The German Election and the Future of U.S.-European Relations

Editor’s Note: The Trump administration’s incendiary rhetoric against long-standing U.S. allies in Europe is already changing both politics and policy there. William & Mary’s Moritz Graefrath assesses the foreign policy implications of the latest elections in Germany. The likely new leadership is already signaling that it seeks to find a more independent path, but Graefrath notes that this may be difficult in practice.

Daniel Byman

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On Feb. 12, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth delivered a speech that appears to be a watershed moment in U.S. policy toward Europe. Emphasizing the need to shift attention from Europe to the threat of China in East Asia, Hegseth forcefully called on European states to take on a greater share of the burden of providing for their security. During the same week, U.S. Vice President Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference—which for decades had served as an annual performance piece of transatlantic unity—did little to assuage European fears. Vance argued that the real threat to Europe was not Russia but mass migration and censorship of conservative voices, and European leaders found unusually clear words of disbelief and criticism in response.

With the future of the transatlantic alliance hanging in the balance, German citizens went to the polls on Feb. 23 to vote in a pivotal snap election called after the collapse of the previous coalition government of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), the left-leaning Green Party, and the neoliberal Free Democratic Party (FDP). While it was not security and defense policy but immigration and the economy that dominated the public debate in the run-up to the election, voters were also confronted with starkly contrasting visions for the future of German foreign policy.

On the one hand, the SPD and the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which have long-standing traditions of transatlanticism, regularly stressed the need to work closely with NATO partners, including the United States, to solve European security issues. They also unequivocally supported continued military aid to Ukraine, although they disagreed about what weapon deliveries that support should include. On the other hand, two populist parties—the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), under the leadership of Alice Weidel, and the left-wing Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW)—ran campaigns that explicitly advocated for an end of German military aid to Ukraine and closer relations with Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

The provisional result of the election shows a general shift toward the right. Friedrich Merz of the CDU will become Germany’s new chancellor as his party, together with its Bavarian sister party, won 28.6 percent of the vote and secured the most seats in the Bundestag. The SPD (16.4 percent) and the Green Party (11.6 percent) suffered significant losses, while both the BSW (4.9 percent) and the FDP (4.3 percent) failed to clear the 5 percent hurdle necessary to gain any representation in parliament. The Left (8.8 percent) made significant gains. Yet the big winners of election night were the far-right populists of the AfD (20.8 percent), who doubled their national vote share and will thus be the second strongest political force in German politics going forward. Given these results, the only politically feasible coalition government will be one formed by the CDU and the SPD with Friedrich Merz as chancellor. The CDU and the AfD also have the seats to form a majority government, but like all other established parties, the CDU has categorically rejected the possibility of working with Weidel’s far-right party.

At first sight, the switch from Scholz to Merz promises to herald significant changes in German security and defense policy—with important implications for U.S.-European relations. Prior to the election, Merz had already stressed the need for increasing German defense spending and expanding military support for Ukraine. For example, while Scholz had resolutely opposed the provision of long-range missiles to Ukraine, Merz had publicly supported delivering Taurus missiles to support the war effort against Russia.

It was mere hours after the first election results were announced, however, that it became apparent how far Merz’s own thinking on the issue had really progressed. In what amounted to a seismic shift, Merz explained that, given the indifference Trump and other U.S. officials had recently shown toward the continent’s fate, he viewed it as his “absolute priority” to “strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.”

Unsurprisingly, these words shocked observers in Germany and beyond. It is hard to overstate how remarkable it is to hear the future German chancellor and leader of the CDU sound more like Charles de Gaulle than Konrad Adenauer on the issue of U.S.-European relations. Merz himself acknowledged as much, noting that “I would have never thought that I would have to say something like this on a TV show.” Yet, he continued, “after Donald Trump’s remarks last week … it is clear that this government does not care much about the fate of Europe.” Merz’s words were no less a watershed moment than those Hegseth uttered earlier this month: For the first time in postwar history, it seems as if both sides of the Atlantic are ready to move on from their historically close partnership in matters of security.

Merz’s comments echo the previous government’s announcement of a Zeitenwende—the promise made after the Russian invasion of Ukraine to fundamentally rethink German defense policy and embrace the need for greater military spending. But observers hoping that the new government will realize this policy revision should not jump to optimistic conclusions.

First, and most important, the degree to which Merz will be able to realize these policy changes will crucially depend on his ability to navigate the domestic political process. Any efforts to markedly increase defense spending and take on more of the burden of defending Europe against external threats will confront formidable opposition. Fiscally constrained by the constitutionally mandated debt brake, a new CDU-led government will find it difficult to find the means to meaningfully increase any form of military spending. The success of the AfD and the Left in the election also means that a constitutional amendment to the debt brake is unlikely to pass in the foreseeable future. Realizing this, Merz has begun exploring the possibility of passing the required constitutional amendment in the outgoing parliament, but it remains to be seen whether he will succeed. In short, even if there is a will for pursuing real change, the ability to implement it might simply not be there.

Second, only time will tell whether Merz will stay true to his election night remarks on the need for more independence from Washington. In Germany, transatlanticism and reliance on the United States as a security guarantor run deep. Moreover, the German population has long been fearful of a move toward serious rearmament. Like no other country, Germany has embraced the “end of history” narrative and convinced itself that hard power competition is a thing of the past. Significant U.S. military withdrawals from the continent will likely provide an impetus to overcome these hurdles, but it will involve a difficult and contentious process, the outcome of which remains necessarily uncertain.