Lawfare Daily: Ukraine, ATACMS, and Putin’s Nuclear Threats

[Intro]

Fabian Hoffman: So fundamentally what these long range strike weapons, as they are sometimes called, right, the overarching category of weapon systems that we're dealing with, what they're really good for is destroying enemy equipment in the so-called pre-deployment and deployment phase.

Anastasiia Lapatina: It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Anastasiia Lapatina, Ukraine fellow at Lawfare, with Fabian Hoffman, a doctoral research fellow at the University of Oslo, who focuses on missile technology and nuclear strategy.

Fabian Hoffman: I'm quite concerned about a future where Russia will be emboldened, has learned the lesson that nuclear saber wrestling and nuclear coercion will enable to achieve its goals, where Russia has learned that aggression against the territory of a sovereign state is something that will not be severely punished.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Today we're talking about America's decision to let Ukraine use its long range weapons inside Russia, and why this decision came only at the third year of Russia's full scale invasion.

[Main Podcast]

So we got you on the podcast to talk about the news that the U.S. has finally lifted restrictions on Ukraine's use of the U.S.-provided long range weapons, specifically ATACMS. And there has also been reporting to show that a similar restriction has been lifted off the U.K.-provided Storm Shadows as well. And this is a huge change in American policy because Ukraine has been pretty much begging Washington to lift these restrictions for so many months. And they wouldn't do it and we'll get into the details of why it took so long.

But I want to begin with asking, why do you think it's happening now? Why now? What changed in the American calculation? They're finally letting Ukraine strike Russian territory with ATACMS.

Fabian Hoffman: Yeah, so I think two key things changed that make it possible now to have this policy change or this change in targeting policy. The first one is the outcome of the election, which means that there is a U.S. president coming in that is potentially much more hostile to the idea of providing comprehensive support to Ukraine. Therefore, there is a bit of an urgency now on the side of the current U.S. administration to enable Ukraine to fight effectively, at least for as long as they are still in office.

And then the second one is that North Korean troops have showed up on the Russian side, which are apparently preparing to, or as some sources say, are already actively engaged in fighting efforts within the Kursk region in Russia. And apparently, the United States has made it clear for a fairly long time that the involvement of third parties into the conflict will be seen as a red line that Russia is not supposed to cross. And because Russia has crossed it now, by again actively involving North Korean troops into the warfighting efforts, this is more or less seen as the final push that the United States needed to allow Ukraine to strike with Western-made missile systems into Russia.

Anastasiia Lapatina: There haven't been any comprehensive statements from either government on this matter, the Ukrainian and the American. There's been kind of this strategic ambiguity, if you will, about this. But there has been a lot of reporting from the New York Times, from the Washington Post. And it's not entirely clear, but it seems that this restriction has been lifted only in relation to Ukraine's control of some Russian territory in Kursk Oblast, that's the part of Russia that Ukraine basically invaded late in the summer and has been holding for several months. And so it seems like, again, there's this lifting of a limitation, but it comes with yet another limitation.

And I assume this also happened because the Biden administration wants Ukraine to really hold onto their territory for the potential future negotiations, if they were to happen in the next several months. Because one of the reasons why Ukraine did invade that Russian territory is to have, like, a bargaining chip, in a potential upcoming negotiation. So I assume that also plays into that?

Fabian Hoffman: Yeah, absolutely. I mean, Trump has indicated that he's interested in bringing this war to an end as quickly as possible. And one proposal of his was that he might seek a negotiated settlement where you freeze the war at the current line of control.

And from, you know, the perspective of Trump and his aides, it's probably, it's a lot easier to do if Ukraine doesn't hold Russian territory because it's really difficult to conceive that Russia would agree to any kind of such settlement as long as Ukraine actively holds Russian territory, given that this would be a tremendous failure internationally and domestically perceived in Russia. And therefore they likely perceive, and that's also a key reason again, what the Biden administration is pushing now for this, that, you know, Ukraine needs to be enabled to hold onto that territory in order to prevent a kind of disastrous outcome where a negotiated settlement is imposed on it, and it could lose dearly.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Could you just briefly describe what an average listener should know about ATACMS and whether we know what kind of ATACMS have been supplied to Ukraine?

