Lawfare Daily: Turmoil in South Korea

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[Intro]

Andrew Yeo: After all that drama, the National Assembly quickly passes, as I mentioned, 190 to zero. So, unanimously, to rescind martial law and I think there was some anxious waiting whether President Yoon would accept that, and then he did. He said that he would end martial law, but we haven't heard from him at all. He hasn't said anything.

Benjamin Wittes: It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Benjamin Wittes, editor-in-chief of Lawfare, with Andrew Yeo, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution.

Andrew Yeo: I mean, let's say that Yoon miraculously survives. I don't think Trump's going to care that he instituted martial law. Trump may think, well, that was something that I should have thought of perhaps. I mean, we had the January 6th riots. So, it's not going to be a blemish in the eyes of Trump. 

Benjamin Wittes: Today we're talking turmoil in South Korea. Within about 48 hours, there was a declaration of martial law, the National Assembly convened to rescind the declaration of martial Law. The president accepted it, and now we have an impeachment going on. What the heck, people?

[Main Podcast]

So let's start with the fact that I think it's fair to say that most Americans did not wake up on Monday morning this week with a, on their bingo cards, a coup slash declaration of martial law slash impeachment in South Korea. Or even a sense that there was a political crisis brewing there at all.

And so give us a little bit of background to get started. How much was this hiding in plain sight and we just didn't notice and how much was this really a surprise?

Andrew Yeo: Sure. Well, let me tell you just how much I was caught off-guard and I'm supposed to be the Korea Chair at the Brookings Institution. But my colleague, our India expert Tanvi Madan and I were in Seoul last week and she sent me a message on WhatsApp and the yesterday morning saying, never a busy day. And I wasn't really sure what she was referring to. I assumed it was because of our flight schedules because she, there was record snow in Seoul.

And then I come into work, I check my emails, I have like seventy media requests in my inbox. I'm like, what's going on? And I see that there's martial law. So I can tell you that even I myself had no idea this was coming. But if we unpack what has happened, there is some context to it.

President Yoon Suk Yeol came into power, and he was voted in 2022 with the slimmest margin possible, with 0.7%. And since then, he has never exceeded over 40 percent in terms of public opinion approval ratings. And more often than not, he was hovering between 20 and 30%, especially in the last four or five months.

So he hasn't been terribly popular. And on top of that, he doesn't have control of the National Assembly. So it's a divided government. And the opposition has been really going after him, his government officials in terms of these different impeachment processes. They're going after his wife for various scandals and he's tried to block a lot of those.

Benjamin Wittes: It's always the handbags.

Andrew Yeo: Yeah, the handbags. Something about Koreans and handbags. But I think the last straw for him was with the budget, so he tried to pass a budget and the National Assembly made some significant cuts that took away from some of the projects they wanted to implement related to national security, related to the prosecutor's office, related to even things that are, would normally be considered bipartisan, like childcare and so I believe that he felt that this was the last straw and he's not going to be able to get anything done moving forward.

He's hit about the halfway mark. And so South Korea's presidency is a five-year term with no re-election. He's hit about two and a half months. And so in some ways, this was a huge political gamble to just declare martial law. It's like hitting a giant reset button. But as myself, many other experts are wondering, you know, what was he thinking? Because what would the path forward then be once you implement martial law, especially if it's coming from left field.

Benjamin Wittes: All right, so, you know, Korea, South Korea has a bit of a history of military rule, but it's not a recent history. I mean, I sort of remember as a late teenager, early 20 something, late 80s, South Korea is kind of coming out of military rule around the same time as Taiwan is, really. Or I think is fair to say, even at the beginning of a second Trump administration, the urge to hit a reset button in the form of declaring martial law is one that's a little bit foreign to you know, American leaders. We've, you know, we had January 6th, right? Extend your term with a coup.

But like the idea that you would reach the middle of the term, you'd face political deadlock. And so you revert to martial law is a concept that, like, does not follow logically to me. And I'm wondering if that's something that makes a little more sense in the context of South Korean history, or whether it's just as weird to you as it is to me?

Andrew Yeo: It does, and it doesn't. So let me explain. It doesn't in the sense that, you're right, South Korea's political transition to democracy was in 1987. It was part of the third wave of democratization. And South Korea, along with Taiwan, is seen as a successful case of this third wave. That it's, you know, it's a successful, consolidated democracy.

