, you know, such as like precisely the kind of large reserve—of course, one thing that like nobody can really help Ukraine with—but like then beyond that, Finland has quite a strong air force and has been investing a lot in like also air defense, like different ranges and and different ranges of like, sort of also long range missile capability. And then artillery—like not that many European countries have much of artillery left anymore, but Finland is one of the largest artilleries in, in all of Europe still. So there's a lot of those things that Finland kept in place because that was sort of like the expectation.

Obviously everything that is happening in Ukraine in terms of the automatic systems is like a novelty and that there's like a lot of lessons for Finland to learn as well, but like on the more sort of like traditional side of things, like Finland is pretty well prepared for this type of warfare.

And one thing that is really important also in this context is the civil defense part. It's sort of this like mobilizing the whole of society as, as Ukraine has done, and at the same time trying to provide the conditions for civilian population to, to keep the economy going, keep life going in Ukraine. So this is something that Finland has invested a lot of energy and like attention to also after the Cold War, sort of like making sure that, that there is like civilian protection mechanisms and, and in what ways you, you can sort of like make sure that that civilian life can continue even, even under the conditions of war.

So those are some things. And of course then like for, for Finland, the biggest change was the NATO membership obviously. So, so that was a direct reaction to, to Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine, and it was definitely a red line that, that Russia crossed there. And I think that it's important, but we also remind ourselves that we have red lines too, and that was one for Finland, and, and that triggered the, the NATO membership.

That has of course, brought some changes along, especially that because Finland's armed forces or the defense forces are to a, like, very large extent based on the reservists, especially the land forces almost entirely reservists. So Finland will have to, for example, increase the number of, of professional officers and like, you know, the standing force needs to grow a bit because now Finland has to send people to the, into the NATO structures and so on.

So I would say that that's like maybe the, the biggest change. But in a way, Finland joined exactly in the right moment because like now everybody realized that this kind of territorial threat and territorial defense is actually not obsolete, and it, it can happen again in Europe, and, and more countries actually would need that kind of ability to, to defend like their territorial integrity.

So the NATO membership didn't lead to as many changes because of that, because now it's, it's sort of like actually the other way around that many other countries would like to have the same kind of defense system as Finland has. Yeah, so it would've been a very different situation, for example to join NATO 20 years ago when, when the doctrine was a completely different one.

Anastasiia Lapatina: We will talk about NATO more because I think it's a crucial aspect, of course, of this conversation. But before we move on to that, I wanted to ask how have other Nordic and Baltic states been responding to Russia's obviously increasingly aggressive posture in Europe? What like, you know, what kind of infrastructure buildup we can say we've seen in Europe, kind of on the other side of that line recently, in the past few years?

Minna Ålander: So there's quite a lot happening in the Nordic Baltic region. So, for example, the Baltic states have teamed up together and they're building this Baltic defense line, which is sort of like joint efforts to fortificate, to build further fortifications along their shared border with, with Russia and Belarus. So, so that's one thing that's happening.

They've been also sort of like jointly procuring certain military equipment. Among the Nordic countries, there's been this huge boost to this Nordic Defense Cooperation format that has existed already long before this full scale war in Ukraine, but, but it has really, it, it has a completely new momentum now after Finland Sweden joined NATO because that sort of lifted a lot of, sort of formal hurdles that have been there before.

And what that has led to is really sort of significantly intensified corporation among the Nordic countries to a point that they're starting actually to integrate the forces, not only to cooperate. So this is like a very important step, like when you, when you cross that threshold, basically.

So Finland and Sweden have already had a very close relationship in, in the defense field because they were both outside of NATO, but now it has, has gotten like much closer also with Denmark and, and Norway. And like one very visible thing here is, for example, the, the joint operations center, the Joint Nordic Operations Center that is being set up in Norway for the air forces.

So the air forces have now like a joint operational concept, and, and their are, their aim is to be able to sort of like operate together in a fully integrated way. So you could imagine it as sort of the Nordic fleet. So they're not like, they're not gonna be fully integrated into one fleet. Each country has still their own air forces, but they can operate really flexibly together, and the command and control structure then now reflects that.

Then you have seen Sweden and Norway, for example, and Denmark, all of the three countries that had significantly decreased the, the number of their troops and, and, and scaled down their overall military capability after the Cold War, they have now really sort of like ramped up, ramped up their defense budget. So Norway just announced today, I think, an increase up to 3.3% of GDP. Sweden has already reached something like 2.6% or so, and I, I believe that Denmark is also close to 3% at this point.

