Should the United Nations Administer Post-Conflict Gaza?

In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, Michael W. Manulak, and Allan Rock advocated for a UN trusteeship to govern post-conflict Gaza. To be sure, “post-conflict” Gaza can seem like a far-off fantasy as kinetic action continues to kill thousands—some civilians, some not—and Gaza remains a huge “prison” run by a terrorist organization, with little medical care, water, sanitation, or food. But dealing with the “day after” in Gaza is nearly as urgent a matter as ending hostilities.

Who would want to govern a place with such acute challenges? Palestinians governing Gaza themselves is the worthy goal, along with an end to occupation and an end to Hamas and other terrorists in Gaza. But with none of that within sight, the UN seems like a natural next choice, and the authors of the Foreign Affairs article are thus to be commended for starting this important conversation, at least in public. However, this course of action would be a mistake. 

The Trusteeship Council is a principal organ of the UN entrusted with overseeing the operation of the “international trusteeship system” under Chapter XII of the UN Charter. Under that system, certain colonies (such as Tanganyika, Western Samoa, Nauru, and Cameroons) were placed under the administration of a state to promote the advancement of their people and in particular to promote “their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate” (Article 76). Eleven trust territories have gone through that system and have become independent or decided on another form of self-government. But it is true that, at any time, a country could voluntarily place a territory it administers under the trusteeship system.

The problem is not with the Trusteeship Council, which has successfully managed the UN trusteeship system and guided its territories to independence, or “self-government” in the language of the charter. It has not disappeared or been suspended. It continues to meet periodically, but with no trust territories left to manage, its agenda has only one item: the election of officers. The Trusteeship Council last met on Dec. 5, 2023, when it elected the U.K. representative as president and the French representative as vice president “by acclamation” among its five members. The rules of procedure of the Trusteeship Council provide that it shall meet “as and where occasion may require.”

It is not a good idea to put Palestine under UN trusteeship, because the Palestinians, Israeli government, and U.S. government would almost surely oppose such a proposal. Instead, governments should consider other options, including an international transitional authority established by the UN Security Council or another international transitional authority perhaps “blessed” (but not necessarily administered) by the UN.

Why the Palestinians Would Oppose a UN Trusteeship

As indicated above, the goal of a trusteeship is to promote the progressive development of a territory’s inhabitants “towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate.” It assumes a given piece of land is in a colonial or non-self-governing status. The UN considers Palestine to be an independent state and that that state includes “occupied Palestinian territories,” including the Gaza Strip. On May 10, the UN General Assembly accorded Palestine extensive procedural rights, which basically bestowed on Palestine de facto “associate membership” status, even though no such category exists under the rules or the charter.

In light of obtaining statehood in the UN, and recent news of Ireland, Norway, and Spain joining approximately 140 countries in recognizing Palestinian statehood and wishing to establish bilateral diplomatic relations, the Palestinians would likely have little to gain from a UN trusteeship.

Any “day after” solution for Gaza must have Palestinian buy-in. Imposing anything by the UN, friendly Arab states, Israel, or the United States will not work. So why would any Palestinian state, authority, or leader give up all that status by asking the UN to establish a trust territory so that it could become independent when it and the UN already consider it to be an independent state? That defies logic and runs counter to the Palestinians’ own self-interest. What the Palestinians may want and ask for is international, temporary assistance in trying to turn Gaza into a governable and livable place. There is another more relevant option that should be considered for that purpose (see below).

Why Israel and the United States Would Oppose a UN Trusteeship

Under Article 85 of the UN Charter, the Trusteeship Council operates under the authority of the General Assembly, a fact the Foreign Affairs authors view as an advantage. But the General Assembly has adopted resolutions that one might guess the current Israeli government considers antisemitic, biased, outrageous, and lacking any objectivity or credibility. The permanent representative of Israel, speaking recently before the General Assembly, shredded a copy of the charter and said, “[T]his shameless body has chosen to reward the modern-day Nazis with rights and privileges.” The General Assembly would, he said, have to explain how, in opposition to all morality and the charter, it supported mass murderers. Why would Israel be interested in having the General Assembly exercise any authority, whether through the Trusteeship Council or not, over territory bordering Israel? 

Similarly, the United States has voted against most, if not all, of the General Assembly resolutions opposed by Israel, suggesting a similar aversion to the General Assembly exercising authority over a Palestinian trust territory.

A More Relevant UN Option: An International Transitional Authority Established by the Security Council

Though the trusteeship option itself would be unpalatable to the parties involved, the UN could still be a viable source for ideas on governing Gaza. The 1947 Partition Plan for Palestine adopted by the General Assembly envisaged the UN administering Jerusalem “under a special international regime.” Relatedly, as the authors of the Foreign Affairs article note, in the face of armed conflicts between Arab and Jewish groups in Palestine following the adoption of the Partition Plan, in March 1948 the U.S. proposed to the Security Council a temporary trusteeship for Palestine “to maintain the peace and to afford the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, who must live together, further opportunity to reach an agreement regarding the future government of that country,” not as a substitute to that plan but as an effort to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the British as the mandatory power governing Palestine. Neither of these possible trustee-type UN administrations came to pass.

