Lawfare Daily: Zelensky’s Victory Plan, with Anastasiia Lapatina and Eric Ciaramella

[Intro]

Eric Ciaramella: We have to be clear that the victory is not defined in the plan. It's deliberately ambiguous. Are we talking about still military liberation of all territory up to the ‘91 borders or something short of that or something, a different conceptualization of victory? It's deliberately vague.

Benjamin Wittes: It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Benjamin Wittes, Editor in Chief of Lawfare, with Anastasia Lapatina, Lawfare’s Kyiv Fellow, and Eric Ciaramella of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Anastasiia Lapatina: No one is really publicly articulating the return to 1991 borders right now. And so, for the kind of offensive that they want to do with the long-range weapons, I just, I don't think we need to mobilize tens of thousands of men. So maybe this is actually the way out of this problem for the Ukrainian government.

Benjamin Wittes: Following Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's speech to the Ukrainian parliament outlining his victory plan, we talked about the components of the plan, the reaction from the United States and other allies, and what the plan says about the state of Ukraine's war effort.

[Main Podcast]

So, Nastya, the president of Ukraine, gave a big speech today. He announced and talked about the details of his victory plan. This is Wednesday, October 16th. What did he talk about? And what did he lay out?

Anastasiia Lapatina: So FYI, as I'm recording this, I'm holding my nine-month old daughter, so she's gonna interject and have opinions as well.

Benjamin Wittes: Baby noises are always welcome on the Lawfare Podcast.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yes. So basically what happened is that Zelensky presented his, what he calls the victory plan to the Ukrainian public, finally. He's been talking about this for months since August, the end of August. And it was this kind of really interesting situation because he's been traveling abroad and presenting it to the U.S. or European allies, but no one in Ukraine knew what's actually in this plan, and this plan of victory. And people kind of joke about it, that like, hey dude, when are you gonna actually tell us? What are you presenting to our allies? So he finally did do that today.

Benjamin Wittes: And what form did he do it in? It was a lengthy speech. Who did he give it to?

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yeah, it was a format that he loves, as a showman. He was speaking to an audience that applauded him again and again, like a dozen times during this very dramatic speech to Ukraine's parliament, Verkhovna Rada. And it was this very dramatic thing about just peace and about victory and about Ukraine protecting democratic values, all the talking points that we've been using for years now, which are all valid.

And basically, the substance came down to the five points of this victory plan. There are five points and three secret annexes to it. And so, I'll just give you a rundown of what it was. So, the first point was about NATO and basically says that Ukraine has to immediately receive an invitation-

Ava Lapatina: *Loud baby noise*

Anastasiia Lapatina: To NATO. This was roughly the reaction of Ukraine's Western allies, I think to this point, because just after, like hours after Zelensky unveiled this plan, U.S. ambassador to NATO said that it's not going to happen and the discussions about issuing an invitation to NATO for Ukraine in the short term are not happening.

So that was that. Point number two was this like very lengthy list of increased military aid that Ukraine requires. So, Ukraine asked for more long range weapons and also to lift all restrictions on their use inside Russia. Ukraine also wants its NATO allies near Ukraine's Western border to carry out joint operations with Ukraine to shoot down Russian missiles and drones. So this would likely be probably, Poland, theoretically, helping Ukraine with air defense.

Ukraine also asked NATO to boost Ukraine's air defense, provide more military aid to its reserve brigades, share real time satellite data and other intelligence. And Zelensky also said that Ukraine shall continue operations on Russia's territory and even potentially expand them to bring the war to Russia. So Russians feel the war and kind of this like symbolic thing about the Russians realizing what's actually happening here.

So point number three is interesting. It says that Ukraine wants to host a comprehensive non-nuclear deterrence package on its territory. So I assume this would be some sort of NATO base, but I mean, it's open to interpretation, we can discuss what Zelensky actually meant here. Point number four was more sanctions against Russia, as well as a special economic agreement between Ukraine and its allies for the joint protection investment in and use of Ukraine's natural resources, like uranium, titanium, lithium, et cetera.