The last time there was martial law was 40 years ago. It was in 1980, instituted by the dictator, President Chun Doo-hwan. So there hasn't been martial law since then. So it's extreme. Like, no, that's why South Koreans were, are angry. And even his own party members are now calling for President Yoon's resignation.

But, on the other hand, if President Yoon and some of his cabinet officials are, there's been arguments that he's been influenced by something known as the New Right Movement, or New Right Ideology. And this traces its roots back to the authoritarian period. So it's guided by a strong anti-communist ideology. It's very anti-North Korea. And you would see this in President Yoon's speeches when he talks about freedom and democracy.

So from a United States standpoint, we President Biden actually loved President Yoon because he talked about making the U.S. South Korea alliance the centerpiece of his foreign policy. And President Yoon often talked about liberal democracy, values-based diplomacy. In his inauguration address, he used the word freedom over 30 times. And I've checked other presidential speeches and statements, and that's unprecedented.

But he would at times refer to opposition members or those who are opposed to his policies as anti-state. He would say anti-state forces. And I also teach at Catholic University. I'm teaching a class on Korean politics. We watched this film 1987 and you see how the authoritarian regime tries to, they basically try to make these blanket statements about communism and North Korean sympathizers as trying to overthrow the state.

If you see President Yoon's speech that he gave justifying martial law. He makes, it's like language from the 1980s. So there's arguments that himself, his defense minister, his former defense minister, the unification minister, they are also part of this new right movement or ideology. And so if you're coming from that, if you have that as a precedence, then I guess it's not so surprising that you would think about martial law. It's just that South Korea has been a democracy since 1987, and Koreans haven't seen martial law since then. That's why it was so surprising.

Benjamin Wittes: And what are the constitutional provisions in South Korea for martial law? I mean, you know, in this country, I mean, there are sort of prohibitions, you know, the president can't just willy-nilly declare martial law, although there are sort of other things he can do.

What provision does the constitution in South Korea have for the president waking up one morning and saying, gosh my, you know, there's a lot of political deadlock, and I want to force doctors back to work, and my political enemies seem like North Koreans, I'm going to declare martial law. Is that something that the constitution contemplates?

Andrew Yeo: Well, there's an article in the constitution that does allow for the executive, the president to declare martial law under cases of extreme emergency, and that's, but that can be loosely defined. But there are other measures to that also state that it has to be upheld by the National Assembly, and this is what pressured Yoon eventually to reverse course because the National Assembly voted to revoke or and martial law.

Now, of course, the president can ignore that. But in this case, I think, President Yoon maybe came to his senses and saw that the pressure was mounting both politically within his own party and among the population. But yeah, there are provisions for martial law. I can't quote the specific line, but it is loosely defined when there is some emergency. The line was in there really, though, for issues like if North Korea were to invade South Korea. It's really there for security purposes, not because there's political gridlock and extreme polarization.

Benjamin Wittes: So, are there any merits to, I mean, leaving aside the fact that the remedy was clearly inappropriate to the problem, would you describe the Korean political scene? I mean, are there merits to his complaints? Are reasonable policy initiatives on his part being inappropriately upheld, or is he just super sensitive to the rough and tumble of regular politics?

Andrew Yeo: Right, so I'm glad you asked that question because I'm pretty sure in the next few days, as this political saga continues to unfold, we're going to see a lot of praise about South Korean democracy. The fact that the National Assembly did rush in, 190 of the 300 members came in despite the National Assembly being barricaded by riot police and the military. They did come in to vote. And so, again, there's going to be a lot of headlines about South Korean democracy functioning, that the institutions are strong. I agree with that.

But even though this was really President Yoon's own problem, his own problem that he made, he dug his own hole or perhaps his own political grave. He's not the only one to blame. And I think this is and I've written a piece with this with a scholar at the Fletcher School at Tufts University about nationalist polarization and sort of it outlines the problems of democracy in South Korea.

So while it is a consolidated democracy, we've seen increasing polarization, but it's part of the political culture such that it's either my way or the highway. You see a lot of politicians looking at the other side as, really the enemy, the language that they use, the rhetoric that they're using. So there's a lack of forbearance or tolerance.

And so in this case, I think the opposition Democratic Party, they were taking on a lot of initiatives to stymie the president's ability to rule. I'm not going to say that the president's not without fault either. So it goes both ways. But my point here is that despite, you know, martial law being absolutely not the right step to take, I could see why President Yoon may have been extremely frustrated that his ability to govern had been severely hampered.

