Lawfare Daily: Ukraine Peace Negotiations with Mykola Bielieskov

[Intro]

Mykola Bielieskov: Russia wants to compromise Ukrainian security, Ukrainian sovereignty, have Ukraine on its own mercy, basically defenseless. Ukraine wants on the other side to preserve sovereignty, thus NATO option should be open, also guarantee its own security through its own defense forces, through interaction with its partners. So compromise, as for me, is, is not possible.

Anastasiia Lapatina: It's The Lawfare Podcast. I'm Anastasiia Lapatina, Ukraine Fellow at Lawfare, with Mykola Bielieskov, a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and the senior analyst at the Comeback Alive Foundation.

Mykola Bielieskov: Major criticism out of Ukraine and its fair, its universally shared that escalation management exercise in 2022 cost Ukraine a right to deal a decisive blow.

Anastasiia Lapatina: On Friday, May 9, Mykola and I sat down to discuss the past three months of peace negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S. A lot of intense public diplomacy happened in the three days since then, but the conversation remains relevant.

[Main podcast]

So to set the stage for the conversation, I wanted to ask a bit of a general question because I wanted to talk to you about the past three months of the negotiations between the United States, Ukraine, and Russia, and what all of that means for Ukraine.

But before we get into that, I wanted to ask, it's clear that when Donald Trump came back to power, there is now a shift in, you know, the American standing in the world, how the United States approaches foreign policy, how it approaches Ukraine. So how do you think Ukraine fits into that new Trump's worldview and his understanding of just how global politics work? Because it's clear that Ukraine and Russia's war are no longer, you know, the top priority for the United States government. So why do you think is that?

Mykola Bielieskov: The problem for Ukraine, the challenge for Ukraine is that it's very difficult for Ukraine and Ukrainian position, the Russia-Ukraine war to fit into Trump worldview, for a number of reasons.

So the major problem, the major challenge for Ukraine is that Donald Trump and his subordinates doesn't see current world order, world order established after 1945, as advantageous, as favorable for the U.S. So their thinking is that it says U.S. enemies like China or U.S. allies like Germany who benefited more than U.S., while U.S. was just protecting this order. So this order is not favorable, not advantageous for Ukraine. There is no point for the U.S. to defend this order. And this is a problem for Ukraine 'cause our argumentation, like basis for promoting our national interest was a constant appeal to this post 1945, so-called rule-based international order. So that's a major challenge.

Another challenge is that it seems that Trump personally subscribed to the very archaic, I would say, idea that might makes right. So if you are more powerful then you can do whatever you want. So in his thinking it is Ukraine, which is weaker in absolute terms, in terms of resources, manpower than Russia, which is the one that was subjected for the aggression, and there is nothing wrong with this.

So this might makes, right, philosophy is very dangerous, but it seems that Trump subscribed to this and thus it's also problematic 'cause we appealed to values, we appealed to norms. Like UN Charter, it says that, borders shouldn't be violated whether you are strong or not, but they should be respected, not violated, and thus we see this clash between UN Charter and might makes right approach of Donald Trump.

And personally also, I think that there is a strong anti-Ukrainian sentiment, or not maybe anti-Ukrainian sentiment, but skepticism towards Ukraine. A number of instances: so in 2016 when Paul Manafort was relieved because of working before this for the Party of Regions in Ukraine, so it was one example which is like Donald Trump is evidence that Ukraine is against him. Another example is this first impeachment proceedings after an attempt in 2019 by Rudy Giuliani, private lawyer of Donald Trump, to get blackmail material for Hunter Biden to discredit President Biden campaign. So he has like this anti-Ukrainian streak, which also make it difficult to interact with him.

So in my view, there is this combination of factors which contribute to the difficulty for Ukraine to establish good working relations with Donald Trump.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Let's go back to Trump's reelection several months ago, Trump was confident that he could end Russia's war extremely quickly, and he spoke about this a lot, right? He said that he could end it in 24 hours in a matter of days, weeks, or months, whatever the deadline.

It seemed like there were a few operating assumptions that Trump and his team had, and one of them, one of the operating assumptions of Trump was that neither side—nor Ukraine nor Russia—can win on the battlefield, right? That there is no military solution to this war and that, you know, no realistic amount of military aid can help Ukraine turn the tide. What do you think about this assumption? Is this, is this true?

Mykola Bielieskov: Well, the problem is that Russia doesn't subscribe to this assumption. Russian political and military leadership doesn't subscribe to this assumption. If you analyze statements, if you analyze Russian conduct on a battlefield, their thinking is that despite all the problems, despite all the difficulties and challenges of sustaining the current military strategy very human intensive, resource intensive attritional war, Russia still can effort this strategy, it can sustain it for some time despite huge losses and thus create a new reality on the ground, so there is no point for Russia to negotiate on the idea of mutual exhaustion.

And that is the reason why Russian leadership is so stubborn, why the Russian leadership is so confident they attach some conditions before they're ready to, to come to any ceasefire, to come to any truce. They in advance require major political concessions because in zero calculation, if there is no agreement, if there is no framework, they can still try to advance. Whether they would be successful or not, it's another question, but they can still sustain this level of fighting, level of casualties despite all the difficulties.

