The =Real= Internet Kill Switch

Paul Rosenzweig
Sunday, March 31, 2013, 4:48 PM
Last year, as Congress debated cybersecurity, some worried about an "internet kill switch" -- that is, the authority for the President to order access to the internet cut off.  As the debate resumes this year, it is worth remembering the real nature of an internet kill switch.  As this report of sabotage in Egypt makes clear the greatest vulnerabilities of the network probably lie in the hardware that supports it,

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Last year, as Congress debated cybersecurity, some worried about an "internet kill switch" -- that is, the authority for the President to order access to the internet cut off.  As the debate resumes this year, it is worth remembering the real nature of an internet kill switch.  As this report of sabotage in Egypt makes clear the greatest vulnerabilities of the network probably lie in the hardware that supports it, not in the code itself.  From the news report:
Egypt said it has arrested three men suspected of slicing a crucial undersea Internet cable on Wednesday, causing widespread problems from Kenya to Pakistan. [The men cut] [t]he South East Asia-Middle East-West Europe 4 (SEA-ME-WE 4) cable [which] runs 12,500 miles from France to Singapore, with branches connecting telecommunication companies in Malaysia, Thailand, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Italy, Tunisia and Algeria

Paul Rosenzweig is the founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company and a Senior Advisor to The Chertoff Group. Mr. Rosenzweig formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security. He is a Professorial Lecturer in Law at George Washington University, a Senior Fellow in the Tech, Law & Security program at American University, and a Board Member of the Journal of National Security Law and Policy.

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