Lawfare Daily: The U.S. Bombing of Yemen and the Houthi Response

[Intro]

Gregory Johnsen: For the Houthis, while the U.S. is, is more capable than the Saudi and the Emirati Air Force and is able probably to inflict more damage, the Houthis have been down this road before and they've managed to survive and even thrive despite massive airstrikes.

Daniel Byman: It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Daniel Byman, the foreign policy editor of Lawfare, and I'm here with Gregory Johnsen, who is a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf State Institute in Washington, D.C. and one of the country's leading experts on Yemen.

Gregory Johnsen: The U.S. is wary about yet one more open ended conflict in the Middle East. But if the U.S. is clear minded about its goal that the Houthis have to stop this, then that requires a decisive military defeat of this organization, which is going to be very, very difficult.

Daniel Byman: Today, we're going to talk about the U.S. bombing of Yemen and how the Houthis in Yemen are reacting.

[Main podcast]

Gregory, I just wanted to start out with a very basic question. On Saturday night, the United States bombed Yemen. Why did it do so? Can you give us an overview of what's been going on?

Gregory Johnsen: Yeah, absolutely. So when the Trump administration came into power in January, one of the first things that President Trump did was to designate the Houthis—this is the group that controls large portions of north and western Yemen. He designated them as a foreign terrorist organization, which was a designation that the Trump administration had made in its first term right as it was leaving, leaving office. The Biden administration later reversed that policy. And so Trump, Trump reinstated that.

Once he did that in January, what the Trump administration has been trying to do basically for the past year and several months following Hamas's attack on, on Israel in, in Gaza in October of 2023. The Houthis have carried out a number of strikes on commercial shipping in the, in the Red Sea, and they've been carrying out these strikes, targeting a number of ships, including U.S. naval vessels who are there to, to protect the shipping, shipping lanes.

The Biden administration has tried, tried when it was in office, a number of different approaches, including some limited air strikes. But really by the time the Biden administration left power, at the, the end of 2024, early ‘25, the Houthis were able to basically claim victory in the Red Sea conflict that had been going on throughout much of 2024. And I think the Trump administration has made clear that there were going to be repercussions for the Houthis.

And so what we saw on Saturday was the beginning of a number of much more extensive airstrikes that the U.S. is undertaking. They're ongoing; I think the secretary of defense has said that this operation is, is open ended. And so the Trump administration is basically trying to show the Houthis that they did not win and that the U.S. can basically bring them to heel, deter them from carrying out future attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea while simultaneously degrading their capacity so that they're unable to carry out any of those attacks.

And I think today we're recording this on Wednesday, President Trump in a post on TruthSocial said the Houthis should expect a complete annihilation.

Daniel Byman: So what did the U.S. actually bomb?

Gregory Johnsen: Yeah, that's a good question. So they've they bombed a number of what they call weapon sites, so any storage facilities that the Houthis have. There's been some factories that have been bombed. I think they've also bombed the houses of some Houthi military leaders; there's been some military leaders that the Houthis have said have died. I think the casualty toll right now is several dozen, somewhere 50, 60s, but it's very, very early and obviously the strikes are ongoing. So that number is likely to change.

I think the key thing to take away is that while the Biden administration in 2024 largely limited itself to some of the mobile missile launchers, missile sites that the Houthis had, some of the places where they were launching amphibious operations against the United States, as well as weapons storage facilities, the Trump administration has taken a much, much more expansive view and it has a much wider targeting list.

And so they're carrying out strikes across northern Yemen, across Houthi held territories with the idea of really bending the Houthis to, to the U.S. as well, and making sure that the Houthis aren't in a position to carry out these strikes in the future.

This, I would just add, is going to be fairly difficult to do because the Houthis have been under airstrikes for years now. So the war in Yemen, the regional war, and perhaps we can get into this a little bit later, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE started a decade ago in 2015. And Saudi Arabia and the UAE carried out for a number of years against the Houthis.

So for the Houthis, while the U.S. is more capable than the Saudi and the Emirati Air Force, and is able probably to inflict more damage, the Houthis have been down this road before and they've managed to survive, and even thrive despite massive airstrikes.