However, from 1962 to the present, the UN has been involved in the temporary administration of territory outside the trusteeship system, with varying degrees of administrative control. The first instance of a UN international transitional authority (ITA) was in 1962, when Indonesia and the Netherlands requested that the UN assume administration of the territory of West New Guinea (West Irian), as a transitional administration (UNTEA) bridging transfer of that territory from Dutch to Indonesian sovereignty. In that case, the General Assembly authorized the secretary-general to carry out the tasks entrusted to him by that agreement.

Since then, the Security Council has established UN ITAs in several cases. In some, the UN has been authorized to exercise complete plenary powers of administration—both civilian and military—in the territory. This was the case with UNTAES (Eastern Slavonia, 1996), UNMIK (Kosovo, 1999), and UNTAET (East Timor, 1999). In other cases, the UN shared responsibility, providing partial control or supervision, such as in UNTAG (Namibia, 1989) and UNTAC (Cambodia, 1992). In all cases, the UN administration was to be “transitional”—in other words, temporary.

Establishing an ITA for Gaza would make more sense than an ITA for all of Palestine. The challenges of governing Gaza would be enormous and enough to stretch the capacities of any administering authority, without taking on the additional challenges of the West Bank (e.g., settlements, borders, freedom of movement, payments, Palestinian governance).

Another advantage of a traditional ITA is that it is headed by an individual, not a committee, and certainly not a committee of government representatives. Governance by a committee, even a committee of Arab country representatives, as the authors of the Foreign Affairs article suggest, sounds like a recipe for delay and inaction. If “like-minded” or donor countries wanted to be more formally involved, an advisory council could be established to assist the administrator. Who decides if there is disagreement among the “equal” administrators? By what majority? One relevant historical note: Nauru was a trust territory nominally administered by Australia, New Zealand, and the U.K. From the start, the three countries informed the Trusteeship Council that Australia would be in charge and do the governing and administering on behalf of all three, seemingly recognizing that it is better to have one authority act as the administrator rather than a committee.

Any Gaza governance structure would require a robust security or military component. Although Gaza does not seem as of now to be in a “civil war” situation, there is an obvious need for safety and security among its population, and between itself and Israel. Law and order is needed not only to maintain normal security in any governance structure but also to ensure that the territory is not used as a base for armed or terrorist attacks against Israel from groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In addition, it would help to ensure that Israel makes no illegal or unauthorized incursions into Gaza.

All of that would require negotiation and agreement on the rules of engagement for the troops deployed in Gaza. Most likely, there would be a need for an appropriate Security Council use of force mandate to cover different situations, more than what is provided to the traditional peacekeepers patrolling a cease-fire line in white jeeps with a limited use-of-force mandate. Examples of UN operations being supported by a strong military presence (a “robust” UN peacekeeping force or a military force authorized by the UN but outside UN command and control) would need to be examined. The relationship between normal law enforcement and enforced military security would have to be carefully delineated. 

The military and civilian components would require separate mandates. The relationship between the two would be subject to negotiation and agreement between the council and the countries or organizations contributing troops. 

ITAs are not a cure, and their record has been mixed. Some became unpopular with the local population, who saw them as foreign intervention forces or neo-colonialists. The UN Secretariat and interested governments should take a serious look at prior UN ITA experiences to address the particularities of the situation in Gaza.

The Security Council can establish an ITA for Gaza at the request of the State of Palestine, together with the “non-objection” of Israel and the U.S. This would exclude the General Assembly from any supervisory role and should enhance the chances of getting Israel and the U.S. on board.

Another Option: A Non-UN, but “UN-Blessed” ITA

If Security Council oversight is not sufficiently objective and trustworthy, in theory, nothing prohibits other international organizations such as the League of Arab States or the Islamic Conference from establishing an ITA for Gaza, with the consent of the relevant parties. Such an ITA would be outside the UN framework, which would raise myriad other issues such as funding, organizational and logistical support, and legitimate use of force, among others. One historical example with regard to peacekeeping operations is the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai set up outside the UN in implementation of the 1979 peace agreement and its 1981 protocol between Israel and Egypt.

Any such non-UN ITA could receive Security Council approval or authorization, depending on how much political support it would receive within the UN itself, which would give the non-UN ITA a UN “blessing” or “international community approval” providing international credibility and support. An example of a non-UN security operation given a mandate by the Security Council but operating under the command and control of another organization (NATO) is the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (Resolution 1386 of Dec. 20, 2001).

As with a UN established ITA, an “outside” ITA would still require buy-in by first and foremost the State of Palestine and Israel, followed by the Arab League or at least Arab neighboring states, the U.S., the EU, and other stakeholders.

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The most viable option, if one is looking for ideas for the “day after” UN governance for Gaza, is not to use the UN trusteeship system as a model but, rather, to look to the varied UN experiences in temporarily administering territory. The question is: Could those UN experiences be of any value in designing a solution to the seemingly unsolvable—“day after” in Gaza?