Syria, Threats of Force, and Constitutional War Powers
As I’ve discussed previously, I am finishing a forthcoming paper on constitutional war powers and “The Power to Threaten War.” In the meantime, the Yale Law Journal Online has published my essay, drawing on arguments from that paper and applying them to the Syria crisis: “Syria, Threats of Force, and Constitutio
Published by The Lawfare Institute
in Cooperation With
As I’ve discussed previously, I am finishing a forthcoming paper on constitutional war powers and “The Power to Threaten War.” In the meantime, the Yale Law Journal Online has published my essay, drawing on arguments from that paper and applying them to the Syria crisis: “Syria, Threats of Force, and Constitutional War Powers.” The abstract reads:
In this Essay, Professor Matthew Waxman argues that debates about constitutional war powers neglect the critical role of threats of war or force in American foreign policy. The recent Syria case highlights the President’s vast legal power to threaten military force as well as the political constraints imposed by Congress on such threats. Incorporating threats into an understanding of constitutional powers over war and peace upends traditional arguments about presidential flexibility and congressional checks—arguments that have failed to keep pace with changes in American grand strategy.The essay can be found here.
Matthew Waxman is a law professor at Columbia Law School, where he chairs the National Security Law Program. He also previously co-chaired the Cybersecurity Center at Columbia University's Data Science Institute, and he is Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He previously served in senior policy positions at the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council. After graduating from Yale Law School, he clerked for Judge Joel M. Flaum of the U.S. Court of Appeals and Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter.
.jpg?sfvrsn=8588c21_5)