Ava Lapatina: *Loud baby noise*

Anastasiia Lapatina: Point number four was more sanctions against Russia and a special economic agreement between Ukraine and its allies for investment and the use of natural resources in Ukraine, like uranium, titanium, things like that. And then point number five-

Ava Lapatina: *Loud baby noise*

Anastasiia Lapatina: Was actually really interesting because it was about Ukrainian soldiers potentially replacing certain American troops in Europe after the war. So that was that he gave a dramatic speech. He talked about these points. He said that this plan is basically now on the table of our partners and it's now up to our allies, to fulfill the plan and bring victory to Ukraine.

Benjamin Wittes: Yeah, so Eric, a few preliminary questions. First of all, should we assume that the real plan is in the three classified annexes?

Eric Ciaramella: No, I would not assume that.

Benjamin Wittes: So when you have a big announcement of a plan, and then there are three classified annexes, one possibility is that the meat of the plan is in the secret stuff. The second is that the secret stuff is elaborations of the five points and, kind of, subsidiary, but is fleshing out what a policymaker really needs to know. The third is that there are three additional points, and it's actually an eight-point plan. What do you think we should assume the relationship is between the classified material and the unclassified material?

Eric Ciaramella: I mean, I don't have any, you know, actual knowledge of what's in the sealed parts of the plan, but I would think that there are technical elaborations of certain points, particularly on military and intelligence cooperation. It's hard to envision that there would be some huge category of other activities that aren't covered by these five points that would be totally secret. And that's not the sense I've gotten as I've talked to various Ukrainian and American officials.

Benjamin Wittes: All right. So before we go to the American reaction, I want to focus a little bit more on the plan itself, Nastya. It seems to me that some of this stuff is just reiteration of the Ukrainian wish list: NATO membership, NATO membership now, more weapons, more money, fewer restrictions on weapons, particularly on long range missiles. So what in here is new and what in here is exactly what you expected it to be?

Anastasiia Lapatina: This is a great question because I was actually a bit surprised by how much new stuff I saw in the plan because there was all of this reporting in the months leading up to today when Zelensky presented it. And I kind of thought that like, okay we kind of know exactly what's going to be in it. It's going to be just very like, repurposed talking points from the past. But I mean, the point of, even the NATO point, I think the fact that he's asking for it, like as soon as possible, it's not like that new, but it's kind of fresh, a little bit. Cause I mean, yes, Ukraine has been talking about NATO for forever, but this kind of like renewed sense of urgency. And then also these discussions about like the West Germany plan that's floating around. That didn't come from Zelensky, but we know from the reporting that that's kind of taking hold in the White House, supposedly. So, I mean, that's an interesting discussion to have, like how Ukraine envisions this invitation to NATO and what Ukraine thinks it's actually going to give and what's the purpose. Cause there, there's a lot that can be said about how NATO membership can or cannot change the status quo here.

The point about asking our Western allies to help us with air defense, as in like help us shoot down Russian missiles and drones, that has also been kind of floating, people talked about it, people said that, you know, why does the U.S. help Israel shoot down Iranian missiles?

Benjamin Wittes: Right, the April missile shoot down in Israel really made an impression in Ukraine.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Mhm. Yes.

Benjamin Wittes: Just because it showed what, what-

Anastasiia Lapatina: What could be possible.

Benjamin Wittes: What we're capable of when we care.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yeah. Yeah. And I mean, and with the recent Iranian attack, which also the U.S. helped Israel to defend itself in that instance, as well, I mean, Ukrainian activists and journalists were point blank, like asking in public, like, why are we not getting the same help? And people were really frustrated about it.  So this is also kind of a fresh, interesting talking point. It's interesting that they're putting it right there in the plan and advocating for it, not as some crazy idea that some lawmakers said, but like the president of Ukraine is asking for it. That's pretty fresh.

