New Developments in the Relationships Among AQ, AQAP, and Al-Shabab, and the Potential Impact on the Al-Aulaqi Litigation

A story on NPR's All Things Considered tonight ("Al-Qaida, Affiliates Showing Greater Coordination") conveys a claim by U.S. government officials to the effect that "core/original" al Qaeda ("AQ") since spring 2010 has increased the degree to which it is involved in the affairs of affiliates such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ("AQAP") and al-Shabab in Somalia.  The nature of the AQ/AQAP relationship of course is central to the debate regarding the authority of the United States government to use military force in Yemen, and hence central to the merits issues in the al-Aulaqi litigation.  For that matter, it may also be central to some of the issues that the government has raised in its motion to dismiss (see Ben's summary of the oral argument here), either because the court might decide it may not second guess the executive's judgment regarding the AQ/AQAP relationship  or because the court might decide that the intelligence relevant to shedding light on that relationship in any event implicates the state secrets privilege.  On the latter point, consider the following passage from tonight's story:

U.S. officials say they have seen an increase in communication between al-Qaida's core leadership and these semi-autonomous affiliate groups. They say it appears to be part of a broader strategy from al-Qaida central to establish closer ties to affiliates than ever before.

If it turns out that the ACLU/CCR suit will depend to some extent on the nature of the AQ/AQAP relationship, could the government defend itself without having to produce such communications? As interesting as all of that is, tonight's story may be still more interesting for what it signals about the road ahead--particularly as it relates to Somalia.  For now, attention is focused on AQAP, and for good reason.  Al-Shabab, in the view of many, may have adopted a bit of the AQ brand but ultimately is a stand-alone outfit primarily concerned with local issues.   But note the concluding passages in tonight's story:

Among other things, there has been a push to make affiliates work more closely together. Since last spring, the coordination between AQAP and another group called al-Shabab, which is al-Qaida's arm in Somalia, has markedly increased, the officials said. They have been sharing personnel, ammunition, and training in a way they had not before.

The impact, the story suggests, could be more than merely enhanced tactical and operational capacity; it may produce a disturbing shift in al-Shabab's strategic orientation, in a direction that al-Shabab may be particularly well-positioned to exploit:

The increasing coziness between al-Qaida's Yemeni and Somali affiliates has U.S. officials particularly worried because dozens of U.S. residents joined al-Shabab over the past couple of years. One of their key commanders is an American from Daphne, Ala., and dozens of Somali-Americans from Minneapolis have also joined al-Shabab to fight African Union and government forces in Somalia. Many of those travelers carry U.S. passports, so officials worry they could slip back into the United States to launch an attack. That was less of a worry when al-Shabab was focused on the fight in Somalia. But now that they have joined hands with al-Qaida's arm in Yemen, officials see those foreign recruits as more of a threat.