More on Iraq's Implications for the Continuing Relevance of the 2001 AUMF

Yesterday I posed the question whether the 2001 AUMF has any continuing significance, legally-speaking, for counterterrorism activities (especially drone strikes) in Pakistan, Yemen, etc., given that the President is "confident that [he] has the authorization that [he] need[s]" to do what has been done in Iraq and also to support the expanded role that he will be describing to the nation tomorrow night. I don’t think the situations are distinguishable, but don’t take my word for it, take the President’s:

But this is not going to be an announcement about U.S. ground troops. This is not the equivalent of the Iraq war. What this is is similar to the kinds of counterterrorism campaigns that we've been engaging in consistently over the last five, six, seven years.

[emphasis added]. To be clear, I'm not questioning the strategy; it sounds to me like the right strategy based on what we know at this time and what we can realistically accomplish (leveraging host nation or allied ground forces with US (and allied) air power, logistics, training, etc.). But it does underscore the legal question I raised yesterday: If Article II is enough to do this in Iraq, why do we keep talking about the 2001 AUMF as if it is a necessary condition for the identical counterterrorism activities we conduct in Yemen, Pakistan, etc.? [update: This post by Peter Spiro at Opinio Juris reinforces my point, I think. In it, Peter argues that the President has no need for legislative authorization in circumstances short of a "real war" (which the multiyear campaign for Iraq would not be, apparently). That, of course, would include everything we currently do under the 2001 AUMF aside from GTMO and whatever remains of ground operations in Afghanistan.]