So, so there's been this—especially over the course of the, I would say last year or so—there's been like really huge sort of like efforts by these three countries to, to as fast as possible, which is unfortunately often not very fast. So military capability development, unfortunately, often takes a very long time, but they have at least kicked off these processes.

However, we have to also then of course, remember that when you start at a very low level, even if you double your land force, like Norway is doing, it means going from sort of 1.5 brigades to 3, which is still not much. But on the other hand, there's also like, obviously the countries have different profiles and Norway is really investing quite massively in their maritime capability and their navy, so, so that's of course a really important contribution by, by Norway.

All of these countries have reacted very clearly. I, I believe that Estonia has already reached 5% of GDP in defense spending, and the other Baltic states are also close. So, you have seen this very massive ramping up of defense spending and these efforts to sort of like, set up whole new brigades, both in, in, in Sweden and in Norway.

Anastasiia Lapatina: The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO is of course, a, a very positive thing for those countries and for NATO, but kind of the mechanics of that are also quite complicated. I think you and I have talked about this before, that it's not like, you know, you flip a switch or color a map, and now this is NATO territory, like there's a whole lot of, as you've already started a bit talking about in your previous answer, a lot of integrating that it has to do, and there are a lot of challenges, right? Like getting the troops of the same kind of planning and like whatever you wargamed before may no longer be relevant, right, 'cause you have to kind of change your planning.

Can you talk a bit about how you know that integration has been happening and, and what are some of the potential challenges there?

Minna Ålander: Yeah, sure. Actually here we like really nicely can sort of like circle back to where we started and that was sort of like this whole infrastructure buildup and why it's relevant. Because like obviously the biggest change for NATO was that now that Finland and Sweden closed this gap that had been between Norway and the Baltic states, that had made it like much harder for NATO to, to sort of like plan coherently for this region. That's possible for the first time now.

And that's like a huge game changer for the Baltic states, especially in their defense because there's all these famous war games from before 2022, which sort of like basically stated that like Russia could just sort of more or less walk into one of the Baltic states, grab some land set up nuclear ultimatum to NATO, and, and NATO would have a very hard time sort of like reconquering that territory.

And then another thing was said in 2022, after the massacres of Bucha, horrible war crimes that Russia committed in, in Ukraine, it became absolutely clear that this cannot anymore be the NATO strategy. Like it's unacceptable to accept that some allied territory is first taken and then reconquer. So that's when NATO pledged in the new strategic concept that like NATO will defend every range of allied territory at all times. And that's a bold, bold statement, actually, it's a big pledge, and it would've hardly been possible without having Finland and Sweden, in NATO.

So for example when you look at it from the Baltic states point of view, you now have this whole new supply route from the north through Finland. Like you can imagine that the, the supply route, which is also one for Finland. So like you can reach Finland from, from the north Atlantic coast of, of Norway through Sweden, and then basically down to Estonia. So it would be much harder now for Russia to cut off these Baltic states from the rest of NATO.

Sweden's territory—like Sweden is really long if you look at the maps. So Sweden really connects the whole region, like from the, from the high north down to the Danish Straits and it's in a really key position for any kind of logistics in the region. So, so that's really important too, like from the Baltic perspective.

Or also like when you look at the potential northern front that would be also including Norway, so, Sweden really provides sort of like a, like land connection also, well, not quite, but like through the Øresund Bridge to Denmark also then to continental Europe. So, so Sweden is really important also because it also has a, has a port in the north in, not only the Baltic states.

So all of this is this is a huge win for NATO, and you see also how Russia has analyzed the situation and realize that, that Russia could hardly anymore sort of like do something in the Baltics in an isolated fashion without triggering like some action along the whole frontline that is much longer now. And this is, I think like why it's so sort of like worrisome to see this infrastructure build up on the Russian side because it, it shows that they also know what they're looking at. They are looking at the new situation where they have to sort of like think about the, the Arctic when they, when, if they plan something in the Baltics.

So this is a very significantly changed situation, and of course it has come with like some challenges. Like Finland and Sweden, they had a very close partnership with NATO, but even the closest partner is still not an ally, so, so there were still like a lot of areas where Finland and Sweden were not, not in on the planning and so on. Plus that that NATO started completely new planning process with these three regional plans which it hasn't, hasn't had since the Cold War basically.