So that's the reason why I think Trump's thinking, his subordinate’s thinking was wrong, and it is a good explanation why we hadn't seen any major progress in negotiations because it was based on the wrong assessment on the battlefield in the wrong assessment of Russian strategic thinking.

Anastasiia Lapatina: What does that mean for Ukraine though? Does that mean that Ukraine in fact did have a chance to win on the battlefield given the, you know, if, if Ukraine had the necessary amount of support from the United States?

Mykola Bielieskov: Well, it's a point of debate. I mean, there are different takes. My own take, my own idea is that we still can deny Russia outright victory. We can deny them a situation where they can dictate like the terms of the settlement, maximalist demands that Ukraine constrain its sovereignty, Ukraine impose limits on its own security with all negative consequences for the future development.

So with proper level of support, we still can deny Russia victory because this war, it's a defensive war where defensive mode of action is prevalent or offense because of the proliferation of reconnaissance and strike technologies. Thus, in this kind of war, Ukraine can use all this nuances of the battlefield to its advantage and deny Russia outright victory. So the fact that we are not able, maybe quickly, to recover temporarily lost territories doesn't mean that we should agree with the Russian terms.

There is like third option, middle ground between two extremes and this middle ground, this third option is that we can deny Russia outright victory through defensive mode of warfare that is prevalent on a battlefield.

Anastasiia Lapatina: The second assumption that is worth highlighting that it seems like the Trump White House has, is that you have to, as they say, use carrots with Russia, not sticks, and that the Biden administration made a big mistake by not pursuing the diplomatic solution by cutting all the diplomacy with the Russians.

What conditions are needed to make diplomacy effective with Russia? Like can diplomacy even succeed when it comes to the Kremlin and, and negotiating with the Kremlin?

Mykola Bielieskov: Well, diplomacy succeeds, compromises are forged by by two approaches. One of them are concessions. Another of them is creating a kind of balance of power, balance of risk, balance of threats that would underpin the framework and the make either side stick to it because otherwise negative consequences would be, would be negative and would be bigger than sticking to the agreement.

So just suggesting concessions without creating a kind of framework, military framework through kind of deterrence package for Ukraine is a futile effort, because first, there is no ground for compromises. Ukrainian and Russian political positions, they are mutually incompatible. Russia wants to compromise Ukrainian security, Ukrainian sovereignty, have Ukraine on its own mercy, basically defenseless. Ukraine wants on the other side to preserve sovereignty, thus NATO option should be open, also guarantee its own security through its own defense forces, through interaction with its partners. So compromise, as for me, is, is not possible. So it's a zero sum game unfortunately.

The, the only possible way, it's to actually do a Korea scenario. People like to talk about Korea scenario, how Korean War ended, but, but they usually use it not to suggest the frameworks, the pure political military framework, but just to justify the fact that Ukraine won't be able to reclaim temporary lost territory. So if people invoke Korea scenario, then they should follow the logic fully, and the logic is very straightforward. Why North Korea stick to this armistice with no political deal because if it violate this armies, it means negative consequences because there is independent South Korean capabilities, there is mutual defense clause between South Korea and U.S., and thus disagreements sticks. Those, there is no like, major political agreement, no peace deal. Basically there is just armistice.

So if people want durable and sustainable framework, and not to repeat Minsk I, Minsk II fates. So they should follow the Korean scenario logic fully. It means creating a balance of power Russia would respect and not violate. That's the only possible option 'cause compromise is non-starter. If you compromise Ukrainian security sovereignty, there would be no Ukraine. Thus their options not acceptable either for Ukrainian leadership or for Ukrainian population in general.

Anastasiia Lapatina: It sounds like this is exactly why the Ukrainian government is pressing for security guarantees from the United States, right? Because we understand that without it no kind of ceasefire is gonna hold.

Mykola Bielieskov: Yeah, that's, I would, I would say the fact that Ukrainian leadership, so stubbornly defend Ukrainian position, it's in general the sign of growing Ukrainian maturity as a nation that is able to define its own national interest and to defend them, even if it means incurring negative emotions outta Trump. And it's not only about like example of Minsk I, II agreement of 2014, 2015 that yes, they decrease intensity of fighting, but unfortunately they didn't prevent the enlargement of the scale of the Russian aggression.

It's in general about Ukrainian history, modern history, when we reestablished independence in 1991 and we usually conducted foreign relations as a, as a a as a teenager, as a child. So we believed the people, we believed goodwill of people. We concluded bilateral multilateral agreements with Russia, but they were not supported by powers, they were not supported by external commitments, thus Russia never observed them. So we learned the lessons not only of Minsk I, Minsk II, but in general of our modern diplomacy of the last 33 years, which demonstrated that mere goodwill is not enough. Only goodwill supported by hard power is working.

