Lawfare Daily: Shane Harris Talks ‘Houthi PC Small Group’

[Intro]

Shane Harris: It is trivially easy to add the wrong person to your group or someone who's not supposed to be in the group, which of course is what happened in this case. So there are a number of reasons why Signal is not approved for war planning, kinetic operations. This is merely one of them, but in this case, it was a pretty big one.

Benjamin Wittes: It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Benjamin Wittees here with Shane Harris of the Atlantic.

Shane Harris: The information that I saw based on my experience of having seen classified information—including information that is overtly marked as classified—this information in my estimation would be presumptively classified.

Benjamin Wittes: We're talking “Houthi PC small group” today. Yes, it's the Atlantic's blockbuster story from yesterday by Jeffrey Goldberg. Shane is not on the byline, but he was a key figure behind the story, and we're talking about it and the senior intelligence officials’ testimony about it today.

[Main podcast]

Alright, so Shane, you and I have both been in this business a long time, and you put out on Bluesky the other day that in 25 years of national security reporting, you've never seen anything like this. I gotta say, I've been at it a little longer than you have, and I've never seen anything like this.

So just to get us up to speed, what is “Houthi PC small group”?

Shane Harris: I mean, isn't that the name of all of our text chains now.

Benjamin Wittes: I'm thinking of naming a puppy “pc small group.” But what is it?

Shane Harris: What is it? So Houthi PC small group is a Signal group, thread or chain that was created by the national security adviser to the president, Michael Waltz, for the purpose, as he put it, of coordinating with other principals—PC stands for principals committee—regarding military actions in Yemen against the Houthis, which did occur on March 15.

The principals committee would normally include the national security adviser, the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, the CIA director, the DNI, maybe the Treasury secretary—all those people and others were included in this chain. Principals committees usually get together to discuss things like military action, and that is what happened in this Signal group.

In the days leading up to the strike in Yemen, they were discussing the relative wisdom of taking the strike, the policy, pros and cons, and then when the strike itself occurred, there was real time or near real time updates on military action against the Houthis.

“PC small group” was essentially the place where these folks could stay in touch, particularly it seems considering it was a weekend and presumably people were not at their place of work—the Pentagon, CIA headquarters, etc.

Benjamin Wittes: Alright, so most of us, when we are planning something with a group of people, we set up a, you know, a Facebook Messenger group or a WhatsApp group, or an iMessage group, and if we wanna be secure, we use a Signal group.

So what's wrong with the intelligence and kinetic military leadership of the United States doing exactly that? You got, you're, you're planning your strike on Yemen; you get the people who are involved in the planning; and you do, you put together a Signal group, which is the secure message app.

Shane Harris: Right. So the, the, the problem with it is—and you're quite right to say Signal, is it's pretty secure that provides good end-to-end encryption—the problem with it is, number one, Signal is not approved for the transmission of classified government information.

That is not to say that US officials don't use Signal, they do, but in my, based on my reporting and based on even some comments that the CIA director made today in testimony, it's not a place where you would conduct classified information about military operations. Now there appears to be some gray area that the CIA director and the DNI were testing this morning when they were trying to portray this as totally normal, but people I've spoken to in the past several days have said you would never and should never have put sensitive or classified or kinetic information into Signal. It's simply not approved for that, and the government has other kinds of communications devices and networks that are approved for that.

And we could talk about the reasons why Signal is not a smart way to do it, but in this case, the most obvious one should be that because as anyone has used Signal or any other kind of messaging app knows it is trivially easy to add the wrong person to your group or someone who's not supposed to be in the group, which of course is what happened in this case.

So there are a number of reasons why Signal is not approved for war planning, kinetic operations—this is merely one of them, but in this case it was a pretty big one.

Benjamin Wittes: Alright, so there's three big reasons, right? One is you can accidentally include Jeff Goldberg if you're the national security adviser. That's number one. It's not hermetically sealed from the non-classified world.  So anybody in your, who's on Signal, you know, if you know how to reach out to them and get them, you can add them in.