The focus on Ukrainian resources, right? And this like investment into Ukraine. That's also, again, people have talked about it, but again, the fact that Zelensky is bringing it to such a high level of a talking point and like addressing that directly and putting it in the plan. That's also pretty new, I'd say. Of course, the fact that they're talking about this non-nuclear deterrence package, which it's unclear what that is, but one could assume that's some sort of placement of NATO military capabilities in Ukraine. To me, that sounds pretty crazy. And I have not really heard Ukrainian officials talking about this in the past.

I mean, we can unpack this, Eric, but I'm a bit confused about this point because it's like, I don't think that has ever been like a serious point of conversation for, at least like during the war, right? Like people have talked about this after the war, when Ukraine becomes a NATO member, NATO should host bases, blah, blah, blah. But like to ask for it right now is interesting.

And then the point about Ukrainians replacing some American troops in Europe is also new and it's also interesting and we should talk about it. But yeah, I think there is a fair bit here in this plan that I didn't expect, so.

Benjamin Wittes: All right. So let's focus on those three things in order for a moment and I'm interested, Eric, for your sense of them. First, the focus on mineral resources seems like it is announced in Kyiv, but really the audience for it seems like it's sitting in Mar-a-Lago. Do you take this as a message, as sort of an attempt to appeal in the hedge in the event of a Trump administration, that, hey our friends will get rich off our mineral rights? Or is there more to it than that?

Eric Ciaramella: Yeah, I mean, I think it is primarily directed towards the Trump camp and those who maybe don't see the type of interest in Ukraine's future that Biden and you know, mainstream Democrats and traditional Republicans have articulated, which is that, you know, we have an interest in upholding the European security order that we helped create. And then defending, ensuring a sovereign country can defend itself and whatnot. I mean, those kinds of arguments don't seem to really be landing with Trump and his crew. And so, I think Zelensky is probably trying, you know, a different sort of tack to attract them to this proposal.

I think it's a similar case with the fifth point, which is about Ukrainian troops replacing Americans in Europe. Again, that's not a, that's not necessary to sell a plan to any European countries. Actually, I think most European countries would be really cautious about the idea of, you know-

Benjamin Wittes: Being invaded by Ukraine.

Eric Ciaramella: Well, a Ukrainian security guarantee, replacing an American one. Let's just say that's it's apples and oranges.

Anastasiia Lapatina: That’s not how Zelensky put it. He actually, in his speech, drove this point home. He said that a lot of our allies love this idea and a lot of our allies really support this idea. He may, like, he devoted, fifty seconds to saying that.

Eric Ciaramella: Well-

Benjamin Wittes: It'll be interesting to see whether any of them will cop to being the ones who love it.

Eric Ciaramella: Yeah. Hard to believe.

Benjamin Wittes: But it, but jokes aside, it's not hard to understand why it would appeal to Trump or why it would be a thing to dangle. He's constantly complaining about allies, not doing burden sharing.

Eric Ciaramella: Right.

Benjamin Wittes: They don't pay. They don't, it's always our people on the line. And so it's a clever, you know, if you're trying to open a three month conversation with an incoming Trump administration, which they have are assessing is, if they read 538 or any of the others, a 50% likelihood. So they're saying, let's be Estonia, let's be the country that can say, hey, we're, you know, we're spending 7 percent of GDP on, or it's probably more in the case of Ukraine. You know, we're, we'll relieve burden in this area. I think it's not a crazy play, honestly.

Eric Ciaramella: Yeah. Again it's primarily a political and a symbolic statement.

And again, if we zoom out here, this is supposed to be a plan for victory, achieving some sort of victory. We have to be clear that the victory is not defined in the plan. It's deliberately ambiguous. Are we talking about still military liberation of all territory up to the ‘91 borders? Or something short of that? Or something, a different conceptualization of victory? It's deliberately vague.