And it's about ending the cycle of Russian violence, cause right now external players are asking for Ukraine you agree for some unsupported framework that doesn't guarantee that the next round of Russian aggression won't happen. So you basically agree for the de facto loss of another chunk of your territory with no security, with no development, and no instruments to prevent another round of Russian aggression, which might be mortal in the next couple of years.

So it's an explanation why in this case, after this dispute public at White House, we've seen a number of surveys inside Ukraine that demonstrated actually that support among Ukrainians for Zelenskyy increased. They basically supported the, the stance demonstrated by Zelenskyy that sovereignty and security of Ukraine and not the scenes for the compromise.

Anastasiia Lapatina: On that note, I wanna ask you, what did you think of the Oval Office meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy, which was, you know, quite dramatic in the media. What, what did you think about how that unfolded?

Mykola Bielieskov: For me, it was a culmination of a difficult month. In February a number of like, contentious ideas that I didn't like starting from ideas raised at the NATO ministerial meetings, which cause an uproar. So it was a culmination of changes. And as for me, people miss the major point, people analyze theatrics, people analyze emotion, but beneath theatrics, beneath emotions is objective scene that our priorities, our vision is a different, and it's very difficult to reconcile like Trump administration priorities and Ukrainian priorities as they were defined.

So that's the major problem and that's an objective situation that Trump want to have a peace. Trump want to have a kind of whatever framework that both sides are ready to accept, he can demonstrate to world I promise to you this kind of agreement, I delivered it to you—while Ukraine is not ready to repeat the same kind of mistakes, we repeated all along, not only with Minsk I and Minsk II and mistakes, basically, starting from nuclear disarmament in 1990s is when we surrendered third biggest arsenal without actually receiving persuasive security guarantees only, only assurances.

So that's, it's just reflection of deep differences between priorities, between interests, how two sides define them.

Anastasiia Lapatina: After that meeting the U.S. cut intelligence sharing and aid with Ukraine. It was just for a day or two, but you know, that caused a big  uproar in Ukraine. And the Ukrainian government significantly, the Ukrainian government significantly shifted its tone, right, vis-a-vis Trump and his administration. And since then, Ukraine has said that it agrees to a full and unconditional ceasefire, even without the prior, you know, security guarantees or anything like that, which is what we pushed for before. And since then we've been kind of trying to, you know, to cater to Trump and be on his good side.

Do you think that was the right strategy and is it even still in our interest to keep the U.S. engaged and, you know, to keep the U.S. on our good side?

Mykola Bielieskov: Let's start from the second part. I think one of the problems of our attempts to engage Trump and his team is that with his attempts, Trump has an impression that mere presence of U.S. is important for Ukraine. But Ukraine values U.S. meaningful presence, which means more aid for Ukraine, hardware, ammunitions, intelligence sharing plus more pressure on Russia.

So mere presence is not enough, but try to persuade him or find proper arguments, more, he has this wrong, I would say, impressions that mere presence of U.S. is, is great for Ukraine, which is unfortunately not because meaningful presence is important, because meaningful presence gives leverage both over Russia and over Ukraine. Otherwise, no aid. What is the rationale for Ukraine to listen to you if no matter what you do, you would lose this aid?

So that's, that's the problem. Otherwise, the way, we decided change our approach. We appealed to our partners, European one who kind of intermediaries, they basically helped us in coining this like lateral private communication to say that we regret this and the only side that would benefit from this exchange is Russia, which is true, but in the end, it doesn't solve like the problem and the challenge for Ukraine, how to ensure future U.S. meaningful participation through further aid, through further pressure on Russia because it didn't change this new approach that U.S. is a kind of intermediary, not the side that is aiding Ukraine unequivocally.

So that's the problem, that trying to engage Trump, not to have like public dispute in itself doesn't solve this dilemma—how to have meaningful U.S. involvement, not symbolic U.S. involvement as a kind of mediator.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Do you think anything can ever solve that, can, like, can ever put Ukraine truly on Trump's good side and, and you know, make, turn him into a supporter? Or is that just a lost cause? Like, is that something that Ukrainians should just even stop pursuing and, and move on to other priorities? Just like Trump says he might move on to other priorities.

Mykola Bielieskov: Well, that's a difficult question because we depend on U.S. U.S. is indispensable nation for a number of capabilities, air and missile defense intelligence sharing, munitions for HIMARS.

So we still stick to engagement strategy and this mineral deal we signed last week and would be a basis for, more meaningful interaction. Whether it would be successful or not, we'll see. But there is still simultaneous statements out of Trump team, like from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who says that Europe responsibility for European defense is number one goal. So it's not U.S. that is going to be a prime granter, it's Europe that should assume its responsibility and that's a problem. So we try engagement. We never close the door, but we never certain.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Why is it a problem that the U.S. is shifting responsibility to Europe?

Mykola Bielieskov: For Europe, it would take time and effort to fill the gap. Even there, if there is a major readiness for, for Europe to spend more on defense, it doesn't automatically translate in capability. So it would take years to increase production of Aster 30 missiles, which are kind of equivalent for the Patriot munitions. It would also take years to create its own production of munitions for HIMARS. So that's a problem, is that money doesn't automatically translate in capability, and it would take time and take time as you, as you see, as you all know, is gained by very precious sacrifice of Ukrainian life.