The second is because the device itself is not secure. That's right. And people think, okay, the Signal, Signal app is very secure. If it's running on a compromised machine, it's only as secure as the machine is.

Shane Harris: That's right.

Benjamin Wittes: And then the third is it's portable. You can say, take it to Russia as one member of this group did, or take it abroad like the DNI did. And everything is less secure when you're in an unsecured environment.

Is that the basic gist of it?

Shane Harris: Yeah, that's right. And, and and you know, and I, I guess to just kind of, to amplify maybe points two and three, 'cause I think we all understand how point is sort of at the center of this store—they added the wrong person, namely my, my boss.

To point two, we know that the electronic devices, and I think we would presume that the personal or work mobile devices of the senior leadership of the United States government are primary, or certainly high level targets, for foreign intelligence services.  We know from recent breaches like the Salt Typhoon event, where it appears that Chinese actors deeply penetrated the telecommunication system, that our hardware itself is not maybe as secure as we thought it was.

We know there are such things—and I know this because I’ve reported on it—as malware exploits that can be loaded onto a phone sometimes without even the person having to take any action, so-called zero click or no click zero days, and that all of these people's devices in this chain should be considered to be primary targets for intelligence agencies.

So if there is somebody sitting on the phone, you know, at the MSS in Beijing reading all the text messages that are coming in and out on Signal, the encryption does no good.  In the same way, and this goes to point number three, that if you lost the phone, if you dropped it at the grocery store, right? If somebody was on the train looking over your shoulder and could see the messages that you're typing, then you have no protection there either.

And it's worth just kind of noting that these kinds of conversations usually occur inside SCIFs, right? Sensitive facilities for discussing sensitive information.

Benjamin Wittes: And just for those of you who've never been in a SCIF, a SCIF is a sealed environment that has both protections against transmissions out—o if you have a radio and a phone is a radio, it will not transmit outside of the SCIF, the walls will physically block it—but it also has all kinds of protections directed inward to notice things like cell phones. So if you bring a phone into the CIA, there, there are these guys walking around who are gonna figure out that you've got a cell phone.

Shane Harris: Yep, totally. So, and what that strongly suggests in the case of the Houthi PC small group, is that at least some, if not most, or maybe all of the people who were communicating were doing so outside of SCIF. I mean, unless somebody was on conceivably a, a physical computer that was allowed to be inside a SCIF that had Signal running on it.

But I think that, that our presumption is that all these people were essentially mobile when they were talking, which again, just only increases the potential that the messages themselves could be compromised, the phones could be lost, stolen, etc.

Benjamin Wittes: Alright, so. Let's talk about your role in this weird story. I'm gonna assume that people have a basic understanding. Jeff Goldberg gets added to this Signal group by the national security adviser, apparently thinks it's a fake, turns out not to be a fake, and he gets—according to him—the advance war plans and targeting information and some intelligence data involving the Houthis strike in Yemen both hours before it takes place and then minutes before it takes place. So how did you get involved?

Shane Harris: So I got involved because, so Jeff came to me not long after he had been initially contacted by Mike Waltz—and I'm putting that in air quotes 'cause at the time he's not sure that it is the Michael Waltz, the national adviser—and gets added to this group, and says to me, because I cover national security and intelligence for the, for the Atlantic, you know, what do you make of this? And my initial reaction was, this seems like it could be a hoax,

Benjamin Wittes: Which was his reaction as well.

Shane Harris: Right. It was his reaction too.

And, and, and, and I'll, and I'll say, we both thought to ourselves this sure would be an elaborate hoax because there are multiple entities, individuals, people apparently in this. They're identifying themselves for the most part by name, and they're also nominating people to be their point of contact. And those names are people who we've heard of, they're not household names, but they're staff. And so I'm thinking, well, this is really an elaborate hoax if it is a hoax.

