Armed Conflict Foreign Relations & International Law

Six Observations—and Open Questions—on Ukraine’s Kursk Operation

Anastasiia Lapatina
Thursday, August 15, 2024, 11:05 AM
Here’s what we know and don’t know about Ukraine’s invasion of Russia.
An SPG-9 Spear anti-tank grenade launcher in service with the 24th Mechanized Brigade. Aug. 15, 2024. (Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, 24th Mechanized Brigade, https://x.com/defenceu/status/1824053821502353583?s=46)

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On Aug. 6, Ukraine launched a bold offensive into Russian territory, surprising the world, and even its closest ally, the United States.

An unspecified number of Ukrainian troops crossed into Kursk Oblast, a Russian region that borders Ukraine to the southeast. Russia has been using the region to launch relentless missile attacks against Ukrainian cities. Now, the Ukrainian military says it controls more than 620 square miles of it.

The offensive comes amid a critically dire situation on the front line in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk Oblast, prompting some to question whether committing resources to an operation with unclear goals is a good move. It also stretches the limits of where and how Western weaponry can be used.

It is still too early to determine what the Kursk operation means—whether it’s a flash in the pan or a strategically important development in what had become a mostly positional war of attrition. With the operation now a week old, however, it is safe to say it is not simply a border incursion similar to previous Ukrainian incursions into Russia. The following are six observations on the situation, elaborating on points I made in a podcast conversation with Benjamin Wittes and Eric Ciaramella:

First, the Kursk attack is distinct in the scale of resources deployed across the border. Ukraine is using a not insignificant number of its regular military formations. In previous attacks, Ukraine relied mainly on small numbers of Russians fighting for Ukraine in units like “Russia Volunteers Corps” and “Freedom of Russia Legion.”

Second, Ukraine was extremely secretive about the operation, so much so that senior officers were left in the dark until three days before the incursion began. Previous raids were primarily public relations stunts, with photos, videos, and commentary coming out of Ukraine every day.

Both the committed resources and the secrecy suggest that the operation’s goals are likely much broader than a PR splash in the headlines, even if the goals weren’t initially clear.

After a week-long media blackout, one with no major leaks or substantive comments from the country’s leadership, Kyiv finally broke the silence on what it was doing: preventing Russia from sending reinforcements to the eastern front and stopping Russian cross-border strikes against Ukraine’s Sumy Oblast.

"Since the beginning of this summer, Ukraine's Sumy Oblast has been targeted with over 2,000 strikes… launched from Kursk Oblast. Unfortunately, Ukraine does not have sufficient capabilities to carry out long-range strikes with the weapons it has to defend itself against this terror,” Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi said at a press conference on Aug. 13. 

Third, while forcing Russia to reshuffle its troops and protecting Sumy are the two stated objectives, there might be other goals as well.

Ukraine could be trying to take a large number of Russian POWs to have more bodies to swap for Ukrainian hostages; videos online purport to show dozens of Russian soldiers in Kursk oblast surrendering to Ukrainians. On Aug. 9, President Volodymyr Zelensky praised Ukrainian forces for “replenishing the exchange fund… over the past three days”—a clear allusion to the Kursk operation that began three days prior.

Other objectives might be boosting the morale of Ukrainian forces and gaining a stronger negotiating position for potential ceasefire talks. Russia has enjoyed the strategic initiative for many months, and it helps Ukraine to show that it can still surprise Russia and wreak havoc on its forces.

An obvious outcome of the operation, which might have also been a goal, is highlighting Russian weaknesses to show that America’s escalation fears are overblown. Ukraine and the U.S. have always been at odds with each other over escalation management, with Washington placing restrictions on the use of its weapons so as not to provoke Russia and avoid a nuclear outcome. Kyiv has said Russian nuclear blackmail is exaggerated and pushed for more long-range capabilities. And, it did so again at the Foreign Ministry’s most recent press conference, directly linking the incursion to Ukraine’s limited long-range capabilities.

Kursk might be, among other things, Ukraine’s bold attempt to prove this point. In this sense, it’s important to understand that the audience for this operation isn’t just Russia, but also the West, and Washington in particular. Ukraine is using Western equipment to invade Russian territory and take control of more than 70 settlements, and Moscow’s much-feared response is chaotic and insignificant, at least so far. 