Fabian Hoffman: Sure. So, there are, ATACMS is a short range ballistic missile. It's not entirely a ballistic missile. It's probably better to describe it as an aero-ballistic missile. The reason is that the trajectory is not a perfectly ballistic arc. It can maneuver quite a bit horizontally and vertically, but nevertheless, the trajectory approaches a ballistic trajectory. So, that means it goes up fairly high into the air somewhere around 60, 70 kilometers, and then it comes down, and it comes down quite fast.

So that, that differentiates it from cruise missiles, which Ukraine has already received previously, prior to ATACMS arriving which typically follow a ground-skimming trajectory. So they fly much closer to the earth. They're also a bit slower or quite a bit slower, and ATACMS is really fast, which makes it quite effective for engaging what we call time-sensitive targets, that these types of targets of opportunity that come up, but then also vanish quite quickly again, for example, this includes mobile air defense assets. Mobile radar stations, for example, right, you can move that relatively quickly, and more an artillery system or a missile launcher.  So that's what ATACMS is good for.

And then there are different types of ATACMS missiles or ATACMS systems. The first one, let's go from the earliest to the latest. The first one was the M39, followed by the M39A1. And these two ATACMS types, they are cluster ammunition missiles, meaning they're armed with a cluster ammunition warhead, which is many small bomblets that are spread out over a large target area.

They all detonate, and they create overlapping fragmentation clouds, right? So small pieces of metal that burst in all directions, overlapping with each other. And basically anything inside that area is likely to be destroyed if it is not armored, quite significantly. So it's really deadly to softer skinned vehicles such as radars, or normal trucks, right, for civilian purposes, or also just personnel, but it's probably not deadly against something like a tank. So, these were the first ATACMS, and those were also the first ATACMS that Ukraine received.

Following ATACMS variants include the M48 where they replaced the cluster ammunition warhead with a so-called unitary warhead. That's just basically a big chunk of explosive packed into a metal casing, put into the ATACMS missile, and that thing is no longer effective against spread out area targets. But now it has become very effective, the missile has become very effective against so-called pinpoint targets, right? Individual buildings, other smaller high value targets, such as logistic depots, transportation nodes, these sorts of things that you might want to engage and you can only destroy with a bigger boom, where an M39 with a small cluster ammunition bomblets are not enough, where you need to pack a bigger punch, that's where this comes in handy.

And then the later variants of ATACMS include the M57 and the M57E1, and that's basically just the M48, just modernized. Mostly a guidance kit, so these are a bit more accurate than the M48. And then the M57E1 also includes a more advanced fuse. The fuse is the thing that determines when exactly the weapon system goes off. Is it, you know, above the ground, when it hits the ground, after it penetrated the ground? This sort of thing. And you can, that's a bit more advanced with the M57E1.

So basically, Ukraine received definitely the M39 and the M39A1, so the two cluster ammunition warhead variants. The difference between those, by the way, is that the M39 has a shorter range, 165 kilometers, but a few more cluster bomblets on board, whereas the M39A1 has a longer range of 300 kilometers, but that comes at the cost of a smaller payload, so less cluster bomblets. And then it definitely also received one of the variants with a unitary warhead. So that could be the M48, that could be the M57, or it could be the M57E1, and we simply don't know. But it definitely was one of those.

Anastasiia Lapatina: This has been talked about a lot, but we know that no single weapon, be it the F-16, be it the ATACMS, be it the Storm Shadow, whatever it might be, the HIMARS, we know that none of those weapons singularly will shift the war's trajectory or really, you know, drastically change the reality on the ground.

But, still, these weapons they, they're small pieces of a broader picture and they do have an effect. So, could you just describe what kind of targets could Ukraine be aiming for with these ATACMS and the Storm Shadows? And, like, what kind of effect can we see on the ground?