So, ideally there should be a period where U.S., for instance, is to provide all this capability for Ukraine if Europe fund this. In meantime, Europe develop its own capability and thus we don't have this very threatening period when U.S. already withdrawn, and for Europe, it's still, some time is needed to fill the gap in meaningful way in terms of capability.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I wanna talk about these truces that Russia has been announcing in the past month. So a few weeks ago, Russia announced the so-called Eastern truce that lasted like almost just one day, and then more recently it proposed another short ceasefire from May 8 to May 11 to celebrate its victory day and have its parade in Moscow. And neither of those is a real ceasefire. We know that Russia keeps attacking Ukrainian positions on those days. So why is Russia initiating this? What? What does it have to gain here? 

Mykola Bielieskov: Well, I think my explanation would be very simple, but I think it's, it's relevant. It's, has its meaning that it is just an attempt to deflect publicly the criticism that is Trump now applying more evenly to both sides. So first it was Ukraine, which was more criticized for its so-called unreadiness for for the peace plan suggested by Trump. Now both sides are criticized more evenly, not only Ukraine, but also Russia. There were a number of aggressive statements directed towards Russia. So they tried to deflect this criticism and say, look, we, we have our own initiative, we are open to negotiations, some process, but on our terms.

So it's a part of as I say, it's kind of, dances around the peace plan, peace process, and Ukraine is trying to find a way to demonstrate its readiness to persuade, but without sacrificing its core interest, core priorities. And Russia is doing the mirror things with all these truces, with all these ceasefires, which its not observing. And a lot of people are not ready to get to nuances, I'm pretty sure, a number of audiences in Latin America, in Africa, in Asia, people would laud in a positive way, Russian attempts without getting all details without being meaningful. Same is true for Donald Trump, who is not a fan of the details.

Anastasiia Lapatina: But speaking of the details, the Ukrainian military has reported that—you know, even though there haven't been any large scale missile attacks against big cities during those ceasefires—on the battlefield, the Russians are still attacking, they're still advancing. Or if they're not, you know, attacking and advancing, they're kind of moving freely around their positions moving, moving their troops around knowing that, you know that our side, the Ukrainian side, isn't gonna fire at them. So is Russia also using these ceasefires to gain a tactical advantage on the battlefield and to just then, you know, kind of regroup and attack with more force in like 24 hours when the ceasefire is over?

Mykola Bielieskov: Yeah. Absolutely, it's a good opportunity for them to use this to regroup, to bring reinforcements, to bring supply and to use it.

The major problem is that why Russia feel itself so confident that in zero calculation, if they do not agree with the framework suggested by Trump, they would face no consequences, negative one, so they can play with all that they deals. They can basically rebuff all the suggestions.

I've seen a number of signals with suspension of aid to Ukraine with disrupting transatlantic relations, with all this reshuffles inside of Trump team, in U.S. domestic politics being radicalized and optimized and differences growing between Republicans and Democrats. In zero calculation, they see that this administration won't be able to deliver a consistent policy to oppose Russia. Thus they basically feel this pretty confident and stick to the zero maximalist approach. That's problem.

Anastasiia Lapatina: This ties perfectly into my next question. I was gonna ask, why do you think Russia is rejecting the American peace plan? Because, you know, I, I've seen some experts say that like Trump has given Russia, it seems like nearly everything in his asked for, including things that, you know, used to be unthinkable, like the American legal recognition of Russia's rule in Crimea, and Putin still hasn't budged even though, you know, the U.S. has offered so many concessions. Why do you think that is? Like, is, is Russia actually interested in the U.S. withdrawing from the peace process and walking away, or is Putin just, you know, miscalculating and being emotional in this?

Mykola Bielieskov: First major, major nuance I think, which is important to mention that Trump dangled a number of ideas, very pro-Russian, but I think the last 100 days plus demonstrates that though Ukraine is dependent on U.S., U.S. can't impose this harsh terms of Ukraine even using the aid, which is evaporating basically because there was zero more packages approved and Biden approved aid is ending.

So the problem, I think in Putin’s mind in Putin’s calculation that yes, Trump might suggested a couple of things, but he is not sure and not certain that Trump would be able to deliver them restrained position on Ukraine. Ukraine in this 100 plus day, they demonstrated an agency. Yes, we're dependent on U.S., right? U.S. didn't manage to impose all these terms. We still basically, I would say politely called the bluff, 'cause Trump is bluffing. You can have a leverage if you suggest something, if aid is going to end in any scenario, then what is the point for Ukraine to agree with these harsh terms?

So in Putin’s assessment, I think yes, he's seen a number of very favorable points, ideas out of Trump, but he's not sure that Trump would deliver through imposition on Ukraine. And even that, he still wanna have even more harsher terms because there are some nuances between U.S. suggestions and Russian demands. As far as I understand, out of like publications in media, that okay, this administration is skeptics towards NATO in general and to Ukrainian membership in NATO in particular, but they are not like, in, in, in the mood of restraining Ukrainian independent capability, military one, but Russia want to impose very harsh limits on Ukrainian independent capability. So there are new nuances and differences between Trump suggestions and Putin demands.