And again, when it comes down to it, really, it's the first few points that matter way more. I mean, mineral exploitation and Ukrainian troops defending Poland. That is some abstract stuff that is not going to get Ukraine closer to some sort of war termination. And so, I would put all those things aside and focus on the nuts and bolts here, which is that essentially Zelensky is saying we need a NATO invitation. We need more weapons and fewer restrictions and we need some sort of long-term deterrence plan.

And I think there's an element of truth in all of those that there is going to need to be some sort of real, kind of robust, long term conception of the kind of current near term military requirements of Ukraine to defend its positions on the battlefield and blunt further Russian offensives. And then a parallel planning process for the future deterrence model and what combination of you know, accession to NATO and or some other security guarantee structure that has yet to be invented, boots on the ground, to me that seems, you know, pretty hard sell. But, you know, maybe you get trainers or something like that. That's not quite combat presence. But more significantly, what's the future Ukrainian Armed Forces going to look like? What is their indigenous production capacity going to look like? And how can the West support that so that it's more sustainable?

Those are the kind of tools that you need to be thinking about sharpening to get to a point where, you know, Ukraine and the West can credibly communicate to Russia that there's no outcome of this war where Ukraine is completely, you know, wiped off the map or made so weak that it's forced to capitulate.

And again, I think this to me, this is a, it's a starting point for a discussion. It doesn't really answer any of those big questions. What I would like to see going forward is more of a conversation about how NATO, a NATO invitation, and the discussion about security guarantees dovetails with the conversation about war termination and potential negotiations with the Russians.

I don't bring up negotiations because I think they're likely anytime soon or that Ukraine should rush into them. But clearly if there is no, you know, military solution to get to the ‘91 borders, then eventually there's going to have to be some sort of stopping in place. And again, that can be achieved through mutual exhaustion, cost imposition and whatnot, but probably there's going to be some conversation between the Ukrainians and the Russians about some new rules of the road during that ceasefire period. And so what role is the West willing to take on to push the Russians to be more realistic about that conversation and get them into a place where they're ready to have it now?

I don't see the ingredients in this plan, but I think also based on my conversations in Kiev, I was there a couple of weeks ago, on the Ukrainian side it seems like there is a desire for the U.S. to also articulate what it's willing to do. And Ukraine can't furnish the entire plan without a sense of what the Americans are going to do. And obviously with our election, you know, in a few weeks and huge uncertainties around that, the Biden administration hasn't been able to give a long-term perspective.

Benjamin Wittes: Right. And realistically, even if it thought it could, it can't.

Eric Ciaramella: Yeah.

Benjamin Wittes: So let's talk about the American response. This was presented to Biden and to Trump two weeks ago. This is the public presentation of it. We know that the American administration did not embrace it, exactly. What do we know, Eric, about how this has been received in Washington and what aspects of it are considered how?

Eric Ciaramella: Yeah, I mean, I think it's an ongoing conversation. It was not rejected out of hand, nor was it accepted. I don't think Zelensky ever expected that he would come with a plan and it would just get a rubber stamp of approval in Washington. So it sparked a series of conversations at kind of lower levels, you know, there was a Ukrainian delegation that came through Washington last week and talking about some of the details of this.

Presidents Biden and Zelensky spoke by phone today and they agreed to follow up through a virtual, not in person, meeting of the so called Ramstein Group, which is the Ukraine defense contact group that they were supposed to meet last weekend, but the hurricane pushed off Biden's plan. So now that will happen at some point in November, probably after the election. And so again, there are conversations ongoing about, you know, what points can be elaborated and adopted, what points need further refinement, what points are not really somewhere the American administration wants to go. And then I think similar conversations are happening between Ukraine and European allies.

Benjamin Wittes: Nastya, how has this been received in Ukraine? Are people enthusiastic about it? Is it basically what people, you know, wanted the components of a victory plan to look like from the president? What's been the reaction to it?

