Lawfare Daily: The New Syrian Government and Its Problems

[Intro]

Steven Heydemann: Episodes like this could happen again. We could see a similar kind of really fragmented, almost uncontrolled reaction if we see additional provocations from Syrians who remain loyal to the Assad regime.

Daniel Byman: It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Daniel Byman, the foreign policy editor of Lawfare, and I'm here today with Steve Heydemann. He is a professor of Middle Eastern studies at Smith College and a longtime observer of the Middle East.

Steven Heydemann: Almost immediately on the heels of the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel intervened militarily in Syria and now occupies significant territory in southern Syria and seems to be setting itself up as a permanent or semi-permanent presence in, in southern Syria.

Daniel Byman: Today we're talking about the new government in Syria and the many problems that Syria is facing.

[Main podcast]

Steve, the situation in Syria has been rapidly changing, not only with the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, but in the months that have followed. Can you catch us up since the fall of the regime? How has the situation evolved?

Steven Heydemann: Sure, I'm happy to be here with you, Dan, and I should say this is an especially auspicious day to be doing the podcast because this is the 14th anniversary of the start of the Syrian uprising in 2011. It began more or less on this day in 2011.

And we're about three months into a political transition that I think very few expected, and which is, as you indicated, has brought an enormous change to, to Syria and a change that's unfolding very rapidly and is still quite fluid. I think on, on one level, if, if you look at, at what has happened in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on Dec. 8, the, the, the progress that has been made in putting the pieces of a political transition in place has been quite extraordinary.

Now, there have been acts of violence in, in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime. That's not unexpected. Last week, we saw some especially tragic confrontations between remnants of the Assad regime and loyalists of the interim government, security forces of the interim government, in which many civilians were killed, but, but that was not typical for how the transition has unfolded.

In general, what we've seen is pretty steady progress on the part of the, the acting president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of this Islamist armed group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, that played a leading role in the overthrow of the Assad regime, and, and, and, al-Sharaa has really, I think, made quite steady progress in putting, as I said, the pieces of a political transition in place.

He has secured the agreement of armed factions to his role as acting president. He has convened a large gathering of Syrians to talk about what the core principles are that a transition should be attentive to. He has selected a group of legal experts, Islamic authorities to design an interim constitution that he's now approved. He has established what he calls a national security council to guide him in dealing with remaining security issues that the country faces, and there are quite, quite a few.

And very importantly, last week, he also signed an agreement with Kurdish fighters under the Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria's northeast concerning their position in a future Syria, their integration into some new reformed security sector that is still very much in formation, but which has at least gotten something of a start. And, and these are all really very important benchmarks. In effect, we have the political framework for a transition in place. We have the security framework for a transition in place.

On the other hand, if you look a little bit beneath the surface, what seems to be happening is that Ahmed al-Sharaa is designing a transition that will consolidate his authority as Syria's president throughout the five year transition period. He has not only put himself in the role of president, but commander in chief of the armed forces. And in the new constitution—the transitional constitution that was approved just a few days ago—he has direct or indirect authority over parliament, over the judiciary, and he has given himself, in the new constitution, quite extraordinary power.

So, while we watch events unfold in a fashion that appears on one level, much more orderly than I think we oft, we feared, given how quickly the Assad regime collapsed.  On the other hand, the system that's emerging is one that I think gives us cause for concern. It's a system in which power will remain heavily centralized in the hands of a president. It's a system that will unquestionably exhibit the Islamist features, the Islamist attributes that reflect the ideology of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. And so even though there's been a lot of discussion of minority rights and tolerance and freedom and participation and accountability, what we're seeing, I think, leads us to be a bit wary about where the country is going.

Daniel Byman: Well, let me follow up on that last point. And then I want to circle back to a few of your other observations. You're an expert on authoritarianism and you've judged it in its various guises throughout the greater Middle East. Is there a kind of model you look at and say, you know, I think Syria under al-Sharaa will look like this country or this leader in a couple of years?

Steven Heydemann: The closest model that comes to mind really is the way Turkey has evolved under President Erdoğan over the past decade or so, in which you have a really super empowered executive, super empowered president, who has direct control over all of the other branches of government, the military, the judiciary.

A government that surveils and controls the media very closely. A government that is relatively intolerant of dissent. And, and a government that pursues a fairly liberal free market style of, of economic policy. And, and we can't really say for sure that Syria will emulate in any way the, the Turkish model, but if I had to look for a comparison, that is the one that I would view as perhaps closest.