Daniel Byman: Let me ask for a little more detail on this because to me, this is a really important point. So as you noted, the Biden administration was more restricted in its targeting. And I think the Trump folks would say, perhaps quite reasonably, look, this did not work. That if you want to influence the Houthis, you have to hit much harder.

And if I understand your remarks you're saying, you know, given the nature of the civil war, its intensity, this is unlikely to make a significant difference in Houthi decision making. Talk me through, you know, why they seem like they would resist this especially given that Hezbollah, for example, Hamas eventually did cave to some degree in the face of military pressure.

Gregory Johnsen: Yeah, that's a good question. I think there's two parts. And so the first part that I would lay out is sort of what I see as the, broadly speaking, the five major options that the United States has had in Yemen over the past year. I don't think those options have changed. So I can walk through that.

And then I also talk about the Houthi, the reason I think the Houthis have been baiting the United States over the past 14 or 15 months and why the Houthis really want this war with the United States. And why the Houthis think a direct confrontation and conflict with the United States is in their best interest, their best domestic interest.

But on the U.S. side, I think the U.S. has had five major options. One is sort of a defend only option. That is to patrol the Red Sea and basically shoot down the drones and missiles that the Houthis are firing at commercial shipping. That's what the Biden administration attempted from really November of 2023 up until January of 2024. That was option one, defend only.

Option number two is what the Biden administration eventually decided on in January of 2024. And this was limited military strikes. This is strikes intended to sort of degrade Houthi capabilities and, and deter the Houthis by punishment from carrying out future attacks on, on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. That didn't really work. That is, the Biden administration, along with the U.K. at different times, carried out strikes on, on Houthi—as we talked about, Houthi sort of weapon caches and Houthi missile launchers. But wasn't really able to do enough damage that the Houthis were deterred or degraded from carrying out strikes on commercial shipping.

So that brings us to option three, which is much more extensive military strikes. And this is the approach that the Trump administration has decided on and it has begun implementing as of Saturday. And this is carrying out wide ranging, massive air strikes on what remains of Houthi infrastructure, targeting Houthi military leaders, attempting to destroy, really break the Houthis' will so that they aren't there moving forward.

Option four, which the U.S. has not elected to go down yet, is basically involving itself in the domestic Yemeni civil war. A civil war that goes back, really, to the Arab Spring and primarily to 2014, when the Houthis were able to take over much of, much of northern Yemen.

The reason this may be appealing—and we'll get back to this in a second—the reason this may be appealing for the Trump administration is that there's a possibility, and I would say indeed, perhaps a likelihood, that airstrikes alone are not going to be enough to defeat the Houthis. That is, you'll need some sort of a ground component.

Now the U.S. is not to the best of my knowledge, even contemplating putting ground troops into Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the Emiratis who've had troops in Yemen are both actively looking for a way out of the conflict in Yemen, which really only leaves sort of the anti-Houthi coalition in Yemen. And this is a weird amalgamation of different groups, groups that have fought one another previously, who are basically aligned against the Houthis.

And so I think the temptation for the Trump administration will be that if these much more extensive airstrikes don't do what the Trump administration wants, and that is if the Houthis are able to survive and continue to carry out retaliatory actions, then it may be very tempting for the Trump administration to start supporting this anti-Houthi coalition on the ground as a way of defeating the Houthis. That's option four.

Option five, if none of those work, is coming to the belief that, look, the Houthis are a problem, but they're basically just an extension of Iran. And really the major problem here is Iranian support. And so instead of dealing with the Houthis, let's just go after Iran directly. President Trump has, has threatened that in, in some of his posts in recent days, warning Iran to cease the smuggling of ballistic missile and other munition components to the Houthis that, that has been going on now for, for several years.

And so those are the five basic options that the U.S. has had. And what you’ve seen is a, is a slow escalation by the U.S. first, the defend only didn't work. Then limited strikes under the Biden administration didn't work. And now the Trump administration is taking door number three, which is much more extensive military strikes against the Houthis.

The question, as I mentioned earlier, is what happens if door number three doesn't work? Does that mean that the Trump administration then needs to find a way to put pressure on the ground, bring pressure on the ground to bear on the Houthis? So that's on the U.S. side.