Anastasiia Lapatina: To be completely honest, I mean, I haven't seen much a reaction as like to a point where I'd point out that like, oh, people are very unhappy or, oh, people are thrilled. I mean, it's just, it's tough because like most of these things, as we've said, have been articulated over and over for like literally years. So, to Ukraine, it's like, okay, well, we've repurposed all of these things, put them into a binder and tempted with the, you know-

Benjamin Wittes: Victory plan.

Anastasiia Lapatina: With the victory plan, yeah. And like, now that's that. And like, so to Ukraine, it's like, duh, we've been trying to be in NATO for years, you know what I mean? Like, it's not really something huge. So there was some criticism from opposition politicians, but I don't know how seriously one should like really take that. Cause I mean-

Benjamin Wittes: And what was the nature of the criticism?

Anastasiia Lapatina: I mean, these people will criticize like pretty much everything that he does that's like their public job. Like that's what they do.

Benjamin Wittes: But that's the opposition's job. That doesn't mean the criticisms are illegitimate. What's the complaint?

Anastasiia Lapatina: Right. So the complaint is that like, it's a bunch of nice phrases and fluff about just peace, but there isn't enough of like concrete steps and strategy of how we're actually going to be implementing any of that. So that's one, like the plan isn't really enough of a plan. It's more of like a bunch of goals and dreams and aspirations, but it's not really a plan of action. And that's one complaint. And as a complaint is that it relies way too much on the allies. And it looks like Zelensky is pretty much just shifting the entire responsibility to the partners, which he kind of, I mean, it's really, it's pushing it a bit, but he kind of said that in the speech. He was like, now it's up to our partners. He said something like this.

Benjamin Wittes: I mean, the criticism has some merit to the extent.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Now it's up to our partners, not Russia, yeah, to fulfill this. Yeah.

Benjamin Wittes: Yeah. I mean, the criticism has some merit to the extent that there's portions of vic- of a reasonable victory plan that would be domestic that he's avoiding by doing this. And I guess the big one that comes to mind is, you know, is a mobilization package: is this partly a way of shifting responsibility for the situation at the front away from domestic decisions and toward international partners, or is that unfair to him?

Anastasiia Lapatina: I mean, the issue of how mobilization ties into this is a difficult one because, and I'm not a military expert. So I can't analyze this as much as I'd want to. But it seems to me like you don't need tens of thousands of new men to launch a long range of, like, offensive operation against Russian targets. So, I mean, because he isn't right now articulating, like, an on the ground counter-offensive to regain territory. What they're asking is to give us the weapons to shoot into Russia. I mean, I don't think you need men for that. I mean, you do, but you don't need to mobilize tens of thousands of men.

Benjamin Wittes: On the other hand, I see the skeptical Pentagon person saying-

Anastasiia Lapatina: Of course, yeah.

Benjamin Wittes: Wait a second, bucko, before you ask for more fancier stuff from us, your biggest problem is a manpower problem. And by the way, the Russians’ biggest problem is also a manpower problem, but, you know, you actually have some stuff you need to take. We can't help you with the manpower stuff. The Russians are renting soldiers from the North Koreans. You know, get your house in order before you say now the ball's in the court of our allies. It sounds like the opposition is saying something a little bit similar, although maybe not with respect to mobilization.

Anastasiia Lapatina: Yeah, they're pointing out to the issues of corruption and just general efficacy, which are, I mean, which are valid concerns. Corruption remains a big and key issue that definitely has had an effect on how the war is going. But again, I mean, I just, mobilization is also a key issue and is a really big issue right now. But as Eric said, no one is really publicly articulating the return to 1991 borders right now. And so for the kind of offensive that they want to do with the long range weapons, I just, I don't think we need to mobilize tens of thousands of men. So maybe this is actually the way out of this problem for the Ukraine government.

They're asking, give us, you know, hundreds of these missiles and we can launch an operation into Russia and force them to like, listen to our terms and get to a negotiating table that way. We don't need to mobilize a bunch of men and they don't have to die into Russian artillery. So, I mean, I think that's a more difficult question to analyze from a military point of view. It's not purely political, I think.