Even the doctor's strike, you know, initially the opposition and public opinion was supportive of Yoon's initial decision. So there's a shortage of doctors in the country. He said, well, let's raise the number of admissions in medical school. It seemed like a reasonable approach, but then the doctors were all, and all the residents went on strike saying that, you know, this is going to really resolve the problem, that they're paid.

Benjamin Wittes: And they've been on strike for more than a year, right?

Andrew Yeo: Yeah. And I mean, that's just one example. And yeah, so it's, it was very difficult for him to, I think, have his agendas passed. You know, it, here in the United States, you know, I think because we talk about foreign policy, I think that's where he's fallen back on. I think he's gotten some points there for being able to build out, you know, make South Korea seem like it's a more important country. He has this slogan called “Global Pivotal State.” So I think there's some positive areas there.

But the opposition, again, has made his life quite difficult. And I, and it goes back to then why did you declare martial law? It may have just been something, you know, a Hail Mary in the playbook where he felt maybe now is the time to hit that reset button, declare martial law, create some sort of political crisis and then work, you know, create some path forward.

Benjamin Wittes: And when you say Korean politics is very polarized, I mean, I have a sense of the cleavages in South Korean politics 15 years ago, which is, you know, sort of sunshine policy toward the North, versus a kind of more hardline confrontational policy. But I don't have a sense that, like, that's sort of what the rhetoric of this was about, but, what are the fundamental divisions now in South, like, that would separate this Conservative Party of Yoon's from the opposition that is making his life so difficult? Is it doctors? Is it North Korea?

Andrew Yeo: Well, that's the interesting thing about Yoon. In terms of the ideology. So the left-right, so we refer to South Korean political parties as being on the progressive or the conservative end. They don't necessarily align with what we think of as the traditional left-right in U.S. politics, you know, big government versus small government. Or, you know, I think on the economic front, there's some similarities, conservative governments want more tax breaks. They tend to be more business friendly.

But in recent years, that's been sort of jumbled or mixed. In fact, some of the headlines in the past week before the declaration of martial law was that the opposition party was taking on policies that were more business-friendly, whereas President Yoon was trying to increase the welfare state. He wanted more subsidies for childcare. He wanted, and he's been constantly talking about making homes more affordable.

So it's not that, but it really has to do with branding. And someone, some South Korean journalists were explaining to me that, you know, even though you understand the other side so if you're a conservative, if you're a progressive and you know that, conservatives have some good points.

So a good example on foreign policy is Korea-Japan relations. For much of the population, it makes good sense to improve ties with Japan, as are these looming security challenges related to North Korea or China. But, you know, the polemics in terms of the opposition party leader, Lee Jae-myung, or some other lawmakers in the National Assembly, they were saying things like, this is the worst deal that was ever made in the history of the Republic of Korea.

When President Yoon, he kind of unilaterally reached out to Japan, to start a process of rapprochement. But they were all claiming that Yoon sold out to Japan, he didn't get enough concessions, he didn't get an apology even though in private they'll say, well, yeah we think it makes lots of sense to make amends with Japan. So you tend to look at the other side as in some ways the foe or the enemy.

And in terms of ideology, I do think North Korea still plays a large, a big part in this. It may not seem like it, but in terms of how you view engagement with North Korea, I also think in terms of Yoon, it wasn't so much, you know, partisan politics, but there was a lot of issues with his personality. People didn't like the fact that he was, you know, very clubby. He was, you know, his back—he's not a politician by trade. He's a prosecutor. And so he ran the presidency like a prosecutor. He made decisions, you know, he executed them and there wasn't a whole lot of consultation with the group.

So going back to the Korea-Japan example, what some lawmakers told me was they weren't opposed to his policy of trying to improve relations with Japan. It was that he didn't give the opposition the light of day of what was happening, what was going on, and they could have given him some feedback. In fact, some said that he actually borrowed some of the strategies that we had thought of, but didn't think to give any credit or he didn't consult with us at all. So it's his style I think that was problematic.

Benjamin Wittes: It actually sounds like what you're saying is that the polarization is more about camps than it is about actually different policies.