At the same time, I kind of am leaning towards hoax at this point because I'm thinking, why would all of these people think that this was a good idea? Because remember, when he's added to the group, it's not necessarily clear that they're about to attack Yemen, but you can tell from the conversation the name of the group and the statements that they're saying when Michael Waltz is sort of, you know, table setting things, that there appears to be a military operation that's being considered. And then as the conversation continues, that becomes even more clear.

So I was basically brought in by Jeff to say, you know, what do you make of this. And then over the weekend as it became clearer, that this seemed authentic, and then I think we all kind of really believed it was authentic on Saturday afternoon Washington time when the bomb started falling on the Houthis targets in Yemen. And Jeff had been apprised of that, that that was coming two hours before it actually occurred because Pete Hegseth, the secretary of defense, had shared these highly specific operational details about the strike that was coming.

So at that point, I mean, not long after that, Jeff removed himself from the group and then began our reporting exercise, our meeting mine and his, and then some of our other colleagues, but primarily Jeff and I, reporting out, okay, what happened here? How may this have occurred? Is this normal? And we've just never heard of it, that people plan these kinds of things in Signal. What are the legal implications? Did anyone break the law? What are the security implications? Who else could have been added without, you know, are we sure everyone in here is who they said they were? All of these questions that we wanted to answer.

And then also trying to determine what information we felt was so sensitive that it didn't either need to be published or perhaps shouldn't be published. And I was a part of making, you know, those decisions as well and working with Jeff on that.

Benjamin Wittes: Alright, and full disclosure, along the way in your reporting, you called me, I'm one of the legal people that you refer to as a group in the, in the thing, although honestly, nothing about our conversation quite prepared me for the story, which is way worse than the hypothetical that you gave me.

Alright, I wanna skip ahead to the reaction by the administration to this story, which I'm gonna summarize briefly, and then ask you a few questions about. So Pete Hegseth said, I believe last night, or early this morning, that Jeff Goldberg was a deceitful hoaxer and that there were no war plans shared.

In testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee today, the DNI, Tulsi Gabbard, and the CIA Director John Ratcliffe, who are both part of the thread, seemed to deny that there was any classified information shared, although then they later kind of hedged and said, well, there were no intelligence equities shared.

We can't speak for the defense department, but they seemed to also deny categorically that there were there was classified materials shared. And then the White House in the person of Karoline Leavitt said there was no classified information on the thread.

So my first question is, you've seen the thread. Are they lying?

Shane Harris: The information that I saw, based in my experience of having seen classified information—including information that is overtly marked as classified—this information in my estimation would be presumptively classified. You can look at the definitions for what cla, what constitutes, for instance, secret or top secret information in DOD regulation, right, which is publicly available, and this information I think clearly maps onto those descriptions.

When the CIA director and the DNI were asked specifically, by one of the Democratic senators, I can't remember which, did you see anything? I believe he asked them about weapons packages—just just say, you know, the kinds of weapons, you know, that were gonna be used here—their answer was very interesting. I think Director Ratiffe said something like, not that I'm aware of, or not that I recall, but they weren't saying no, right?

Now, that's interesting because there are passages in the text from Pete Hegseth that precisely describe that kind of information. So maybe they don't really remember, or maybe they thought it was perhaps more accurate for them to say I can't recall. But it was in the texts, and they were in the texts. They would've had to have looked over and not seen that part of the chain—possible I suppose.

But to say it's not classified raises up another question. Who made that determination? According to whom is it not classified? Because you know, I think any reasonable person would assume, hey, you know, we're bombing the Houthis in this location at this time with, you're getting these individuals referring back to conversations that you've had with the president of the United States about taking lethal military action, referring to plans for how you're going to attempt to send the bill to the Europeans, you know, internal policy deliberations, including officials up to the rank of vice president who is coming in and giving his view on what they should do. If that's not classified, I'm not sure what classified means.