The one really crucial difference I, I, I expect is that even though Erdoğan himself is an Islamist, I think Ahmed al-Sharaa and some of those he's appointed to very, very senior positions in his, in his government have an even deeper, ideological commitment to a vision of Islam that may be even more restrictive, perhaps socially more regressive, than that of Erdogan.

Daniel Byman: Steve, let me follow up on the, your point about the recent fighting. As you noted, some degree of score settling is inevitable after brutal civil war, but the media reports put the number of deaths at over a thousand people. Is this the sort of thing that's likely to recur? And what's your sense of the causes of this particular fighting?

Steven Heydemann: Well, let's, let's recall, I think, first of all, that this fighting got underway because a very large number of troops of former Assad regime officers and security officials launched a major attack against the forces of the interim government. The media reports indicate that there may have been as many as 4,000 Assad regime loyalists who participated in the initial operation that, that led to the kind of reprisals that, that we saw last week.

And as that confrontation erupted, the interim government responded by dispatching its own security forces to the coastal region of Syria, which is the heartland of Syria's Alawi community, its minority Alawi community, the community to which Bashar al-Assad himself and his father belonged. And in the course of confronting the Assad regime fighters who had launched this attack, we saw as well an enormous movement into the coastal area of fighters affiliated with other armed groups, other armed factions, as well as Sunni civilians from villages near where the confrontation was occurring, including villages that had experienced severe brutality at the hands of the Assad regime earlier in the Syrian conflict.

And that turned out to be a formula really for, for massive abuses at the hands of those who moved into the coast to try to put down this uprising on the part of Assad regime fighters. And we know that there were, as you mentioned, perhaps as many as a thousand people killed. We know that perhaps a quarter of those fatalities were caused by fighters loyal to the Assad regime, so the violence was not one directional in any sense.

But it was a really important testing moment for the interim government. And in many ways, it failed to test because what we saw in the fighting that occurred was the limits of the interim government's control over armed factions that had, at least nominally, pledged their loyalty to this new government, to Ahmed al-Sharaa.

In fact, as the fighting continued, it became clear that many of these armed groups were acting quite independently. They were committing grievous abuses against civilians. Some of the treatment of Alawi civilians that we saw was quite grotesque. And they conducted themselves in a way that I think demonstrated their complete lack of concern for accountability. They were clearly outside of any kind of chain of command.

And, and the chief takeaway, I think, from that episode is how limited the interim government's control continues to be over the many, many armed factions that are still operating in Syria. And that's deeply troubling. There is a long way to go before any kind of centralized command structure will be in place in Syria. And so episodes like this could happen again. We could see a similar kind of really fragmented, almost uncontrolled reaction if we see additional provocations from Syrians who remain loyal to the, to the Assad regime.

On the other hand, it seems that the intent of the Assad regime fighters who launched this wave of violence was to spark a cascade of anti-government violence across a much broader swath of Syria, perhaps even reigniting a full scale civil war. And that failed. It didn't happen. And I think we can take a very, very modest degree of comfort in the failure of this operation to cause that kind of cascade. But still, the way the forces affiliated with the new government conducted themselves was, was grievous and is something that that Ahmed al-Sharaa himself is going to need to take very seriously to prevent future outbreaks like this.

Daniel Byman: So, as that was happening, and as I was starting to, to worry about Syria, really going off of a, a conflict cliff, as you also know it, there was this deal between the al-Sharaa government and the Kurds. Can you talk a little bit more about that in a particular, what did they agree to and what concessions, if any, did each side make?

Steven Heydemann: Yeah, the relationship between the Syrian Democratic Forces, Kurdish led Syrian Democratic Forces—the, the units that the U.S. has supported for the past seven or eight years because of their participation in the anti-ISIS operations in northeast Syria—the relationship between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the interim government has been a difficult one from the beginning.

The SDF has hoped to negotiate a reintegration into Syria that would preserve a fairly significant degree of autonomy, of self governance, and would preserve the integrity of the SDF as an armed group. And from Ahmed al-Sharaa's perspective, the only option that, that the new government in Syria was prepared to consider was the integration of the, of the SDF fighters as individuals, and the, the reassertion of the authority of the central government over the northeast, an area that has been outside of the government's control since about 20, 2012. So, so the differences were quite significant.