Andrew Yeo: Yes, it's so it's not about the policies per se. I mean, even something like, you know, South Korea has one of the lowest birth rates. It's 0.72. It's the lowest in the OECD countries, if not the world. And the Yoon government has a variety of issues to try to help address that. So it's again, that's not a, maybe there are different policy approaches to this.

Yeah, so it's less about policy. It's more about the camps and the way I know if it's like in the 1980s, like the Celtics versus the Lakers, you have your tribe and it revolves around that camp.

Benjamin Wittes: Let's talk about the sequence of events. He makes this announcement of martial law in the late evening. There is an uproar in response. He tries to have the military keep the National Assembly shut. It fails. And they vote unanimously, including his own party, to reject the declaration of martial law, and then he withdraws it, by morning. Is that a reasonable summary of what happened?

Andrew Yeo: Yes it's, I mean, it was, I want to say that was a very straightforward summary in an event that's anything but straightforward. But yeah, he declared martial law. He gave the speech. He made a national address, of course, with his justification. When they started, you know, they were blocking National Assembly because he, the martial law says that you have, you know, the government is going to take political control.

They tried to shut down the National Assembly, but protesters had come in. There were riot police. We weren't, I wasn't as clear about the military, but this morning I saw footage of helicopters bringing in the military overnight.

Benjamin Wittes: Yeah, it sure seems like military. I mean, unless you, unless South Korea has riot police, like, that are, you know, super militarized.

Andrew Yeo: In full deck camo with arm.

Yeah, so, so the military had come in, but they were, yeah, but the National Assembly members weren't able to come in and then they tried to block out the military from coming in. So, you see footage of soldiers, you know, breaking windows trying to enter the National Assembly. But, you know, this was a situation where I was afraid, if you were thinking the worst, that there could be extreme violence.

In South Korea, when you say martial law, it evokes these images of, there's the last, you know, the 1980 Gwangju massacre, that was the last time martial law was invoked. So you almost associate martial law with violence and bloodshed. And so that was of course the fear, but fortunately that didn't happen. I think there was restraint, even on the part of the military. And I mean, they did use tear gas. It looked like.

But yeah, after all that drama, the National Aassembly quickly passes, as I mentioned, 190 to zero, so unanimously to rescind martial law and I think there was some anxious waiting whether President Yoon would accept that, and then he did. He said that he would end martial law. But we haven't heard from him at all. He hasn't said anything.

There was a statement from the defense minister, so now South Korean media is reporting that it was, South Korea's defense minister, Kim Yong-ho, who actually recommended martial law. But he's now tendered his resignation and I think he wants to, in his statement, he took full responsibility for the military getting involved in, you know, descending onto the National Assembly, saying that was his order and they just obeyed or followed his orders.

But yes, we haven't heard anything yet from the president. But yeah, that was the end of the coup. And then the following, so that would be December 4th, local time, in Korea. They've, they're now, you know, calling for his resignation. Both the opposition members have a party member, the Democratic Party has already filed, I think, a motion for impeachment, but his own party members are, I think, pushing for resignation.

I think about two hours ago, I saw in the media report that they were, there was a closed door meeting among the People Power Party to figure out how to move forward. But I'm assuming that the party is going to also ask for Yoon to step aside before it gets to impeachment.

Benjamin Wittes: What's the difference functionally between, I mean, I did a little crash course on South Korean impeachment law, which seems to require just more than the opposition has in seats in the National Assembly, or 300 seats. The ruling party has 108, so they could afford to lose eight votes before the opposition would have two thirds to conduct an impeachment. What's functionally the difference between Yoon being impeached and Yoon resigning? And why does his party care about that distinction?

Andrew Yeo: Well, I mean, if he's, if he resigns, the People Power Party can, in some ways, it would look better for the public. I mean, if he's forced to impeachment, it means that the party is in disarray and they, there's no party discipline. They're not able to get Yoon out. But if it means that, because there's going to have to be an election, a special election, probably sometime in the spring. And there's some steps before that, which we can get to. But in this election, if it comes down to impeachment, then it's going to look bad for the People Power Party.

So it's better for Yoon to voluntarily resign. And the current party chief, his name is Han Dong-hoon. His popularity is actually higher, much higher than President Yoon. He could be a likely candidate that could run for the presidency, because from very early on, he disavowed the martial law rule and he said that this was wrong. I think there may be some credibility on his part to perhaps lead the party. But it would look a lot better if Yoon resigns for his party, the ruling party, then for this to go all the way to impeachment.