Fabian Hoffman: Yeah, exactly. I mean, none of these individual weapons systems are so-called silver bullets. None of them is gonna win Ukraine the war single handedly or is, you know, pushing Russia single handedly into a defensive position. I think all of these weapons systems, they're really part of a greater whole. And it's a piece in a puzzle and, you know, unless you have all the puzzle pieces, it's just really difficult to complete what you're working on. And this is also the same for Ukraine right now.

So fundamentally what these long range strike weapons, as they are sometimes called, right, the overarching category of weapon systems that we're dealing with, what they're really good for is destroying enemy equipment in the so-called pre-deployment and deployment phase.  So, basically, it's about disrupting and destroying enemy equipment and material and also manpower before it arrives at the front line. Because every artillery piece, every tank, every artillery grenade, every soldier that doesn't arrive at the front line in the trench, is something that does not have to be fought there.

And now this is exactly what would be great for Ukraine if it receives these weapons systems in larger numbers, is that it would enable Ukraine to conduct a more comprehensive strike campaign against these types of target to again, interrupt Russian supply and the deployment and pre-deployment stage, meaning it has to deal with less pressure along the front line.

And that's of course, right, really difficult to quantify how much value will there be. I would say, I mean, every struck transportation node, every struck logistics hub, every struck commando post has a value in itself. And, you know, each of these individual targets are probably not going to be a determining factor in the outcome of a certain theater, but all of them combined and cumulatively certainly can make a difference.

And if you ask Ukrainian defenders, right, would they rather fight with these long range strike weapons while also enabling them to launch into Russia or without that capability? I mean, all of them will tell you that it is much better to fight with these missile capabilities on your side. And by the way, right, if you look doctrinally, and in terms of procurement, what all the major states around the world are currently doing: United States, China, Russia—prior to the war— many European states, all of them are buying missile systems because all of them have realized that modern wars are missile wars, and while you can fight a war, high intensity war in the 21st century, theoretically, without missile systems, doing so puts you at an immediate and severe disadvantage.

So, no European state, not the United States and any other countries would try to fight a war, as it was imposed for a very long time on Ukraine. And you know, this just shows you that, yeah, there absolutely is a value added to enabling Ukraine to strike at a longer distance and also to strike into Russia because all the other states would do exactly that just from day one onwards.

Anastasiia Lapatina: You're right. And this is something that I've been thinking about a lot throughout the years since the beginning of the full scale invasion. It's this idea that, first of all, yeah, no European country, and certainly not the U.S., would ever put themselves in a position that Ukraine found itself in. And they wouldn't really fight the way we were forced to.

And then, at the same time, I was thinking, because we had all of these months, sometimes years long delays for the provisional weapons and would be told that, oh, we can't supply this, we can't supply this, we can't supply this, and then it would be supplied anyway, in a year or so.

And as you've mentioned, on its own, these weapons aren't gamechangers, but what they're good for is being used in tandem with other systems, right? So you need all of these different systems to be deployed together. But very often that's not the situation that Ukrainians would find themselves in because we would wait for a particular weapon for a year, then it would come, would use it, and then we'd be waiting for another very strong weapon for another year.

So, like, I'm not a, I'm not a military expert, but from a military standpoint of view, that doesn't make too much sense to me because. Like, strategically, how did the U.S. expect us to fight with such a limited amount of everything they've been giving us, right? Like it's from a military standpoint of view, the fact that we weren't able to hit targets inside Russia did not make any sense, right? If you take the politics out of it, which I know you can't in the real life, but if you do, then from a military point of view, like no one could have expected us to really achieve huge successes with the constraints that have been put on us, right?

Fabian Hoffman: Honestly, it doesn't make sense from a military perspective and it doesn't make sense from a political perspective either. Militarily speaking you're absolutely right. What should have happened is that, you know, early after the full scale invasion started and at the latest in summer 2022, that large-scale weapon deliveries should have been planned and implemented, including, you know, all these critical enablers: tanks, jets, missiles, in order to, you know, enable Ukraine to fight an effective and large scale counteroffensive in 2023 and not the one it was forced to fight. But one that, you know, had much more chance of succeeding.