In addition, Turkey, bordering Syria to the north, views the SDF as an extension of a Kurdish irredentist group with which it has been at war for almost 40 years, the PKK. And so Turkey was threatening military intervention to suppress the SDF, and that created an additional, I think, source of, of pressure on the SDF to reach agreement with, with the Syrian central government, with the interim government.

And an additional factor, I think, that might have pushed the SDF toward this agreement is the engagement of the U.S. military, actually. Because we're aware from media reporting that senior officials in the U.S. military advised the SDF that this was the time for them to reach an agreement with the central government, because the fate of U.S. forces that have been in northeast Syria since about 2017 really could not be guaranteed. The Trump administration has committed to the withdrawal of U.S. forces. And, and so what we saw was a kind of coming together of a number of different factors that I think created the conditions that led to this agreement.

As to what it contained, it's a very broad, very general understanding. A document—an eight point document—was signed by Ahmed Al-Sharaa and by Mazloum Abdi, the head of the SDF, and it contained a number of very general principles that reflected the willingness of Ahmed Al-Sharaa to be responsive to the concerns of Kurds in the northeast.

It acknowledges Kurds as full and equal citizens of Syria. It acknowledges the right of Kurds to participate as equal citizens in Syrian politics. Those were, those were things that Kurds had not enjoyed under Bashar al-Assad and his father. And so it, it really signaled, I think, a willingness on the part of, of the new government in Syria to accommodate some of the principal concerns of Syria’s Kurds.

What we didn't get any clarity about is how the two sides resolved their differences around the integration of SDF fighters into the Syrian military. We didn't get any clarity about whether the northeast would be able to be governed with any measure of autonomy. And so a lot of the really important details remain to be resolved or if they were worked out, we, we don't know how they were worked out.

But nonetheless, I think the agreement did represent an incredibly important step forward. Not least, I think it meant the, it removed any incentive that Turkey might've had to intervene militarily against the SDF. It brings the SDF into a nominally unified Syrian security sector, with a lot of details still to be clarified. And it removed in the process the possibility of a confrontation between forces of the interim government and the SDF.

So it's, it's a very important step, but with a lot still of ambiguity around important details.

Daniel Byman: I want to also discuss another major force that you've mentioned a couple times, which is Turkey. Could you describe how Turkey views the current government, as well as how Turkey might use its influence to try to change things?

Steven Heydemann: Right. Turkey has been one of the principal sponsors of the, the current government. It sees itself as the country that is best positioned to influence serious political transition. It sees itself as the country best positioned to play a lead role in Syria's post conflict reconstruction, if and when that eventually gets underway.

And that has a lot to do with the role that, that Turkey has had in northern Syria pretty much since the start of the Syrian uprising in, in 2011. Syria has intervened militarily in northern Syria several times to prevent the Kurds from consolidating control over a contiguous swath of territory on Turkey's southern border. It has sponsored a number of armed factions as its proxies in, in northern Syria. And it was very close in terms of intelligence sharing and other kinds of activities with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in the northwest of Syria, even though the relationships often, were often complicated and, and, and not entirely collegial or cooperative.

But because Turkey has such a long border with Syria because it has occupied such an important position in the north and sees Syria as, in many respects, as its, as its backyard, because it has been so concerned about the potential threat from the Syrian, the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces, Turkey has moved very quickly to consolidate its position as really the preeminent regional actor with an interest in shaping Syria's political transition.

Daniel Byman: Let me follow up with really a similar question about Israel, where we've already seen Israel intervene militarily in post-Assad Syria. What role do you think Israel is likely to play in the coming months, and is that something that the U.S. government should be trying to influence one way or another?

Steven Heydemann: Yeah, Israel's strategy in Syria has been interesting and somewhat troubling to watch as it's unfolded.

As you mentioned, almost immediately on the heels of the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel intervened militarily in Syria. It now occupies significant territory in southern Syria and seems to be setting itself up as a sort of permanent or semi-permanent presence in southern Syria. It has launched hundreds of attacks to degrade the equipment, the military equipment of the Assad regime. It has begun an outreach to the Syrian Druze community on the grounds that this is a minority with which Israel could form some form of, of alliance.