Benjamin Wittes: So this question may, of course, be resolved by the time you, the listener, hears this, because we are recording on Wednesday afternoon, Washington time, which is to say, late evening, Korea time. And by the time this runs, there will have been half a day of Korea time for this to sort out.

So you may hear this after President Yoon has already resigned, or by the time you hear it, it may be much clearer that we're heading toward an impeachment. I want to ask you about two South Korean foreign policy matters that this potentially has bearing on one of course is the inevitable one of the north.

If I were the North Koreans, this would look like, it would surprise me as much as anybody else, and it would say, wow, this country looks a little bit less stable, and a little bit less like the juggernaut that we've been confronting. Does this create opportunities for mischief among, along the DMZ, or in the territorial waters?

Andrew Yeo: I mean, it could, I mean, some are saying that we have to be vigilant about North Korea exploiting the situation as the country's distracted, could they, you know, fire missiles? They've all, we've seen, you know, month for months now, these balloons filled with trash entering South Korea from the north.

Benjamin Wittes: That’s mature.

Andrew Yeo: Yeah. But my thought is that it's better to do nothing. And in fact, as you mentioned, North Korean media, they're going to talk about South Korea being a failed state. Look at democracy. It's a mess. It's in disarray, especially the South Korean president. So they're going to exploit it for as a PR win for North Korea.

So I don't think, I mean, I not, I don't suspect that there's going to be any kind of malfeasance or some kind of an attack, you know, struck by the North Koreans during this period, but yeah, they are definitely paying attention to what's happening. Because it makes South Korea look like they're not that powerful and their country is in a mess.

Benjamin Wittes: The other area, and the reason why I had a, why President Yoon was on my radar screen at all was that, you know, he's been actually quite forward leaning and courageous with respect to matters like Ukraine. And South Korea has, of course, been very effective in certain supply areas with respect to the Ukrainians.

And I'm curious whether, to what extent that policy has been controversial within the divide that you've described. And as he gets shunted out, by one way or another, assuming he does, is that policy likely to change?

Andrew Yeo: Yes, so President Yoon has really tried to expand South Korea's strategic importance, within the region, within the Indo-Pacific region, but globally, as I mentioned, he has this slogan, Global Pivotal State, trying to make South Korea more relevant in global affairs, commensurate…

Benjamin Wittes: You know, I love the policy, the name. He's got to do better than Global Pivotal State.

Andrew Yeo: Well, and they don't even use it in Korea. It's more for foreign consumption. But a lot of people kind of scratch their heads on the pivotal, what pivotal really means. But the whole idea is that Korea wants to take on more responsibility, and this includes Ukraine.

And of course, they've been backfilling the Poles to help provide weapons to help provide weapons to Ukraine.

Benjamin Wittes: A lot of artillery.

Andrew Yeo: A lot of artillery, a lot of tanks. And they have been somewhat outspoken in terms of supporting Ukraine. Of course, that stopped the level, I don't think it's a law, but there's a policy that prevents South Korea from actually selling or providing weapons to states in conflict, so they haven't given lethal weapons to Ukrainians. But that has come up several times, especially since North Koreans have now sent soldiers to Russia. And I think Yoon was seriously contemplating that.

But in terms of the South Korean public, you know, I don't think there's a, I don't think this resonates quite so much with the public. And when it comes to Democratic Party opposition, the opposition leader said during the parliamentary April 2024 elections in his campaign he basically said Korea doesn't have any business, you know, providing assistance to Ukraine at this time, and we should stay out of it.

I don't know if that's the position he would take if he were to become the leader, but yes, they would be much less forward leaning, I think, with a Democratic Party politician in office.

Benjamin Wittes: Interesting. So what are you, as you look forward over the next few days and weeks, what are the signs that you would take as reassuring? What are the signs that you would take as dangerous or not reassuring? And how should we think about, you know, how should we think about the state of South Korean democracy at this point? You said earlier that it's going to get a lot of praise, and sure, it deserves it, but, I mean, what do you want to see happen to make you feel like this thing is, however weirdly, resolving in the right direction?

Andrew Yeo: Well, there's been precedence before. You know, exactly eight years ago, South Korea was going through another impeachment process. It was with President Park Geun-hye. And at that time, you saw over a million people protesting, you know, it's week after week calling for the resignation of then President Park Geun-hye. She was eventually impeached, and it went through the different institutional channels.