And last but not least, Putin doesn't feel any negative consequences if he doesn't agree with this framework, 'cause again, to persuade Putin to think otherwise, Trump need to demonstrate ability to pursue consistent policy and for a number of things I've already described previously this administration, unfortunately, thus far, didn't convey and drive Putin to the idea that they are able to a pressure policy towards Russia, if Russia were to turn down U.S. suggestions.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So basically Putin feels like no matter what happens with the war in Ukraine, and no matter what happens with, you know, if the U.S. decides to withdraw from the peace negotiations, the U.S. will eventually go back to business as usual with Russia anyway. Is that sort of the calculation? That, you know, he doesn't fear any major sanctions, he doesn't fear any sort of blow back, so it doesn't matter to him.

Mykola Bielieskov: Well, I think Putin is still calculating because ideas suggested by Trump, it's like the maximum things that can be suggested to Russia. He can't expect anything bigger than that, so I think he's still calculating whether to turn down them outrightly or to accept them though I think he would turn them down in general.

Unfortunately, Trump administration in these 100 plus days, they did a number of things that are contrary to the sound strategy. So first you never undermine transatlantic unity if you want to pressure Russia. Second, you do not suspend aid to the country which is subjected to the war of aggression. You also form a coherent policy and implement it with a coherent team. And you also do not undermine your own country from inside if you want to be persuasive on a global stage.

So basically, the signals that was sent, the, the steps that were taken, they're counterproductive and in Putin eyes, it’s not persuasive. It’s not a signal that necessary to persuade Putin to stop this aggression and to negotiate honestly.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So is Putin counting on just continuing his war and continuing trying to achieve his goals through military means?

Mykola Bielieskov: Well, Russians—very unique people. They would never publicly admit weakness, never. Even when they have problems, they usually publicly demonstrate even more aggressiveness, even more overconfidence.

What is the Russian calculation right now? I think they, that they suppose that they can attain their goals before they won't be able to sustain this level of fighting, because even Russia has its own limits. Even Russia with its advantage of manpower and disregard for human right lives and human rights, they can't sustain losing like 400 thousand plus people that had wounded a year as they lost last year.

So Russia has limits, but their thinking is that they would jump in this window opportunity before their current military strategy would be unsustainable. So I guess this thinking is guiding Russian policy, but they never would admit publicly problems. They would demonstrate publicly only aggressiveness and overconfidence.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So essentially. Russia doesn't really need a ceasefire right now, then does it? Because I, I've seen some experts say that, you know, the Russian economy isn't doing well. As you've mentioned, the military losses are terrible and that, like, ultimately Russia does need a pause in fighting, but everything they're doing in, in the diplomatic track seems to suggest otherwise.

Mykola Bielieskov: You know, quite interesting development was seen recently. I mean how U.S. intelligence, NATO intelligence have changed his calculations. 'Cause there was a CNN report like a week ago that said that according to latest estimates, intelligence estimates, Putin changed his calculation and he's now more about solidifying control on the occupied territories and maybe having some rest.

But previously, like at the, the beginning of the Trump administration, if you look at the public reports by intelligence leaks from intelligence to media, it said that no, Putin still thinks that he is, he can impose maximalist terms. And it basically was the idea of Annual Threat Assessment published jointly by all intelligence U.S. community in in March of 2025.

So I don't know what caused them to change calculation; maybe it's a politically motivated change that now we want not to contravene our commander in chief. So that might be the reason, or maybe they know something we do not know. But for this year, at least this year, 2025, despite all the economic difficulties, despite the fact that now refinance percentage—this central bank major, major economic like indicator, how on what terms, they're ready to lend money—it's like 20% something. It's incredible and it's not, not favorable for doing business despite all these problems like inflation and also–

Anastasiia Lapatina: Depressive oil.

Mykola Bielieskov: Absolutely. Despite all this, I think for this year, we should proceed from the assumptions that Russians would be able to sustain their military strategy that was tested in 2023, 2024.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Let's then consider the worst possible scenario, which for Ukraine, which would be that, you know, the U.S. walks away abundance, the peace effort, but also it stops intelligence sharing, stops weaponry—even sales, we're not even, you know, talking about aid that seems just completely unrealistic. What would be the consequences of of that for Ukraine?

Mykola Bielieskov: Well, Ukraine would find it more challenging to implement its own active defense military strategy. Consequences won't be felt overnight because on the battlefield we are not dependent as we were dependent on the U.S. supply. It's not an artillery war it was in 2022, it's more UAVs war, but it would be by the way, the rare, which would feel the major negative consequences because of air defense, intelligent sharing. Then we can go to Europe and say are you ready to face negative consequences if we fail, or are you ready to risk your own security and give us air defense, missile defense stock, and still preserve.

