MILOPS Thoughts on China's Maritime Disputes
I spent this morning at the MILOPS conference watching a series of presentations on China's maritime disputes with its neighbors in the East and South China Seas. Because of the ground rules of the conference, I can't describe who said what, and I'm very far from an expert on the subject. But a few thoughts struck me as I listened. The first is that China has done a remarkable job of scaring its neighbors into the arms of the United States. It's not just the new-found enthusiasm of countries like the Philippines for a U.S. presence. It's the weird solicitude for the U.S.
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I spent this morning at the MILOPS conference watching a series of presentations on China's maritime disputes with its neighbors in the East and South China Seas. Because of the ground rules of the conference, I can't describe who said what, and I'm very far from an expert on the subject. But a few thoughts struck me as I listened. The first is that China has done a remarkable job of scaring its neighbors into the arms of the United States. It's not just the new-found enthusiasm of countries like the Philippines for a U.S. presence. It's the weird solicitude for the U.S. of countries like Vietnam. The aggressiveness of the Chinese claims scares people. And the reticence about the United States is largely a question of whether we'll really be there when needed; it's not about whether we're wanted.
As a flashpoint for possible conflicts, uninhabited rocks and shoals---some of them submerged at low tide---are a funny choice. Unlike other parts of the world, where conflicts are about peopled regions and lands claimed by more than one nation, these rocks are in and of themselves utterly unimportant. Except in two respects. They are symbols, of course, and in some cases, they represent very real rights of economic exploitation over wide areas with rich fishing and oil and gas reserves. They also represent great power status, the ability to claim whole bodies of water nearly up to the shores of other countries---and, in another context, they represent a rejection of Japanese claims that are seen as part of that country's imperial legacy. They also help satisfy the nationalistic domestic politics that the Chinese government also stokes.
Yet I can't help thinking that the most expansive claims simply aren't worth the cost to China if those costs include uniting its neighbors in a fear that seeks protection under the umbrella of the United States Navy. Perhaps the ambition is to induce great fear and then later to play nice on terms conditioned by that fear. Perhaps the voracious need for natural resources is such as to overwhelm any other calculation. Perhaps contempt for countries like the Philippines induces an attitude something like the one the United States has sometimes shown towards Latin America. Whatever the calculation, it seems to me a mistake---and a significant strategic opportunity for the United States.
Benjamin Wittes is editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of several books.