Benjamin Wittes: Right. But I assume it's not marked classified. It's not marked classified. It's, it's, it's a text.

Shane Harris: It's text, it's, it's conversation, right? And you know, I have—I, I mean, Ben, you've been doing this a long time too—have we ever heard of a principals committee meeting that was considered unclassified?

Benjamin Wittes: I've never heard of an operational meeting involving military action that is not classified at, you know, at least the secret level, totally top secret level.

Shane Harris: I mean, this is information that if I had gathered it by reporting, let's say, talking to sources who said, you know, there's about to be a strike in Yemen, or somebody had passed me a document, I mean, I would have, as I always do with information that I consider sensitive and potentially classified, go to the relevant agency and say, look, here's what I have—

Benjamin Wittes: And they would try to talk you out of it.

Shane Harris: They would absolutely have tried to talk us out of it in this instance. I have zero doubt about that.

Benjamin Wittes: Okay, so let me ask you—you went to them, or Jeff went to them yesterday, and said, we're gonna publish this stuff. Did they try to talk you out of it?

Shane Harris: No. They did not. We went to all of the, you know, the, the, the, the relevant people who were the ones really engaged in the full conversation, and fairly quickly after we went to the spokesperson for the national security adviser, he gave us an on the record statement saying this appears to be an authentic conversation, a few other things too about the operation and the security of it. That is the same statement that they gave to other journalists throughout the day who then follow up with their own reporting. At no point did anyone say, you can't publish this. You can't write about it. You can't include screenshots of texts, which we did.

We did make clear in some instances that we were withholding to the relevant people, certain information, and we spell that out in the story when we say what we're withholding. So if we felt something was too sensitive because it could be classified or it's operationally sensitive, we told the reader that. And in those cases, that was information that honestly, the reader doesn't need to know to understand what's happening here and why it's significant, right. It's just a level of detail you don't have to go into, and I think that is a perfectly—not only is that a defensible position for journalists to take, it's a one we routinely take.

Benjamin Wittes: Right. And, and I, I think it's a, it's a perfectly reasonable thing for you and Jeff to have said. We are treating this material as sensitive because it obviously is.

Shane Harris: Yeah.

Benjamin Wittes: And we're not giving out more of it than we need to to tell our story.

But okay, so there's an intervening event since you published the story, which is that the DNI and the CIA director are both under oath and both say there's no classified material in here, and then maybe they hedge, but maybe they don't, depending on how you read it. And the defense department in the person of the secretary says there's no discussion of war plans, which is a flat contradiction of the story and the president through his spokesman says there's no classified information.

So I have never seen a situation before in which the entire intelligence apparatus says, nothing to see here. It's not sensitive, it's fine for us to be discussing it with a journalist, even if by accident. And the journalist takes the position, whoa, we got some sensitive material here; there are some real national security equities that these buffoons over here ought to be taking more seriously.

And so my, my read is you have the administration’s permission at this point to publish the entire set of text exchanges, or at least their clear statement that there's nothing classified in them and no war plans. So what are you gonna do? Are you gonna make 'em public?

Shane Harris: Well, I'm not gonna get ahead of the reporting then. I do think I share, you know, your sort of bewilderment, maybe–

Benjamin Wittes: I have never seen this situation.

Shane Harris: No, I haven't either. Where essentially, you know, it appears to me that what the administration is trying to do, particularly Secretary Hegseth disparaging my colleague, is trying to make it look like we are portraying this as something more serious than it's that we're out there saying, oh, it's classified, it's really sensitive. We have to withhold it from you. And they appear to be saying, oh, that's not true at all.

Now, of course, they're, I, I believe, saying that because they want to absolve themselves of any, you know, accusations that they behaved inappropriately or potentially any legal vulnerabilities. I mean, you know, if this was, and if this is actually national defense information, then there are Espionage Act, you know, implications of it. Now, I'm not saying I think that anyone's gonna get prosecuted on the Espionage Act, and certainly not in this administration, not gonna prosecute any of their colleagues.