Politically speaking, why it doesn't make sense is, of course, for many reasons, right? This is what I, and many other people keep screaming is just that, you know, even if you forget for a moment about how morally and ethically right Ukraine's fight is and how deeply immoral and wrong Russia's fight is, if you just ignore that for a moment, and you just focus on a national interest, it should be amazingly clear to European decision makers. And, you know, to be fair, some do understand that, but many more still don't, is that Ukraine winning this war is deeply in the national interest of states like Germany, of states like France, of states like the United Kingdom. I mean, for two reasons.

The first one is that if Russia gets away with this, we are all in huge danger. I mean, this is going to be a huge mess, and I'm quite concerned about a future where Russia will be emboldened, has learned the lesson that, that nuclear saber wrestling and nuclear coercion will enable to achieve its goals, where Russia has learned that aggression against the territory of a sovereign state is something that will not be severely punished, right? So this is something that Western decision makers should understand anyways.

And then, of course, there are a whole bunch of other reasons, including, you know, refugee streams to European countries, they would have to deal with that, that there would be the economic opportunity cost, right? I think Ukraine constitutes an amazing economic opportunity for a Europe, an EU that has seen very slow economic growth, right? Integrate this market into the European Union, or at least have access to this market and there is a lot of economic opportunity and industrial opportunity.

So again, right? If you, even if you want to ignore all these moral reasons, just understand that it is inherently in your self-interest to make sure that Ukraine wins this war. But this is also why it makes politically absolutely no, there's no reason why we have acted like this politically.

And then finally, what I find so shocking over this last year, I mean, we have, we've debated about strikes into Russia for over a year. If you compare that to the United Kingdom in mid-2023, when they determined or made a decision that they would deliver a Storm Shadow to Ukraine. There was no debate about that: the weapons system just arrived in Ukraine one day. It was announced and several hours after, you saw Storm Shadow strikes being carried out by Ukraine. Russia was caught completely unprepared militarily, but also politically. I mean, they didn't really have time to, to escalate, to threaten, to push their rhetoric on us.

And now you compare that to what happened over this last year, where we debated over it endlessly and over again, and basically these commitment traps that we are afraid of, right? This idea that, okay, if Putin threatened something and he threatens often enough, at one point he has to go through with it. This is a commitment trap we have created on our own because we allowed Putin to threaten so often because we debated for so, so long.

Had we just done it like the U.K. in mid-2023 and just, you know, basically delivered ATACMS, said you can strike on Russia. This is it. Final point, period, we would not find ourselves in a position where we would have to debate the potential consequences, right? If you just present Russia with fait accompli, I think this is a much safer option than what we actually did over the last year.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So given all of that, let's unpack a little bit why it took so long for the U.S. to finally lift these restrictions. And could you just describe what you think have been the considerations for a no, for so long? And then we can also go into actually analyzing each of them.

Fabian Hoffman: The big deal is that the United States appears very concerned about a potential escalation of this conflict to a broader confrontation between Russia and NATO that potentially could then also escalate to and involve nuclear weapons.

The problem, I think, largely is that, you know, for Ukraine and for a lot of the European states that are bordering Russia and Ukraine, it is quite clear to them that the existential threat that Russia presents, if Russia gets away with this, I mean, for Ukraine anyways, but states like Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, they know very well that, you know, they could be next. So they perceive an immediate existential threat in Russia winning this war.

For states further removed, including Germany, and most notably the United States, this existential threat is not as present, or I think for many decisionmakers, it does not exist. They do not perceive it. For the Americans, that is potentially reasonable, right? I don't think Russia is the means to existentially threaten the United States right now. I think for Germany, it's a bit of a farce. I think, you know, Schultz might perceive that this existential threat is not as severe as it really is. I think he's wrong, but at least you can debate about that, right? Yeah. I think for Estonia and so forth, it's very clear for these states more removed, not so much.