So, so this is all new on, on the NATO side and, and like integrating Finland and Sweden into those plants is completely new. So in a way there's been like—it, it's been a mutual integration process, like you have to integrate NATO into Finland and Sweden, but, and then like Finland and Sweden into NATO. So, so it has been quite a, quite a transformational moment for NATO as well, especially because it coincides with this whole new planning process.

Anastasiia Lapatina: When people talk about a possible Russian attack against NATO, they usually invoke several specific scenarios again and again, usually somewhere in the Baltics. Let's break down some of those scenarios. Like what parts of Europe are perceived as sort of NATO's weakest point that Russia could potentially exploit?

Minna Ålander: I mean like the Baltics have been a popular choice there because like they have a very difficult geographical position because the countries are simply so small, they have no strategic depth whatsoever.

For example, right now facing this really difficult dilemma, when you look at, again, the lessons from Ukraine, like the massive missile attacks for example, and like how important the air defense is, the Baltic states don't have air forces of their own because the deal was sort of when they joined NATO, that NATO will provide this air policing for them, and that if sort of it came to a head like NATO would come to come to their help and so on, because basically it would be hard to have air forces in the Baltic states that because they would be so vulnerable to, to Russian missile attacks, or then you would need like a very robust missile defense, which the Baltic states can't really right now afford.

So this is, to be honest, the, the new Baltic scenario, actually, like when we consider the lessons from Ukraine, it's like this land grab is just one possibility and maybe not even the most likely one. And, and it's a much bigger question, sort of like how to set up a proper missile defense in the Baltic states that can't really afford it by themselves because like missile defense as it exists now, or like air defense systems like the Patriot, they're just like so expensive. So this is a huge challenge for, for, for the small Baltic states, so that has been a very popular idea.

Then of course right now when we're looking at what's happening—so Moldova is right next to, to Ukraine, sort of like between Ukraine and, and Romania, or in, in the Black Sea region there. So there is one possibility of course that, that the Black Sea could take a worse turn again, and, and there have been already some Russian drones and other things falling into either, like sort of violating Romanian airspace or falling into Romanian territory. This has also happened in the Baltics, so, so that's one possible angle.

And then there's of course, like the, the northern dimension as well. There's this Norwegian island Svalbard, which is a demilitarized island with some like Russian presence there because there is a Russian community. According to the Svalbard Treaty, any nation that is a signatory to this treaty has the right to have commercial activity on this, on this in this archipelago.

So that's also one tricky sort of angle for NATO because like Svalbard is very far off, like, I think some thousand kilometers off the, the Norwegian northern coast mainland highway, so, so it's like really far away up in the Arctic. Not many people live there. And sort of like definitely this huge Article 5 security guarantee question would be because like technically Svalbard is nevertheless, is Article 5 territory. Like how many NATO nations would be willing to go to war with Russia over Svalbard?

So there are multiple scenarios. There was also like some ideas that maybe Northern Finland could also be one of those places where Russia could somehow like,

Anastasiia Lapatina: Make a buffer zone or whatever.

Minna Ålander: Yeah, or like somehow go in a little bit and, and poke around.

Anastasiia Lapatina: There's also this stretch of land between Belarus and Poland that's pretty important, stretching from Kaliningrad.

Minna Ålander: Yes, Suwałki Gap. Yeah. That, that was like one of the very popular Baltic scenarios as well, that, that Russia would use that Suwałki Gap, going to the Russian exclave, Kaliningrad, to cut off the Baltic state. So that's, that's one of these classic scenarios.

And then there was this idea about northern Finland, but I personally, as a Finn think that it would be interesting if they tried, because it's not like it's–

Anastasiia Lapatina: They would never dare.

Minna Ålander: Well, let's just say that it's not like, it's like no man's land where like nobody's looking into. I mean like, we have a very significant air base, one of the largest artillery exercise ranges in northern Finland and the new NATO forward land force contingent that will be placed in Finland, will also be in the northern part of Finland. So there will be a lot going on there that should hopefully deter Russia from any such ideas.

Anastasiia Lapatina: You've already mentioned that the Baltics are extremely vulnerable and they rely on NATO a lot. And I think here we should talk about the role the U.S. plays in NATO and you know, the, the effect that Trump has had on the alliance in the past few months since he was reelected. So it's clear, you know, that the Trump administration wants to sort of pull back from Europe and kind of relieve itself of responsibility of looking after Europe.

