A Response to Paul Rosenzweig's Modest Proposal on Encryption

Herb Lin
Thursday, July 9, 2015, 12:17 AM

Paul proposes a simple rule -- "encryption providers may be required to adopt a government sponsored "back door" technology if, and only if, the methodology for that technology has been published publicly for more than 12 months and no efforts to subvert or defeat it have been successful."

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Paul proposes a simple rule -- "encryption providers may be required to adopt a government sponsored "back door" technology if, and only if, the methodology for that technology has been published publicly for more than 12 months and no efforts to subvert or defeat it have been successful."

This rule would certainly be a step forward from where we are today. But because human practices are often at the root of hacking a system, we also need to know who will be building the system (and what processes they will use), who will be operating the system (and what processes they will use). Otherwise, the system being analyzed is incomplete.

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Herb Lin

Herb Lin

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Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. His research interests relate broadly to policy-related dimensions of cybersecurity and cyberspace, and he is particularly interested in and knowledgeable about the use of offensive operations in cyberspace, especially as instruments of national policy. In addition to his positions at Stanford University, he is Chief Scientist, Emeritus for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, where he served from 1990 through 2014 as study director of major projects on public policy and information technology, and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar and Senior Fellow in Cybersecurity (not in residence) at the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies in the School for International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. Prior to his NRC service, he was a professional staff member and staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986-1990), where his portfolio included defense policy and arms control issues. He received his doctorate in physics from MIT.

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