But then the issue is that the only real existential threat that they perceive is the nuclear threat. And this is why they are so allergic to anything that could increase the likelihood of a confrontation with Russia, which could then escalate. They're so focused on this existential threat, rather than the threat of Russia actually being victorious and the consequences of that, that they try to avoid it at all costs, meaning they also take these decisions that are militarily very, very unwise. And also what I think are politically very unwise, but in their perspective, this is what needs to be done in order to avoid this broader existential threat which then also includes them and not only Ukraine.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yes, so this has been the main argument, right? The much hated in Ukrainian word, escalation. Trying to avoid escalation with Russia, escalating this conflict. We could pivot here to talk about the nuclear issue, since you brought it up. It's worth unpacking Russia's reaction to U.S. lifting restrictions for Ukraine on the use of its longer range weapons, because Russia has been talking for months about changing its nuclear doctrine.

I assume they were discussing that very publicly on purpose to intimidate the West and to make sure that those restrictions would not be lifted. And then finally, when they were lifted Russia signed those changes into the doctrine into law, just, I'm pretty sure like the next day or a few days after. And so let's talk about that. Basically the very big parts of these changes are that Russia said that now a conventional attack that creates a critical threat to its sovereignty is something that would be enough of a threshold for Russia to respond with nuclear weapons.

It used to be a bit higher. The threshold used to be that Russia is facing an existential threat and that it could only respond to a nuclear attack, whereas now it's a lower level of threats and also a conventional attack. And then, also, it said that if a non-nuclear state, let's say Ukraine, is backed by a nuclear power, let's say the U.S., then Russia sees that as grouped together. Russia sees that as a, as basically a nuclear state attacking it, Russia.

So what do you make of all of these changes? And is this just Putin bluffing? Is this something that we should take really seriously? How concerned are you about it?

Fabian Hoffman: Yes I'm not too concerned about that. I think a doctrine, first and foremost, is a signaling tool that is used to signal to the adversary, you know, under what conditions you are potentially willing to employ nuclear weapons.

What a nuclear doctrine is not is a, you know, an ironclad tool of statecraft. This is not something like a law. I always say, you know, if, if Putin decides to use a nuclear weapon, I don't think there's any civil servant running into the room and telling him, oh, look, but our doctrine says this and this, and that's why you can't use it right now. That's not how it works. So in that sense, I am really not concerned about Russia changing its nuclear doctrine.

What I do believe is I think it, it represents a bit of a step up from like this cheap talk that we’re used to from the Kremlin, right? Especially from talk show hosts that talk about nuking certain Western cities, a different one every week. It's not bad, so it represents a step up from there, because it's now more official rhetoric, while the doctrine in the end is official state-sanctioned rhetoric. In that sense, you know, don't just fully ignore it. But also don't overreact to it. In the end, this is still very much on the rhetorical level.

And if we look what happens, for example, on the preparation side, it's still pretty clear that nothing is going on. So Russia is not moving non-strategic nuclear warheads from storage. It doesn't look like they are preparing to made any launcher equipment or launcher missiles with their nuclear warheads. This is all signals that we would pick up if it were to happen. And that is something I would consider much more serious. But again, I think right now we're still firmly within the rhetorical level, which means again, don't fully ignore it, but don't overhype it. And certainly don't panic because of it.

Because in the end, nothing has changed, right? The wording has changed. But I think in the end, it still just comes down to what Putin believes is in his best interest and the best interests of Russia. And if the costs outweigh the benefits of nuclear use, I think it is very unlikely that Russia would use nuclear weapons. And if this were to change, so if the benefits outweigh the costs, then it becomes a possibility.