And all of that is premised on this assumption on the part of the current Israeli government that Israel's security can best be assured by the presence of a weak and fragmented Syria to its north. And that's a position that grows out of the decades and decades of antagonism and conflict between Syria and Israel, in part, and it grows out of the understanding on the part of the Israeli government as well that Syria's interim government is a Salafist, jihadist government that will inevitably pose a threat to Israeli security.

Now, what's, what's troubling about this is that Israeli officials seem to feel that a weakened and fragmented Syria is in Israel's best interest. And yet, a weakened and fragmented Syria is also one that is likely to invite the return of Iranian intervention in some form, which Israel, I think, would view as a significant threat. A weakened and fragmented Syria is a country that Turkey would view with a great deal of concern and might take steps to try to, to intervene in, to stabilize this country on, on, on its southern border.

And, and so it really does seem as, as if the conclusion that Israeli officials have reached, that the only path for assuring Israeli security is through the instability of Syria is, is quite short sighted, and, and has implications that may work very much to Israel's disadvantage.

And it's interesting because we're now beginning to hear that concern reflected within the Israeli political establishment as well. Former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, either today or yesterday, came out with a statement in which he called for improved relations with the new government of Syria, for recognizing the government of Ahmed al-Sharaa, and for beginning a process of engagement. And he expressed the sense that in its current policy, Israel is missing an historic opportunity to reset its relationship with Syria.

So, what the Israeli government is doing is contested among Israelis. It's an approach that is viewed with a great deal of concern outside of Syria. I think the one, the one very important actor that seems to be supportive of Israel's policy is in fact the United States.

And I think that is a reflection of perspectives within the Trump administration that are closely aligned with those of the Israeli government that once a jihadist, always a jihadist; that, that Ahmed Al-Sharaa himself has a rather troubling past as a, as a former member of, of Al-Qaeda who fought against the U.S in Iraq; and that therefore Israel's interest in a weak and fragmented Syria is an outcome that plays to American interests as well.

So I, I do think that, that the U.S. has quietly up till now been supportive of the approach of the Israeli government. And that, I think, gives Israel a great deal of license to continue its current policy. But, as I said, it's a policy that I fear has implications that will backfire in, in quite serious ways over time.

Daniel Byman: Let me use our last bit of time here to talk more on the U.S. role. The United States, of course, has a series of sanctions it's imposed on Syria in the past related both to the civil war and human rights, but also to narcotics and also to support for terrorism, and in general has treated Syria as, as a hostile country, often with good reason.

How should the Trump administration approach Syria? Should it be lifting economic sanctions? Should, in general it be embracing the new government? Or would you recommend kind of a wait and see sort of approach?

Steven Heydemann: Well, whether the Trump administration moves to deepen engagement with the new Syrian government, I think addressing the issue of sanctions is really of crucial importance. Because unless there is a process of economic recovery that feels tangible to Syrians, I think the prospects for a successful political transition become much, much more remote.

I really do view the economic crisis that Syria is experiencing as perhaps the most significant threat to the progress of serious political transition. And, and so the, the reluctance of the U.S. to address the issue of sanctions in a comprehensive way—most of which were imposed on the Assad regime and that regime of course no longer exists—in my view, I think will become a significant obstacle to economic recovery and a significant threat to Syria's near term, mid-term stability and political progress.

Now, the Trump administration, I think, has shown, to date, significant reluctance to address the issue of sanctions. It has not taken any steps, for example, to remove the designation of Syria as a state sponsor of terror, which was imposed in 1979. It has welcomed statements from Ahmed al-Sharaa about his willingness to complete the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons supplies. It has acknowledged his statements in opposition to terrorism and to ISIS.

So it is, it is acknowledging that the new government is saying the right things, and yet when it comes to the economy, we really have not seen any movement at all from the Trump administration to ease conditions that would support Syria's economic recovery. And, and I think that's unfortunate because Syrians are very quickly asking themselves, am I better off today than I was under the Assad regime? Is this new government able to deliver on the critical economic concerns of, of, of me and my family?

And the inability of the interim government to, to support improvement in Syria's economy is increasingly going to become a target of, of popular grievance and popular anger. And it's an issue that I think the Trump administration could do a great deal more to, to assist with.

Daniel Byman: Steve, that was extremely helpful. I appreciate your willingness to guide us through the most important issues facing Syria today. So thank you very much for joining us at Lawfare.

Steven Heydemann: Well, thank you, Dan. I'm happy to talk with you.

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