Fourth, the Russian reaction to the attack is telling. Russia did not expect the incursion and had no idea what to do about it for days. The Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that the Kremlin took three days to figure out the media messaging: journalists were told to praise the successes of the Russian military and downplay the situation.

Russian President Vladimir Putin called the incursion “a large-scale provocation” and shifted responsibility to the local authorities, who imposed a counter-terrorist operation regime in Kursk Oblast and two regions near it.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported that Russia has been relying on conscripts to respond to the attack, and “elements of some regular and irregular military units pulled from less critical sectors of the frontline.” The Wall Street Journal quoted an unnamed American official saying Russia is withdrawing its forces from other areas of the frontline to deal with Kursk.

ISW also said Russia is “struggling to establish the joint command and control structures necessary to coordinate operations” in Kursk Oblast because the Kremlin delegated overlapping tasks to Russia’s Defense Ministry, the National Guard, and the Federal Security Service.

After local Russian authorities failed to organize an immediate evacuation, civilians fled on their own. One video online shows local residents pleading with Putin to save them from the foreign forces invading their town. “We supported the special military operation, we have been helping our military from the early days… and now we are left with nothing,” Kursk Oblast residents say on video. Another one showed an elderly woman screaming at the camera that the people on TV and in government are a bunch of liars who don’t protect their people. On Aug. 13, the Kursk Oblast Governor announced plans to evacuate remaining residents to Russian-occupied parts of Zaporizhzhia Oblast in southern Ukraine.

Fifth, amidst the panic in Russia, the American and European reactions are striking as well. Both appear supportive of Ukrainian actions—which was not necessarily predictable given how skittish Western policymakers have been about anything that brings the war home to Russia.

Ukraine “has the legal right to defend itself, in particular by striking at the aggressor on its territory," Peter Stano, the European Commission's foreign policy spokesperson, told Ukraine’s Suspilne outlet. 

“We don’t feel like this is escalatory in any way,” Pentagon spokesperson Sabrina Singh said during a Aug. 8 briefing. Singh asserted that the operation was within the boundaries of U.S. policy, even though U.S. officials discouraged similar incursions in the past.

The surprising rhetoric appears to be an extension of the recent policy shift, when the U.S. greenlighted Ukrainian attacks inside Russia to respond to cross-border fire, like Russia’s offensive near Kharkiv. 

Sixth, while Ukraine has made strategic gains in Kursk, continuing to hold the captured territory poses significant risks.

Ukraine has taken dozens of Russian prisoners of war during the Kursk operation, and Russian officials reportedly already reached out about a prisoner swap. Ukraine has shown the world that Russia is weaker than commonly assumed, potentially shifting the U.S. approach to attacks against Russia. The success in Kursk has also boosted morale among both Ukrainian military and civilian populations at a time when war fatigue is higher than ever. And, some reporting suggests Russia might be pulling its forces from the front to deal with the border.

At the same time, large parts of the main front are comparatively weak. Things have only gotten worse in Donetsk Oblast since the Kursk operation, as Ukraine pulled experienced soldiers from there to go into Russia. Despite the reports of Russia reshuffling its reserves, its forces kept moving forward towards the town of Toretsk, occupying several Ukrainian villages, the DeepState monitoring project shows.

Ukraine can withdraw from Russia to protect Ukrainian troops which might yield limited benefits. Enforcing a long-term occupation to use the land as a bargaining chip will be costly, and Ukraine is currently struggling with every type of resource.

On Aug. 15, Ukraine’s top general Oleksandr Syrskyi said the military established a commandant’s office in Kursk Oblast “to maintain law and order and ensure the priority needs of the population in the controlled territories.” Ukraine also created a hotline for Russian civilians who wish to flee to Ukraine or need humanitarian assistance.

Kyiv is thus signaling that it may be considering a longer-term occupation. But whether it can pull it off, and whether doing so will drain resources from other much-needed priorities in the war, is an open question.


Anastasiia is a Ukraine Fellow at Lawfare. She previously worked as a national reporter at Kyiv Independent, writing about social and political issues. She also hosted and produced podcasts “This Week in Ukraine” and “Power Lines: From Ukraine to the World.” For her work, she was featured in the “25 Under 25” list of top young journalists by Ukraine’s Media Development Foundation, as well as “Forbes 30 Under 30 Europe” class of 2022 in the category Media and Marketing.

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