For, for the Houthis, I think one of the reasons—and indeed, I would say the primary reason—that the Houthis have been baiting the United States in, over the past year and two or three months is that the war in Yemen, the war between Saudi Arabia and the Emiratis by 2022 was, was really winding down. And so the Houthis basically think of it a little bit like musical chairs. That is, the music was coming to an end and the Houthis didn't have the chair that they wanted.

And Yemen, Yemen's a very poor country. The exports that Yemen has, even though it doesn't have much, are largely oil and gas. And those oil and gas facilities are located in Marib, which is a province directly east of Houthi controlled territory; in Shabwah, which is south and east of Marib; and then further out in the east in Hadramout.

And, and one Yemeni analyst who, who I respect talks about this as the triangle of power. And the Houthis know that in order to survive long term in Yemen, they need at least one of these areas that will give them an economic base to continue to survive. So over the past several years, the Houthis have been trying time and time again to move into Marib and to take those oil and gas fields. They have not been successful.

But what the Houthis are betting on right now is that A, they can survive the airstrikes by the United States and B, by being involved in a direct conflict with the U.S. and Israel, they'll gain more domestic support. And that domestic support will translate into being able to take Marib or Shabwah or maybe even both, which will give them the long term stability and the long term hold on power through that economic base that they really need.

Daniel Byman: Let me ask you to expand on what you, you mentioned briefly. You talked about the Saudi and UAE intervention in 2015, but you also noted that they're both kind of desperately trying to find their way out. Are there lessons the U.S. can learn from their intervention, and can you talk a little bit about what you think their policies towards Yemen are likely to be going forward?

Gregory Johnsen: Yeah, that's a, that's a very good and I think a very interesting question. And there's, the answer is a little, there's a degree of irony in it.

So if we think back to 2015—this is Mohammed bin Salman is just starting to move up first as defense minister and then as, then as crown prince in Saudi Arabia—the Obama administration, which was in power in the White House at the time, Saudi Arabia said that it was going to move into Yemen. It didn't want a Hezbollah-like group on its southern border.

And the Obama administration really cautioned the Saudis in 2015 and said, look, we, we, we know what you're going to do, we support it. But you need to be very, very careful when you go into Yemen ‘cause this, this thing can, you know, this, this thing can go on much longer than you think. And, and at the time the Saudis estimated that about six weeks of airstrikes would bring the Houthis to their knees and allow the internationally recognized government to be reestablished in Sana'a, in the, in the capital of Yemen.

Fast forward a decade and the Biden administration is contemplating going into Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Now the shoe is on the other foot and Saudi Arabia is counseling the United States, we know you want to go in and strike the Houthis, but be careful because this can last a lot longer than you, than you think it might. And so it's, it's been an interesting situation in for the U.S.

I think one of the main lessons that, that the U.S. can take away from Saudi Arabia and the Emirates attempts to bring the Houthis to, to heel is, is basically that airstrikes alone and air power alone are likely not going to be sufficient to bring about the goals that you want, which is, I think gets us back to sort of the original point.

What happens if these strikes as extensive and as damaging as they are likely to be, what happens if they don't bring about the political goals that the U.S. wants to see? That is, if the Houthis are still able to present a threat to commercial shipping in the Red Sea, how long does the U.S. continue to do this before it realizes it needs a ground component?

And that's what Saudi Arabia was really reluctant to do. Saudi Arabia did not want to put ground troops into what is a very rugged, mountainous area in northern Yemen for what could be a, a bloody, a potentially guerrilla conflict with, with no clear avenue for success. And I think eventually the United States might be faced with a similar, a similar decision to make.

I think the most likely option for the United States would be, as we mentioned, sort of allying itself with the anti-Houthi coalition. There are a number of, I think, potential dangers in doing so; primarily many of these people in the anti Houthi coalition, many of them are guilty of war crimes in a war that's gone on for quite some time. There's really no party in Yemen that has clean hands. Everyone has blood on its hands, and so aligning yourself with one of these groups brings with it a number of potential costs, both reputationally and otherwise.

I think also one of the options that the Houthis have for potential retaliation—and the Houthis have threatened this in recent months—is that they could continue not just to attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea, but to fire missiles into Saudi Arabia and attempt to damage Saudi Arabia as well. So, basically forcing Saudi to pay the price for, for U.S. actions in Yemen.