So it's not just the National Assembly that needs a two-thirds majority to vote to impeach the president, it then has to be upheld by the constitutional court. And so it went through that process. That's why I think South Korean democracy was praised. Because the institutional channels of democracy worked, as they functioned as they should.

So my hope is that this time around, in this state of confusion that the institutions remain strong enough such that the National Assembly, if they do decide to impeach Yoon, it would run its normal course. And whether the constitutional court upholds that or not, you know, it's for them, it's for the courts to decide. But for me, it's if you can have a transition without violence or bloodshed.

And this is coming at a time to in terms of foreign policy, which is my, you know, wheelhouse, my area of expertise where I and other experts have been talking about the importance of South Korea needing to engage with the Trump administration to sustain the alliance. I think eight years ago when the first Trump administration was coming in, South Korea didn't have the luxury. It couldn't pull what Prime Minister Shinzo Abe from Japan did, where he got out early and ahead to meet then-President-elect Trump, and they built a very good rapport.

There's a lot of arguments that President Yoon could actually get along with Trump in some ways because they had similar personalities, similar styles. They were both kind of strong men, sort of tough guys. And now that, you know, with Yoon completely saddled, you know, that may not be the case. And if he's out of the picture, we're going to have a situation again where the South Korean government isn't able to put a good front foot forward and trying to engage the Trump administration.

And then we may see some bumpiness in the U.S.-South Korea alliance as to new, I guess Trump isn't completely new, but you know, his cabinet will be different. But as the two sides try to recalibrate their relationship, I think, there may be some bumpiness. And all of this is within the context of, you know, North Korean threat's growing with deepening ties between Russia and North Korea, and, you know, throw China there in the mix as well, too.

So, you want allies to be well coordinated, but that may get lost in this political transition, so that's something that I'm following as well.

Benjamin Wittes: Yeah. So let's close on that matter. I actually, like listeners may remember that the South Korean-Trump relationship was fairly bumpy the first time around. Both because, you know, Trump really vacillated on Kim Jong-un, but also because he developed this idea that the South Korean-U.S. free trade agreement or trade arrangements were very unfair to the United States. And he became convinced that the alliance, which he almost withdrew from at one point, was exploitative of the U.S.

And so it, I hadn't really thought of this, but this, actually, this turmoil in South Korea comes at a very awkward moment in terms of trying to set up a presumably different kind of relationship with a second Trump administration than happened the first time. Is there damage control from this incident that needs to happen before January 20th, or is this just gonna get factored into, you know, the turmoil that is trans-Pacific relations in a second Trump administration?

Andrew Yeo: Well, I think it's more the latter, but of course, I mean, let's say that Yoon miraculously survive, I don't think Trump's going to care that he instituted martial law. Trump may think, well, that was something that I should have thought of, perhaps. I mean, we had the January 6th.

Benjamin Wittes: Yeah I mean they both tried it.

Andrew Yeo: So it's not going to be a blemish in the eyes of Trump or even the transition team. Of course, they want to work with a stable government. I think that will be the trouble. You know, does Yoon have public support to advance the policies that he wants to, or is the public opinion going to be so bad that he can't even do well on foreign policy?

But the concern, though, is if there's an opposition leader who isn't so keen on being all in with the United States. And, you know, there's already calls that maybe Korea needs to rethink or try to re-engage China a bit more, especially if Trump's going to slap tariffs, 10 to 20 percent on South Korean goods. And there's just a lot more uncertainty, I think especially if an opposition leader comes to place.

I don't think the relationship was all that bad with President Moon Jae-in, the previous president and Trump. They did get off to a bumpy start because of Trump's fire and fury and his, you know, the North Korean threats, but it wasn't, I don't, it wasn't like the Biden-Yoon relationship where they really gelled together.

Benjamin Wittes: No, but there was, and there was internal Trump administration turmoil about, South Korea, even when the relationship wasn't, for example, I believe if memory serves that the treaty withdrawal that got whisked off of Trump's desk before he could sign it by, I think it was Gary Cohn was a Korea treaty relation. Am I misremembering that?

Andrew Yeo: I don't know. I mean, it sounded vaguely familiar, but they could have been done with multiple allies. Not just Korea.

Benjamin Wittes: Right. All right. We are going to leave it there. Thank you so much for joining us today

Andrew Yeo: Well, thanks for having me here on Lawfare.

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