Eric Ciaramella: I mean, I would just say, you know, I think that's where the skepticism comes in from the American side, because there is no way that Ukraine is going to deep strike its way out of this war. It's losing ground in Donetsk Oblast pretty much by the day, and that is primarily a manpower issue. I mean, there is a, you know, munitions, always a challenge about the under equipment of certain brigades and whatnot, but it's primarily a manpower issue.

Benjamin Wittes: And it's a low-grade munitions issue. I mean, it's artillery shells and—

Eric Ciaramella: Right. Which again, is not, we're not holding back artillery munitions that we have a ton in storage. I mean, we're pulling new stuff off the line, we're reallocating things that are committed to other parts of the world. And so it's just that, you know, we have defense-industrial limitations that haven't been resolved over the last two and a half years. You can criticize those decisions or lack thereof, but, you know, there are kind of hard ceilings on these things.

I think the problem from the American perspective of the Ukrainian deep strike kind of theory of victory is Russia is an enormous place. We have a very limited number of these long-range missiles. And you know, Ukraine has been hitting things inside occupied territory and inside Russia and Russia's calculus hasn't changed. So if Ukraine launches a few hundred missiles at Russian bases and then that's it. I mean, it doesn't get you any closer to this kind of negotiation on Ukrainian terms that they're trying to posit.

Benjamin Wittes: Right, particularly if they're losing ground on the front at the same time, it would be one thing if that were a static front that weren't going anywhere and you're kind of raising the attrition level inside of Russia in order to not get anywhere. Right? But if the Russians perceive that they're making progress in Donetsk, which is one of their principal objectives, and they're losing occasional oil depots and weapons stashes inside of Russia, I don't think that's going to make them reconsider. So, Eric, you were in Kyiv recently for a set of meetings and consultations. What were your impressions?

Eric Ciaramella: The most interesting thing I observed this time that I did not see last time I was there, which was December of last year, is this general rising sentiment of frustration towards partners and a betrayal narrative that's setting in. I think it's partly fueled by the fact that the Ukrainian government hasn't really done a good job explaining what the limitations are of current approaches. And you know, hasn't had an honest conversation with the public about what's achievable. But I also think that there is a bit of a, an unrealistic set of expectations also from people who are outside of government who, you know, are not necessarily seeing the battle reports every day and understanding how much of a toll this war is taking on Ukraine. And who don't necessarily buy the arguments that are coming from Washington and partners about the real limitations that we have on what we can provide.

You know, there's this frequent criticism of Biden for incrementalism and for saying no, no, no, and then after the Ukrainians ask a million times, finally saying yes. I think there's merit to that, but I think that it can't be explained away as just politics. In a lot of cases, when you look back to the decision processes for certain things like fighter jets or whatever, it was about the fact that the executive branch got a limited amount of funding from Congress and had to make the best use of it possible given current battlefield realities and procuring F-16s for Ukraine and training pilots from zero to be able to fly F-16s is a costly, lengthy endeavor.

And when Ukraine in 2022 was facing a major artillery duel in the Donbas, the key thing to provide at that point was artillery ammunition. And, you know, if you set aside 5 billion of the $25 billion package, for planes that Ukraine wasn't going to be able to fly for another few years, you're taking away from things that they need.

So all of these, like, dollars and cents things are real tradeoffs that people in the Pentagon have been trying to work through in what I think is an honest way, recognizing the limitations of our, you know, the material resources that have been granted by Congress and our own defense industrial production. But yeah, I mean, it's-

Benjamin Wittes: But they're really not understood that way in Kiev.

Eric Ciaramella: It's not understood that way. And so-

Anastasiia Lapatina: Well, the thing, a part of why they're not understood, I'm sorry, I'm interrupting you. But I feel like whoever's at the podium explaining this during a press conference isn't explaining it as eloquently as you do, Eric, and in this great of a detail. I mean, do you guys disagree with that? Like when whenever we hear a no, it's a very short kind of no. And then it takes months of analysts and people like Eric to explain it on podcasts like this.