But you know, it is notable that they've come out and said this as a way to try and I think deflect from the actual use of the app in the first place. And Director Ratcliffe really went out of his way this morning in testimony in a fairly heated exchange with Senator Warner, the vice chair of the Senate Intel Committee to talk about no, no, no Signal's fine; I mean, we're allowed to use it at senior levels. I had it installed on my computer, he said, after he became CIA director.

Which side note—do you mean it's on your actual computer in your office at Langley? And if that's the case, do you also have Signal running on a phone? Because anyone who uses Signal generally knows that you need to not have it running in two places at once. Not great best practice, really dangerous actually.

So, you know, it just created all these questions, but the, the upshot of it was the Director Ratcliffe, it seemed to me, was trying to say, this is not an issue. We do this, we're allowed. There was nothing too sensitive on here. There was nothing classified. Director Gabbard was a little more measured and at first didn't even admit that she was in the room, which was very odd to me because Director Ratcliffe was happy to admit he was in the room. I mean, they're sitting right next to each other at the table. It was a very strange optic, I must say, but it a very weird position, right, where they're saying this.

And I think we continue to have a responsibility, an obligation, ethically, to be responsible with this information and how we handle it. And I think we are looking very closely at what these officials had to say today and, and moving forward with our reporting.

Benjamin Wittes: Jeff was on the Bulwark Podcast this morning and made clear that you guys were thinking about what to do next. But he also said—and I think this is a quote—when, you know, when asked, hey, they say there's nothing classified, nothing sensitive here. He said, you know, they're wrong.

And I'm curious—I totally understand the sensitivity of you all seeing this before the operation happened, but how much of that sensitivity survives the operation itself? Now, you know, the bombs have landed. We, they've taken out whatever targets they're taken out. Obviously the airmen aren't in, in hostile airspace now. So what, what is the residual sensitivity realistically of some of this, of the most sensitive of this material?

Shane Harris: I think if you were sort of going on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the most sensitive and 1 being the least, when the information about the raid that was about to occur was coming across in the Signal group, I would consider that like a level 10 sensitivity. You know, an unscrupulous person could have taken that information and tweeted it while planes were in the air and the Houthis could have taken more defensive measures. I mean, you absolutely conceivably are risking people's lives if you push that information out.

As soon as the operation's over, I think the sensitivity of that information drops considerably. Is it a six? Is it a five? It's kind of somewhere in the neighborhood 'cause the operation's over. And in point of fact, I would note that the national security adviser's spokesperson, Brian Hughes, talked about like the fact that like no one has, we haven't lost any people. I forget the exact words that he said—in fact, let me if pull it up because I think this. This bears on the subject. He said the thread is a demonstration of the deep and thoughtful policy coordination between senior officials. And this is the part, the ongoing success of the Houthis operation demonstrates that there were no threats to troops or national security. So he is himself, I mean, it seems to me kind of aware of that possibility and is addressing it, although from a different angle.

So yeah, I think the sensitivity has dropped. Look, there is in that thread that the director of the CIA shared that it refers to an active intelligence officer. He said today in his testimony that this person's not undercover and actually kind of took a jab at us for implying that he had done something wrong by sharing it.

I will just say that based on my reporting experience specifically on this question, that is not a name that CIA officials want known publicly, and the director is now trying to make it sound like it's really not a big problem. I suppose it's not a problem if you're only sharing that in a room with other people in the national security circle. If you said that room out loud in the situation room, it's not a problem. Right? If you're in a government, it's not a problem. When you're in a room where there's a journalist outside, it's potentially a problem. It's not good practice.

Benjamin Wittes: If you went to—so Jeff referred to this person using female pronouns, so I will do the same, in his Bulwark interview—if you referred to this person by name in an Atlantic article and called the CIA press office and said, hey, we're gonna name her, you have a problem with that? They wouldn't say no, no problem. I mean, not today—

Shane Harris: They would not.