And there are chances we can cope with negative consequences and you know, I'm not that doom and gloom. If we manage to sustain fighting without major U.S. aid in one quarter, in two quarters, like half a year, I think we would provide a powerful argument for pro Ukrainian forces inside U.S. Especially if we would be successful in this current campaign, defensive one, inflicting a major damage and ensuring that there is no major breakthrough, that even for Trump it would be difficult to ignore Ukrainian defensive needs.

So the fact that we might indeed face very negative scenario doesn't mean that it's the end of fight. There are still like scenarios, still ways how we can cope with it and provide arguments for, for Ukrainian forces, both, on both sides of the Atlantic.

Anastasiia Lapatina: The Trump administration, of course, talks about the war in Ukraine in these kind of very grand dramatic and disastrous terms. You know, talking about how if it wasn't for Trump and his efforts, Russia would just take the whole country. Or if the U.S. withdraws, you know, the whole country just collapses. So you, you think that's, you know, a, a complete over exaggeration, that we can actually hold on our own, although it will be hard?

Mykola Bielieskov: It would be more difficult. It means losing another chunk of Ukrainian territory. It would be more price in terms of human rights and human, human lives.

But it might sound paradoxical, but in these three years, Ukraine increased its own agency. Even in terms of weaponry now we produce almost 40% of our own needs through our own production. Yes, rest is supplied by our partners, yes, we don't have production of some capabilities, but the fact that now we meet 40, 40% of our needs of armament and weaponry through our own production, it's a major achievement. So, Ukrainian agency increased, not decreased.

I don't think even Trump would effort a major and like full pause in Ukraine aid indefinitely if Ukraine is successful in confronting Russia. Not on its own, but with European support, if we keep fighting successfully, for three months, for half a year, even without U.S. aid, I think it would be really, really difficult for even Trump to withstand the pressure that would be constantly growing out of pro-Ukrainian Republicans, pro-Ukrainian Democrats, pro-Ukrainian media, pro-Ukrainian think tank. So the fact that we should be prepared for the most negative scenario doesn't mean that it's the end of fight. It's the end of fight on the Russian terms.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I wanna reflect a little bit, you know, on the Biden administration as well and how things have changed for Ukraine. So a lot of people see Trump's come back and Trump's approach to Ukraine as this radical shift from the Biden era, right? A near complete reversal of the Biden policy to support Ukraine as long as it takes.

But is that really true? Like how much has Ukraine's reality on the battlefield and with the negotiations, how has our standing really changed since Trump's reelection, if we compare it to the Biden era?

Mykola Bielieskov: It's a difficult question, complicated question because, you know, people, people make assessments based on the political affiliations, and yes, opponents of Trump would say it's a major departure, major, major difference in a negative way.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Right.

Mykola Bielieskov: But I would say that there are some differences again. The starting assumptions were different. One, so Biden and his team, they were staunchly defending post 1945 orders, and thus Russian aggression against Ukraine was a major blow to this order and they supported Ukraine. This administration is not a big fan of post 1945 order, and thus it's a difficult sell for Ukraine.

But otherwise, you know, you said as long as it takes, this very difficult, complicated process to have Congress to agree for a package of aid that was eventually approved in April, 2024, demonstrated that it was more and more challenging for the Biden to get more, more funding out of Congress. And let's do a hypothetical scenario. Kamala Harris, she's commander in chief. Would Republicans support another package this year? I hardly doubt.

So there were objective difficulties already in the Biden approach, and by the way, and the major problem was that, okay, you can sustain some fund and you can sustain some aid, but it wasn't persuasive in, in Putin’s eyes. As we see Putin didn't demonstrate readiness to negotiate based on a true compromise during Biden administration, so Biden provided U.S. aid through the approval of Congress.

There was also a difference in the approach towards like Ukraine NATO option. So Trump's thinking is that since you are not able to join NATO quickly, then why you should push for it at all, and maybe agree to neutrality. Biden’s approach was yes, they basically saw the, in terms of like Ukraine won't be able to make in NATO quickly, but they never closed this option, or even thinking in publicly that Ukraine should like stop pursuing NATO membership. So there are some difficulties.

Otherwise Biden, not Trump, never say that Ukraine victory is recover all, unfortunately. You won’t find any Biden administration representative in almost three years of the big war saying that Ukraine victory is recovering all the territories. So in this case, difference is not that great. So each administration from the point of view of Ukraine was challenging in its own way from the standpoint of Ukrainian national interest and our end goals in the war. So neither was ideal and each was difficult in its own ways.

Anastasiia Lapatina: This is a very complicated and kind of big question, but I'm gonna ask it anyway. Could you just reflect a little bit on the Biden administration's approach to the war? You've already started doing that a bit, but what do you think they got right and what did they get wrong when it came to supporting Ukraine?

Mykola Bielieskov: Major criticism out of Ukraine and it's fair and it's universally shared, that escalation management exercise in 2022 cost Ukraine the right to deal a decisive blow. Yes, we managed to recover major forces of temporarily occupied territories, but escalation management, which translated in delay in provisional weaponry or decreased the scale of provisional weaponry, it allowed Russia to regroup, to basically create defense in depth, and thus our offensive in 2023 failed. So the major criticism for the, for the Biden, that very cautious approach in 2022 cost us outright victory.