Daniel Byman: In my view, at least, this has been a pessimistic podcast where you've been very clear about the limits of U.S. power and the problems with the Houthis and the weaknesses of various Arab neighbors. I realize the Trump administration may not be listening to this podcast, but if officials were and they were open minded on what to do in Yemen, what would you recommend?

Gregory Johnsen: Yeah, that's, that's a great point. And I mean, this is, this is—Yemen is a challenge. There are a number of these challenges where you would like to have a full range of options, often though that's not the case in the real world because of decisions that were made either by previous administrations, by people who are in the White House, by what the U.S. did 10 years ago or 6 years ago, and that's not a very satisfactory answer, but that's simply the case.

So there are, you know, there, there was a time in which the Houthis were on the verge of extinction. This is a group that has been fighting in Yemen since 2004. They've basically been fighting for the past two decades plus, almost continually. And there have been times in which their power has waxed and waned, but they've been able to survive.

When it comes right now, I think the U.S. has to decide A, what it wants. I think the U.S. has decided that it wants a cessation of attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, the ability of the Houthis to fire missiles into Israel and to some of U.S. partners into Saudi Arabia and so forth. If that's what the U.S. wants, then the only way to get that is to destroy the Houthis, and that is to drive them out of power, because if the Houthis are in power, they will continue to do this when they, as they have the capabilities as they've shown.

And, but that, to bring about that goal is going to require a fairly high cost for the U.S. That is, if you buy the argument that I'm making, airstrikes alone are not going to be sufficient. That's going to require some sort of a ground element, whether U.S. forces or other forces that that we've talked about before. But that's going to take a while, and it's going to require U.S. involvement.

And I think this is one of the reasons that the Biden administration attempted the limited air strikes because it did not want to get bogged down. Everything else that the U.S. has going on in Ukraine, talking about INDOPACOM, its strategic competition with the PRC—the U.S. is wary about yet one more open-ended conflict in, in the Middle East. But if the U.S. is clear minded about its goal that the Houthis have to stop this, then that requires a decisive military defeat of this organization, which is going to be very, very difficult.

So the U.S. has two options, I think, which is either A, change your goals, reduce your goals, or B, be willing to go in for the long haul and do everything required to decisively and definitively militarily defeat the Houthis, which is in, at least in my opinion, is not going to be particularly easy and it's not going to be very quick.

Daniel Byman: Let's say that the U.S. does reduce its goals. Is it plausible or even likely that, I'll say two years from now or several years from now, that if things flare up again between Israel and the Palestinians or some other crisis, that we'll also see Houthi attacks against shipping in the Red Sea and elsewhere?

Gregory Johnsen: Yeah, I think as long as they have capabilities. And I think to, you know, to give the Trump administration credit, the Trump administration is, is trying to financially cut off the Houthis. So this was part of the foreign terrorist organization, that is, it wanted to dry up all the support.

 And certainly the Houthis have weaponized humanitarian aid for years. They have used humanitarian aid to solicit and, and recruit child soldiers. They have used it as a carrot to reward their supporters and something to withhold from those who, who are not supporting them.

I think the Trump administration, as well as the Biden administration have both attempted to interdict military shipments that are being smuggled from Iran. But this is very, very hard to do because they're coming across in a number of different places on sort of Yemen's eastern coast, across the border with Oman, as well as through the Red Sea, coming in very small shipments that are making their way to the Houthis.

So there are a number of things that the U.S. is trying to do outside of just sort of the military strikes. I think the military strikes are obviously the most sort of visible, but it's going to be again, very hard to do.

I think to your question, in two years, in six months, in 18 months, if conflict breaks out between the Palestinians and the Israelis, once again, I think if the Houthis have the capacity and have the capabilities, they will absolutely continue to strike at commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

And one of the reasons is that within Yemen, the Palestinian cause regardless of political party, —regardless of where one is on the ideological or religious spectrum—the Palestinian cause is incredibly popular. And so for the Houthis, they are not a particularly popular group; they're an authoritarian group that is carrying out, you know, that arrests its opponents, that mines and destroys the houses of its political opponents. By wrapping themselves basically in the Palestinian flag, the Houthis make themselves more palatable to a broader Yemeni audience than they would otherwise.

Daniel Byman: Gregory Johnsen, thank you very much for joining us.

Gregory Johnsen: Thanks so much for having me.

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