Benjamin Wittes: But, but—

Shane Harris: They would ask us not to publish that name.

Benjamin Wittes: And would they take the position that the name is classified or just that it's protected? I mean, there's a specific statute, the Intelligence Agents or Officer's Identification Act that protects this stuff, right?

Shane Harris: I mean, I think they would take the, the, the, the, the position—I don't know whether they would say it's quote unquote classified—I think they would take the position that it's sensitive and we don't want the identity known.

And there are real practical reasons for this too, by the way. I mean, and I'm not saying they apply directly in every way to this individual, but generally speaking, the intelligence community likes to keep these identities out of the public eye so that these people can be more effective clandestine operatives, you know?

And, and you know, and I think it's also just worth noting as we're having this discussion, when people say classified, they often mean like sensitive. It's kind of a word that gets used as a catchall, but it has a legal meaning, right, as does national defense information, which is actually what's in the Espionage Act.

Benjamin Wittes: And yeah, they're different meanings from one another

Shane Harris: And they're different meanings. What I'm saying and what we are saying is that this information that was in these threads, it's unquestionably sensitive. There is just, there is just no—it's operationally sensitive. It's talking about kinetic military operations. And it seems to me that when people get into this discussion as they were today in testimony, well, it wasn't classified, like you're really getting into a very jesuitical kind of argument that is, is really veering from the point here.

Benjamin Wittes: No, actually I wanna insist on this. First of all, the category of sensitive stuff is much broader than the category of classified stuff. There's even, there's stuff that's even designated sensitive, but unclassified, right?

Shane Harris: Correct.

Benjamin Wittes: Which, broadly speaking means stuff that's not classified, but we don't wanna get out there. But the prototypical—there, there's kind of two prototypes of highly classified information, defined as information that the original classifying authority believed would, if released, do damage at one level or another to the, to the foreign policy or interest of the United States.

One is intelligence sources and methods, right? That maybe doesn't apply here. The other one is active military operations.

Shane Harris: Yes.

Benjamin Wittes: Right. And plans, projected targets, right—these are, this is the definition of classified material. And for, for senior intelligence officers to be sitting up there in front of the committee and pretending that there's some doubt about this, much less that it's obvious that there was—I mean, it's strikes me as completely shocking.

And the senator who really brought this out was Jon Ossoff, who really grilled Mr. Ratcliffe about this. You know, are you talking, you're, you're talking about, you know, the payloads of, of delivery of, of munitions before an operation, right? That's like, this is the, the, the textbook definition of classified stuff in the defense sector.

Alright so, let's talk about Kash Patel, who once again got away without like a lot of pressure. But he was asked, are you investigating this? And he said, I dunno, basically, because—

Shane Harris: No updates. I just got briefed.

Benjamin Wittes: Yeah, I just got briefed last night. How do you understand the FBI's posture in this right now?

Shane Harris: If this were any ordinary situation or any ordinary administration, I would imagine that the FBI would presume that it would investigate what happened here. There has been a spillage of national security information—NDI, classified information, sensitive information, however you wanna characterize it—here's been a spillage and one of the jobs, the FBI had would be to say, let's look at the information and find out what it actually was and how it was classified.

That's just, I mean, like we wrote this in the story. This is a very strange leak, but it's a leak. I mean, they released information to a journalist. They didn't know they were doing it, but they did do it. And that is historically something the FBI investigates if you know the relevant agencies whose information was exposed makes what's called a crimes report to, to over to the bureau to say, hey, look into it. I mean, I suppose if none of these agencies make a crimes report, maybe there's an expectation the FBI doesn’t investigate it.

I will say the NSC has said—I think the White House said this too—that they're looking into what happened here, how looking into how a journalist was added to the thread. Now, mind you, they're not saying, we're looking, not looking into why there was a thread in the first place, but like why a journalist was added to it. Which I kind of read from this, and I read from Director Radcliffe's comments, that they're not admitting that there was anything inappropriate about using the Signal thread for this event. Which in and of itself is astounding.