So in the event of a Russian attack—a , you know, hypothetical one in five or 10 years—what role would the U.S. play in, in that NATO response? And, you know, and, and what does that mean, what does the Trump behavior right now mean for that response? How, how, how does Europe now need to kind of replan its actions if the U.S. just, you know, says we're staying out of it?

Minna Ålander: This is indeed the question, and I, I was already starting to feel a little weird about, like talking about the situation as it as it was in the good old times like a couple months ago still, because like it has radically changed from a European perspective.

I would say that for the Europeans right now, the most important thing is to avoid any kind of disorderly withdrawal of the United States from NATO because Europe needs time to figure this out for itself, and, and Europe needs time to build up the capability on the, on the continent to like sort of take more responsibility for its own defense and to figure out what to do about a lot of the enablers and like strategic capabilities that the U.S. has traditionally provided.

So that's gonna take a bit of time and the more time Europe can buy, the better, and that explains also why Europeans are trying to avoid like directly antagonizing Trump and his administration. Which might look sort of like a little bit of appeasement sometimes, or that they're bowing too deep to Trump or something, but I have to say that European diplomats have my sympathy because it is a very, very difficult situation.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Can you just explain exactly what role the U.S. plays in the NATO security infrastructure in Europe? Like there is a nuclear component, there is, you know, as you've said, like an air force, air defense component, military bases. Can you just like describe it in a few words?

Minna Ålander: Sure. The U.S. has a number of bases in Europe, like both air bases and others that are very important like actually also for the U.S. for, for American ability to project power globally. So, so that's one important element.

And then like, the most important thing, of course, is the nuclear deterrence, the extended deterrence that the U.S. offers its treaty allies the so-called nuclear umbrella, because that is sort of like the, the basis of the, the deterrence that NATO provides to its members. And it has been extremely detrimental already now that Trump has started sort of like adding some conditions to, like, to whom this deterrence still, still applies and, and under which conditions. Like, let's say like, whether a country spend enough or not, or, or, or, or things like that. So that already like, has undermined the credibility of the, this extended deterrent.

And, and this is a big issue for, for Europe because like obviously we want to try to make sure that Russia feels sufficiently deterred so that it does not start a war with Europe, and that it does not go as far as to test NATO’s Article 5. And the Trump administration and its sort of like occasionally open hostility towards Europe is like an invitation.

So that's why I was saying that it's like still from the European perspective, it's important to try and make sure that the U.S. doesn't sort of like in a disorderly fashion exit NATO next month because that would then be exactly the kind of opening for Russia that, that they would, they would be wishing to see.

So as long as the U.S. in NATO at least sort of like officially, like one could hope that there is some level of uncertainty about like a possible U.S. response left, although it looks increasingly unlikely that they would really do anything to help their European allies in, in a case of war.

So this is maybe the most important thing that, that, that the U.S. is providing, and this is exactly for for all the like very exposed, smaller allies like the Baltic states. This has been incredibly important that they can rely on, on, on the United States and, and that this nuclear commitment to the extended nuclear deterrent is really like ironclad. And even this current level of sort of discretion of that, of that commitment is is a huge blow for the whole alliance, and it requires quite a significant rethink, of course.

But then beyond that, the U.S. has a very important conventional role as well. The idea is for example, in these defense plans that, for example, in the Nordic region, the Nordic countries are trying to build up, like a robust first responder sort of force so that the U.S. maybe doesn't have to be present all the time like with boots on the ground, but the expectation was that there would be reinforcements and supplies from the United States to the region in a case of war. So, so there is this idea—I mean, like the, the Americans have been incredibly present in exercise activities and stuff in northern Finland, let's say, or like in the other Nordic countries as well, and, and there has been like this expectation that, of course, like the U.S. is basically also the conventional backstop at least.

And, and like you could say that the U.S. has been the super glue that keeps it all together. So when that is gone, it's, it's, it's a challenge obviously, to figure out how to think of all of these things without the U.S. because it's, the U.S. has been like such a like really central and significant player in, in all the defense plans for Europe. So it's, it's hard to wrap your head around this very sudden and very radical change.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Well, I'm a bit sad that we're ending on kind of a bad note, but well, those are the times.

Minna Ålander: Yes, indeed.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Thank you so much, Minna. This was really interesting.

Minna Ålander: Thank you.

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