Benjamin Wittes: So I think, you know, I think Jake Sullivan has occasionally made a, made the mistake of, on Sunday talk shows, of kind of lecturing about what Ukraine does and doesn't need. And, you know, I think what he's channeling is some of the stuff that Eric is describing. But it does come out sounding like, you know, we decided that, you know, Ukrainians came to us and asked for, you know, this weapon system. We decided that what they really need was needed was this. And so we gave them that.

And I do understand how that rubs a lot of people the wrong way. I mean, it's like, I've heard him do it a few times and sort of scratched my head and said, you know, do you really want to say sort of our analysts have figured out what you need to fight your war? Yeah, no, I agree with Nastya about that.

Anastasiia Lapatina: I mean, yeah, like it's just that things that make it to the headlines that most people then read in like news, Telegram channels, it's not this kind of analysis of like, okay, there was this amount of money appropriated. So we had to choose between giving you artillery or giving you weapons. No, that's not what people hear. People are going to read. We're not giving you F-16s cause that's escalation with Russia cause people in the White House said that. Or we're not going to give you F-16s cause we don't have enough money. Then we're like, well, excuse you. You're the richest country on earth. You can figure out where to get the money or then, you know, you don't actually need F-16s and we're like, we don't have, we almost don't have any planes, especially compared to the Russians. What do you mean? We don't need F-16s. So it's like, I understand that we're being emotional on our side, but I feel like this also could really be articulated much better with greater detail.

Eric Ciaramella: Yeah, I mean, I think there are serious communication challenges at the official level on both sides. And I think the American side, again, the people who actually understand how the Pentagon operates are very, very few and usually buried within the Pentagon bureaucracy and are not out doing the talk shows.

And I mean, books will be written one day about the massive operation that was undertaken to find the resources to arm Ukraine. And it was really an incredible global operation that nobody even thought was possible to pull things from different places.

Benjamin Wittes: Supply chain. That's the title.

Eric Ciaramella: Totally. Yeah, and you know, that's that isn't well understood, even by a lot of American officials who are doing these, you know, and folks in Congress who are making some of the political arguments that tend to get a lot of traction. So I think that's a problem.

I think on the Ukrainian side, you know, there is still a very, I would say, there is a challenge that has existed for a long time in kind of planning capacity and being able to talk and plan like a NATO military. And that's part of the interoperability processes for Ukraine to get proficient in that kind of planning language and capacity to be able to, you know, have these discussions at the NATO level.

But again, when the Pentagon goes to Ukrainians and says, give us a plan for, you know, your 3-to-5-year outlook on the military, what's the force structure that you desire and you think that you need based on the potential scenarios for the threat so that we can try and resource that properly and help you make acquisitions. Again, because you make decisions about, let's say, an artillery system that you want to procure and it still takes a lot of time to actually get that, get folks trained up on it, get it fielded, get the repair infrastructure in place and all of that. So, I think Ukraine is fighting a war, so it's very difficult to do that planning. But Ukraine has to find some way to, to walk and chew gum and fight the war and also plan for the future because if they can't plan for the future, they're not going to be able to mobilize the kind of Western resources that they need to sustain this.

Benjamin Wittes: Alright, I want to focus on, since we seem to have these conversations roughly every three or four weeks, which is the horizon of the election: do we assume that this discussion is frozen in place for now? Or is there, are we likely to regroup between now and the election to discuss some breakthrough or progress in this set of discussions?