Benjamin Wittes: Astounding.

Shane Harris: If that is true, that they are affirmatively saying there's nothing wrong with this.

Benjamin Wittes: Especially because—and I, I, you know, I wanna pull back the curtain a little bit—they know that you guys have the actual thread and they know that you can release it any time. And they know if and when that happens, or if and when short of that, you release it to the intelligence committee, they will have to answer for what's in the thread.

And the questions that we're talking about here have objective answers, and you've been gracious about how you've said this, so I'm gonna be blunt, either you guys are fraudsters or they're lying. And there's an objective answer to this question that is available, and if it doesn't become public, it will certainly become available to the Senate Intelligence Committee. And so I'm not sure I quite understand why there is no remote even tactical retreat here

Shane Harris: By the administration.

Benjamin Wittes: Yeah.

Shane Harris: I—one possibility might be because they know there's not gonna be any accountability for it. That they have no expectation that the FBI will investigate this. They have no expectation that they'll be scrutinized for it. Again, to hear Director Ratcliffe say it, I mean he really was. I mean it making it sound like, no, no, no, this is this totally, this is totally fine. Like this is okay to do this.

Benjamin Wittes: Right. But that's the kind of thing you can only say before the information's out. Well imagine that tomorrow you guys publish the thread or turn it over to the bipartisan leadership of the committees or whatever, and it turns out that what's in the thread is what you guys say it is, which they're denying, and it is in fact war plans, and it is in fact material that is either classified or should be classified at the highest of levels. I don't know that the, oh, there's, they're just hoaxsters over there at the Atlantic is gonna survive that moment. Do you?

Shane Harris: I don't think it would survive—no, I certainly don't think it would survive because the messages are gonna show it's precisely what we said. It's, and it's gonna show that Secretary Hegseth is not being accurate when he denies that there was war plans. And let's not get into like war plans in air quote. Like it's a battle plan. It's attack plan. This is like common sense will prevail when people see this stuff, if they see this stuff.

But again, I think that the, the posture of the administration so far in the past, you know, 24 hours or so that this story has been out there, has been to say, there's nothing inappropriate about this, there's nothing here. Although they're acknowledging they made mistakes, which is interesting; like the president said, Mike, you know, Waltz is a good man who made a mistake, CIA director is making it sound like, no mistake.

But essentially they're, they're, they're not, they are not conceding at all that there was anything really inappropriate about here that demands accountability of like resignation, firing, you know, investigation, criminal indictment. And they're turning it back on the press. They're turning it back on the reporters and, you know, that doesn't surprise me one bit.

Benjamin Wittes: We're gonna leave it there, but Shane, I got one more question. You say you don't wanna get ahead of the reporting. What's left to report on this story?

Shane Harris: I don't wanna get ahead of the process. Let's say that.

Benjamin Wittes: Alright. Shane Harris, not on the byline, but a key figure behind the “Houthi PC small group,” which has gotta be the name of somebody's next album.

Shane Harris: Totally.

Benjamin Wittes: We will see you soon. Thanks for joining us.

Shane Harris: Thanks Ben.

Benjamin Wittes: The Lawfare Podcast is produced in cooperation with the Brookings Institution. You can get ad-free versions of this and other Lawfare podcasts by becoming a Lawfare material supporter through our website, lawfaremedia.org/support. You'll also get access to special events and other content available only to our supporters.

Please rate and review us wherever you get your podcasts, and look out for our other podcast offerings, including Rational Security, Allies, and Escalation, our latest Lawfare Presents podcast series on the war in Ukraine. Check out our written work at lawfaremedia.org.

The podcast is edited by Jen Patja and your audio engineer this episode was me. I did it myself. Our theme song is from Alibi Music. As always, thank you for listening.