I think right now we are very firmly within the territory where the costs of nuclear use are tremendously higher than the potential benefits. So that's why right now I'm very relaxed about, you know, the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used in this conflict. But yeah, there certainly is a chance that the increases at one point in the future, as this cost-benefit analysis changes, but then also we still have opportunities to react to that, right? We're not a stationary actor in that we have flexibility. We have adaptability. We can take policy measures, potential other measures to then still disincentivize Russia. This is a fluid game and we just have to adapt to it, but right now I'm not at all concerned.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Right, so there isn't a world in which we wake up one morning and find ourselves under a Russian nuclear attack, right? Even if it's tactical nuclear weapons, there would be signals, the U.S. intelligence community would know. I don't know how much time in advance, but they would know, so.

Fabian Hoffman: Almost certainly, I mean, you know, never say never. And as a nuclear strategist by training, you know, you typically prepare for the worst-case scenario, which is a bolt out of the blue strike, which comes completely without warning.

But if you put yourself into the position of Russia for a moment and you now believe that look, nuclear use is warranted and it potentially would benefit us in such a way that it outweighs the costs that we would incur, reputational, economical, because states are going to sanction us. We're going to be politically isolated. Potentially, there's going to be a military response from NATO. So if you still believe that nuclear use is warranted, why would you immediately go for that tool and immediately deploy nuclear weapons, if you could first try to get away with nuclear threat at a lower level of costs, right?

So for example, if I was Russia, then, I would first start removing those warheads from storage. I would, but publicly made them with the delivery vehicles, the missiles that would transport them. I would, you know, if I was Putin, then I would really go out on the international stage and make a couple of really powerful speeches where very much try to drive home this threat of imminent nuclear use.

I think, you know, seeing these types of signals prior to actual nuclear use, that's much more likely than just randomly waking up one moment and a nuclear weapon has detonated. But that being said, I, of course, also don't have a crystal ball but yeah that's what I would say.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Let's also unpack another major reason for why Ukraine had to wait so many months before these restrictions were lifted. This is a more like a DOD, strictly military kind of argument is that one, the U.S. doesn't have many ATACMS to give Ukraine. And so the amount that they could give us wasn't enough for, like, a really powerful, big aerial campaign that would, you know, make it like, basically give a decisive blow to Russia. And so therefore the benefits that Ukraine would have, out of the provision of these ATACMS without restrictions wasn't outweighing the risks that it would bring. So that was an argument.

And there is a lot of components in there, of course the fact that the U.S. perhaps isn't ramping up the production of weapons as much as it could be. There is also the factor of other theaters, of course, and other immensely important places in the world: China, Israel, the Middle East, where the U.S. has an extensive presence, also many forces in Europe.

And so could you just talk a bit about this constraint in numbers that the U.S. doesn't have enough and what they have isn't enough for a big campaign. And then, you know, what do you make of all of that?

Fabian Hoffman: Yeah. So basically I don't buy into that argument that the United States did not have enough or does not have enough to deliver substantial numbers to Kyiv

I mean, first of all, right, when it comes to ATACMS arsenal, right now in the U.S. stockpile you can differentiate broadly between two categories. The one is expired inventory of ATACMS, and the other one is unexpired inventory. Let's first go with the unexpired inventory. This is the missiles that are fully operational that the United States would intend to use if it comes to some type of warfighting contingency, either in Europe or in Asia that will compel them to make use of these missile systems.  And that's about 1,100 unexpired ATACMS.

 But then on the other side, when it comes to the expired inventory, which includes ATACMS, that are currently not used in the United States’ operational planning. They're basically just lying around, either waiting to be completely dismantled or potentially to be upgraded, there are approximately 1,200 or even over that of expired ATACMS, that right now, or at least at the end of December 2023, so it's a while ago, but I don't think the numbers have fundamentally changed, that it’s 1,200 ATACMS that currently do not play a role in any type of warfighting planning or contingency within the United States Armed Forces.

Anastasiia Lapatina: What makes them expired?