Back at that time, since Russia was not mobilizing, since Russia was in like a manpower zero-out calculation that in September 2022 for the frontline, that was about 1,000 kilometers, there was 100,000 Russian troops concentrated in the Kharkiv region.

And if we have more manpower, if you weaponry, if you have these two corps that were eventually prepared for the 2023 offense, but if we have them in 2022, and if we applied them against Mykolaiv, not in 2023, but in 2022, maybe war might have changed differently. But then we all know that Biden was fearful and that if Russia is about to lose quickly, then they might resort to unconventional means. So that’s a major criticism of the Biden administration.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Right. That's the fall of 2022, that we now know from reporting, that was supposedly the moment when, you know, the chance of Russia using a tactical nuke was, you know, a flip of a coin as they say in the media.

Mykola Bielieskov: It was a deliberate Russian manipulation.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Okay, could you unpack that?

Mykola Bielieskov: Well, there was a number of reports first in New York Times and another media that in October 2022, Russian General Surovikin, he discussed there was no major movement of nuke warhead, but he just discussed the possibility of using tactical nukes. I guess, Russians calculated in the right way, so since they were being monitored, communication are monitored by U.S. Signal intelligence, a very capable one, so we can use it to our own advantage. And by mere discussions, not even movements of the warhead, from the storage, they managed to manipulate U.S. strategic calculation.

Anastasiia Lapatina: What do you think the U.S. got right about the war? If, if, you know, if we had to talk about the pros of their approach.

Mykola Bielieskov: Well, the fact that they ensure sustained flow of defensive weaponry that made our defense successful, that's to their credit. They might have said that it's not our war, we don't have a major stake, so we indeed should credit U.S. previous government with readiness to give a lot of hardware, a lot of munitions to sustain Ukraine. Just do a sort of experiment. Imagine U.S. provided the same amount of weaponry it provided in the first 18 months of the war, till August 2023, in just first six months of the big war. I think situation might have been different.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Let's talk about Europe for a little bit because you know, its role in the war seems to be growing in light of the American withdrawal from European affairs.

What do you think Europe's role should be right now in this peace process? And then also in contrast, what role can it currently play? Because it feels like there is a gap there between, you know, what the Ukrainians would would want to see happening in the EU and what the Europe can really offer to Ukraine.

Mykola Bielieskov: Well, the situation is very uneven and there is unfortunately a gap. A gap first between rhetoric and actual policy in general, and a gap between different countries.

In terms of gap between rhetoric and actual policy is that Europe still doesn't spend enough on defense, both on its own defense and for aiding Ukraine. Even now, Europe spend less than 2% of their GDP. It's on average 1.9% of their GDP, 'cause there are countries like Spain and Italy that only now would spend 2% of a GDP. So there is this one gap. The rhetoric is beautiful. They say a lot of right things, but 2% of GDP is not enough though even now they didn’t meet on average this benchmark. So that's a major gap.

Another gap between different countries because as I said Mediterranean countries only now would attain the goal of 2%. Then France and UK, we, we value France and UK diplomatic involvement, but they also do not spend as much as necessary. Then there is Germany. Germany finally start to produce more and more in terms of munitions, in terms of weapon, as packages of meaningful of aid towards Ukraine.

And there are Nordic countries, Scandinavian countries, Baltic states, and biggest share of central and eastern Europe that spend already to spend the, even more than on average than NATO, that staunchly support Ukraine. Because in general Scandinavian plus Baltic states, if you add everything, they provided as much aid as Germany in absolute terms. So it's quite persuasive and they're even ready to support Ukraine more. So the story is very uneven. So there is a gap between states and there is a gap, general gap between rhetoric and actual policy.

The major problem is that the recipe for success is already discussed. In war of attrition, you, you need to spend more GDP on defense, but 2% is not enough, and politicians unfortunately, still not ready to challenge general population and to translate this latent power, economic technological advantage into actual battlefield advantage. Thus, Russia is 10, 15 times poorer than Europe, but has more artillery shells.

Anastasiia Lapatina: The Trump administration has said in recent days that. They'd love to see Ukraine and Russia negotiating directly, right, that they're interested in getting U.S. to talk directly. And that's something that the Ukrainian government has said that it's not interested in doing, doesn't wanna do. And, and the Russians have, have made some signals as well that they, that, that they're open to, that they're open to direct negotiations. What would that kind of negotiation mean for Ukraine and why is that something that the Ukrainian government has been avoiding?

Mykola Bielieskov: Well, formats of negotiations, it's it's, it's a secondary thing. So we can do it bilaterally, we can do it trilateral, we can do separate tracks like U.S.-Ukraine, U.S.-Russia. The major problem is that our positions, our national interest, as we define them, are incompatible. And that's a major problem. And so we can start discussing all the issues bilaterally as we did by the way, in February, March, April, 2022.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Right, the Istanbul talks,

Mykola Bielieskov: First Belarus talks, then talks in Turkey.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yeah.