Eric Ciaramella: I think things are largely frozen in place at the, you know, at the top level, and you know, from the strategic perspective, again, we only have a few weeks left. No big decisions are going to be made. I think there's going to be continuing contacts about fleshing out the victory plan and figuring out whether, for example, there's going to need to be a new supplemental budget request for Ukraine. I tend to think yes, in the lame duck period between the election and the inauguration. But there's going to need to be an intensive discussion between the United States, allies and the Ukrainians about what's the level of resourcing required and who's going to do what. But again, these are conversations that are ongoing all the time. I don't think there's going to be a major breakthrough until we know who the next president is going to be.

And then that gets us into scenarios, which I, you know, I had a lot of conversations in Kyiv about, I think, and Nastya should weigh in on this. There is a, you know, I think the general understanding is that, you know, a President Harris would be more predictably supportive of Ukraine and would probably continue a lot of what Biden has done in terms of mobilizing a large amount of Western support for Ukraine, both military and economic. But that she might change some things, you know, here and there. And she may be more open on certain questions or she may be more cautious on others. I think, you know, she just hasn't really come out with a very detailed plan on Ukraine, other than to say that, you know, it's in the United States’ interest to support Ukraine's, you know, self-defense and sovereignty. So, I think there's a general understanding that, you know, again, that would be a bit more of a predictable course for Ukraine.

On Trump, it seemed like there were kind of two minds in Kyiv. Some who thought that it would be catastrophic for the country, given that he has, you know, toyed with cutting off aid entirely to Ukraine and-

Benjamin Wittes: And extorted the president.

Eric Ciaramella: Sure. And, you know, said things like he would talk to Putin immediately. There's been that reporting in Bob Woodward's book that he allegedly talked to Putin seven times since leaving office, who knows?

Benjamin Wittes: Which he responded to the other day. He said, if I had, that would be smart.

Eric Ciaramella: Okay. Well, there you go. That's a Trump way of saying yes, but again, I think there's legitimate fears in Kyiv that, you know, the United States under President Trump would sort of abandon the Ukrainian cause.

Then there is a group of Ukrainians though, who think that he would introduce a certain level of predictability, of unpredictability, sorry, that could work to Ukraine's benefit and that Ukraine sort of sometimes thrives in chaos and can use it as an opportunity to advance its own interests. I, to me, I don't really see how the math adds up there, but you know, maybe. And again, if they're presented with this scenario, I trust that Ukraine's leaders will try and come up with you know, the best possible package to present to him and will probably do some things that they judge to be in their own interests without coordinating with Washington and that's just sort of how the way the world works.

Benjamin Wittes: Nastya, is the pro-Trump Ukrainian community on the march?

Anastasiia Lapatina: I think not as much recently. There used to be a visible minority in Ukraine that kind of said that, you know, Trump may end up being very chaotic to our benefits, as Eric said. That Trump may go and attack Russia with American weapons just for giggles, kind of, and, you know, just he's done crazy things in the past, he's killed Iranian generals, what makes us think that he's not going to like attack Russia to be all strong and whatever?

But I mean, his statements on Ukraine and Russia has gone like progressively worse and worse over the past few months. I mean, talking to Putin seven times since leaving office, like that's intense. So, people are noticing that and people are, I feel like kind of finding themselves in almost a lose-lose situation, right? Cause they don't really like the current administration and they see Harris as an extension of that, and they also don't like Trump.

Ava Lapatina: *Loud baby noise*

Anastasiia Lapatina: So that's the mood.

Benjamin Wittes: All right. We're going to leave it there. Nastya, Eric, and a special nine-month-old guest, thank you all for joining us today.

Eric Ciaramella: Thanks, Ben.

Benjamin Wittes: The Lawfare Podcast is produced in cooperation with the Brookings Institution. You can get ad-free versions of this and other Lawfare podcasts by becoming a material supporter of Lawfare using our website, lawfaremedia.org/support. You'll also get access to special events and other content available only to our supporters.

Have you rated and reviewed the Lawfare Podcast? If not, please do so wherever you get your podcasts and look out for our other podcast offerings. This podcast is edited by Jen Patja. Our theme song is from Alibi Music. As always, thanks for listening