Fabian Hoffman: It's basically just their age, right? Like these missiles, they have a shelf life where the producer, basically the manufacturer guarantees that within 10 to 15 years or potentially 20, they will work or they will work with a 95 percent probability, something like that. Once that time period is expired, you basically, you either have to recertify them with the manufacturer, or you can upgrade them, but you have to do something to make sure that these missile systems still work.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Could you still use them?

Fabian Hoffman: Yeah. If push comes to shove, of course you can still use them, right? But ideally you would want to make sure that they are still working.

I mean, the worst case scenario with an ATACMS, for example, is that there is some issue. I mean, they use solid fuel, right? So, they don't use liquid fuel, but solid fuel, which is stored in a solid state inside the missile. And as the missile gets older, this solid fuel cake, as you call it, so, this mixture, for example, can create cracks. And these cracks, they can either lead to the fact that there's a malfunction and missile just doesn't launch, or in the worst case, it can blow up in your face. And if it blows up inside the HIMARS launcher, then the whole thing is gone, together with the crew, potentially. So, that's of course really bad. So ideally you would want to make sure that these things still work.

That's also, by the way, what they did with the ATACMS that they sent to Ukraine. They first go to Lockheed Martin, to the manufacturer. They go over the missile, including do an X-ray of the fuel section, to make sure that there are no cracks or if there are cracks that you get rid of them and then they go to the battlefield.

But theoretically, yeah, they're still available and they're still useful, but typically, yeah, you would want to do something about it but so basically, right, if the United States had just delivered this expired inventory, or let's say at least half of it, that would have already been 600 ATACMS that could have gone to Ukraine. Now we don't know how many ATACMS Ukraine has received, I would estimate somewhere between 100 to 200, maybe a bit more, but certainly not 600. And again, right, this is only the expired inventory that the United States is not even planning for in its own operational planning for warfighting contingencies.

So this argument that there is just not enough ATACMS, I don't buy into it. I think there is plenty enough. Only focusing on the unexpired inventory, especially if you can take into account how disastrous it would be for the West if Russia actually won. I think this is a really good reason to dip into your own stocks.

Anastasiia Lapatina: This also seems to highlight a huge vulnerability for the U.S. going forward, right? Because it seems like the world isn't getting any safer and various intelligence agencies around the world are raising alarm about more wars of different nature in the coming decades. So the U.S. is really going to have to fix this issue of its stockpile. It's gonna have to invest more one way or the other.

Fabian Hoffman: Yeah. To be fair, they're doing that. And they're doing that very effectively with cruise missiles. They had a really high surge in cruise missile production rate. The JASSM-ER, they're currently producing over 400 a year. Going to, I think, 550 for max rate production in 2026 or a bit later, but they really ramped up production there.

They also made sure that they invest in a successor of ATACMS, the so-called precision strike missile. And that missile has now entered into low rate initial production: LRIP, as it is called. The problem is with this low rate initial production, I think they’re only producing around 50 a year right now, and that's up from around 26, I think last year.

So, there are, I think this year they're going to produce 26 and I think next year that they're ramping up to a bit over 50. And certainly they want to produce a lot more, but they have to make sure, you know, that the manufacturer ramps up production. It certainly was a policy failure, right, that this hasn't been done sooner? I mean, that it needed this war to break out to really accelerate this process, but that's how it is.

And to be fair, at least the Americans are doing it. The Europeans are just looking away and they're doing absolutely nothing when it comes to missile production. So, that's probably much worse, but yeah, when it comes to ATACMS, this is also a reason why the United States wants to be a bit more conservative with its stockpile because they say that, look, our successor missile, it's still going to take a while until we ramp up production.

And until we have that in sufficient numbers, and until then, we have to rely on our ATACMS inventory a bit more, and that's fair enough. I would just still say, you know, look you have the expired and unexpired inventory and my God, just send the expired one to Ukraine and you still have plenty enough for yourself.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Well, hopefully people who make these decisions sometimes listen to this podcast and they will take note of the arguments. But thank you, Fabian, this was extremely interesting. Thank you so much.

Fabian Hoffman: Yeah, no worries at all. Thank you so much.

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