Mykola Bielieskov: But the major problem is that war of attritions, they radicalize position, and they destroy this compromise space. And you can discuss things countlessly, but if there is no room for compromise, there will be no compromise. And we can't compromise our security and so we can't repeat the same mistake all along. Like, just agree that you won't control some territories, limit your security, limit your sovereignty to please everyone, not only Russia, but Europe, some Europeans, some Americans. And what is the point for Ukraine? We already made that mistake. So why Ukraine should follow the same wrong path, that's a major problem.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So essentially the only paths forward are, you know, either just counting on winning in the war of attrition, or to go back to your, to the scenario that you brought up, the, the Korean example, right? The, the South Korean example, why that worked is because America clearly identified that it had a stake in that conflict and that it was fully backing South Korea, and that's the only reason why that held up.

Does that mean that like those are kind of our, Ukraine's only option? It's either we’re, we're somehow negotiating a security guarantee and kind of a fait accompli for Russia. Like, you know, we're freezing, we're freezing, you know, we're making a ceasefire, freezing the line here, and if you attack the U.S. or NATO will respond, that's one. And then two, just continuing grinding in the war of attrition?

Mykola Bielieskov: Well, I think a lot of people who discuss like this negotiations process, they miss the point that Ukraine is not suggested good viable options. Right now it's two bad options. If Ukraine was suggested the option either you keep fighting though conditions deteriorate or you agree with some freezing to which Russia also agree, plus you have commitment out of U.S. of Europe sustained shipment of weaponry, then we can do a choice and it would be second choice.

Right now, Ukraine is not suggested the viable choice. So one choice is just to keep fighting, though we have problems, or agree with acceptable terms, which mean the end of Ukraine, but stretching time.  That's a major problem. If we have suggested good option among number of options, then we would choose good option and leave bad options.

If you have suggested an option, either you keep right now and hope to treat Russians before they would be able to attain their goals or you agree with no NATO, no security, sovereign restraint, then it's better to keep fighting though it's difficult. Because otherwise you agree outrightly with the end of Ukraine. If you keep fighting, you still preserve a hope that Russia would find the limits on its own quicker than it would be able to impose its will militarily.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Is it the NATO prohibition that makes the, you know, the America presented plan a bad option that Ukraine can't agree to?

Mykola Bielieskov: It's one of the things, its ability to personate a membership, its sovereignty. Whether or not we would use it, it's another thing. It's like in Finland. Finland, after the Cold War, reclaimed an option to join NATO. It didn't pursue it till the all out war, and only they pursued it. But the very option of joining NATO was a sign of sovereignty. If you constrain your sovereignty, then your development is in question. The same is about security.

Plus, by the way, first invoking NATO membership is basically a kind of instrument to persuade our partners to aid us. We always raise NATO membership; our partners are not ready to give U.S. NATO membership right here, right now, but in meantime, they do something. They give some hardware, some munition, some training, some intelligence as a compensation for inability to admit us into NATO quickly. So for Ukraine, it's not only about sovereignty, which is important to any independent state, but also it's a major leverage. It's a major instrument to somehow guarantee security though NATO and partner countries are not ready to admit Ukraine right now.

Anastasiia Lapatina: What do you think is the effective path forward for the U.S. administration in actually achieving Trump's stated goal of ending the war? What is it that the White House can do right now to actually achieve a, a lasting ceasefire?

Mykola Bielieskov: We're in a paradoxical situation, the only viable way forward if we're talking about durable and sustainable framework, and not about Ukrainian surrender end of independence and sovereign Ukraine, is to pursue further the Biden approach of aiding Ukraine—pressure on Russia, sanction on Russia, weaken Russia. But for Trump, it's non-starter to admit that only viable option, only possible option if you indeed want a durable framework, not a pause of fighting.

And by the way, Marco Rubio in one of the first interviews he said that we interested not in a pause of fighting for two or four years, but an actual solution, final political solution, good one. So if you want this kind of thing, you can only pursue Biden approach, but it’s non-starter for Trump that Biden way is the only possible way.

Anastasiia Lapatina: So essentially that leaves no good options for anybody. That's what it sounds like.

Mykola Bielieskov: That's all about strategy. You, you never have ideal solutions, but you need to pursue least harmful solution. And again, it was written countless times that it's cheaper to support Ukraine than to have Ukraine lose and Russia impose in its will, and then you need to confront Russia on its own somewhere in Baltic states. So it was countless reports, articles that demonstrate the logic, the rationale to support Ukraine.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Well, on that note, Mykola, thank you so much for spending a whole hour with us. This was really fascinating.

Mykola Bielieskov: Thanks for this opportunity.

Anastasiia Lapatina: The Lawfare Podcast is produced in cooperation with the Brookings Institution. You can get ad-free versions of this and other Lawfare podcasts by becoming a Lawfare material supporter through our website, lawfare media.org/support. You'll also get access to special events and other content available only to our supporters.

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