Surveillance & Privacy

The Lawfare Podcast: Data Privacy and Consumer Protection with the FTC’s Ben Wiseman

Justin Sherman, Benjamin Wiseman, Jen Patja
Tuesday, April 2, 2024, 8:00 AM
Discussing the FTC's recent focus on health, location, and kids' privacy

Published by The Lawfare Institute
in Cooperation With
Brookings

The Federal Trade Commission’s data, privacy, and AI cases have been all over the news recently, from its proposed settlement with Avast Antivirus to its lawsuit against data broker Kochava.

Lawfare Contributor Justin Sherman sat down with Ben Wiseman, the Associate Director of the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection at the FTC, who oversees a team of attorneys and technologists working on technology and consumer protection. They discussed the FTC’s recent focus on health, location, and kids’ privacy; its ongoing data privacy and security rulemaking; and how the FTC looks beyond financial penalties for companies to prevent and mitigate harm to consumers.

Click the button below to view a transcript of this podcast. Please note that the transcript was auto-generated and may contain errors.

 

Transcript

[Introduction]

Ben Wiseman: So in crafting remedies, we want to establish substantive protections for consumers’ data. And here's what I mean: in the health privacy cases in GoodRx and BetterHealth and Premom, our orders didn't allow sharing of sensitive health data so long as consumers consented to it. The orders banned it altogether. In X-Mode and InMarket, the orders didn't allow those companies to sell or disclose precise location information so long as they obtained consumers consent. It was banned. And then another case, our recent Rite Aid matter, a case in which we alleged that a company had recklessly deployed facial recognition technology. The order we obtained included a five-year ban on the use of any facial recognition or surveillance system. So, when we're crafting remedies, we look to injunctive relief to stop unlawful conduct, but we're also looking at injunctive relief to address some of the broader problems we're seeing in the marketplace and some of the incentives that are driving the harm.

Justin Sherman: I'm Justin Sherman, a contributor at Lawfare, and this is the Lawfare Podcast, April 2, 2024. The Federal Trade Commission's data, privacy, and AI cases have been all over the news recently from its proposed settlement with a vast antivirus to its lawsuit with data broker Kochava. I sat down with Ben Wiseman, the Associate Director of the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection at the FTC, who oversees a team of attorneys and technologists working on technology and consumer protection. We discussed the FTC's recent focus on health, location, and kids’ privacy, its ongoing data privacy and security rulemaking, and how the FTC looks beyond financial penalties for companies and companies to prevent and mitigate harm to consumers.

It's the Lawfare Podcast, April 2: Data Privacy and Consumer Protection with the FTC's Ben Wiseman.

[Main Podcast]

Ben, why don't you start off by telling us more about yourself. How did your career in privacy and cyber security and consumer protection begin?

Ben Wiseman: Well thanks, Justin. And first off, just thanks for having me. I'm very excited to get to be on here and talk about all the exciting work we're doing at the FTC. Let me start with the standard disclaimer that I give as a government employee, which is that my views are my own. They don't necessarily reflect the views of the commission or any particular commissioner. So, my career in privacy and consumer protection began at the D.C. Office of the Attorney General. The former Attorney General Carl Racine persuasively convinced me to join what was a brand new Office of Consumer Protection at the DCAG's office. This was the first time there was a standalone Office of Consumer Protection focused on privacy and consumer protection issues. He promised me that it would be a startup like environment, and it really was.

We were a very small team, and over the course of several years, we really built up a consumer protection and privacy program from the ground up. Within a few years, we were one of the lead states on the Equifax multi-state investigation. We were the first state regulator to sue Facebook regarding the Cambridge Analytica incident. We led a large Google multi-state investigation concerning their location collection practices, which resulted in what I believe still is the largest monetary payment in a multi-state privacy enforcement case.

So it was just an incredibly exciting time to, one, get involved in privacy and consumer protection issues. And just to be working at the state AG level, just have tremendous respect for the folks in the D.C. AG office, my former colleagues, as well as, AG's offices across the country that are working on all these issues. In 2022, I had the opportunity to join the FTC. So, I packed up my things and literally walked two blocks down 7th street in D.C. to FTC headquarters. I first worked for the Bureau Director for six months, and then I found my home in DPIP.

Justin Sherman: So, some listeners hear DPIP, and they're well familiar with that organization. Undoubtedly, some others may be less familiar. And so can you just talk to us about what exactly does the FTC's Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, or DPIP, do and how has that role evolved over the years?

Ben Wiseman: So DPIP is the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection. Sorry, I know not that everyone knows that offhand like we do. It was formed in 2006, so when the internet was really blossoming, when we're starting to see the surge of the online digital economy, and it was formed in response to really what was a growing number of privacy and security issues that the Commission was facing at that time. The Bureau Director at the time in announcing DPIP's creation noted that in DPIP, it's going to be all privacy and security all the time. And in the nearly 20 years since then, that has absolutely remained true.

So simply put, DPIP is the chief privacy and data security enforcer in the United States. Someone recently told me we should start calling ourselves the U.S. DPA, given our role in privacy enforcement in the U.S. We rely on Section FTC Act to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices relating to their privacy and the security of their data. We also have sector specific statutory authority that includes enforcement of statutes like the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Children Online Privacy and Protection Act, or COPPA, and the COPPA rule, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which involves financial data, and the Health Breach Notification Rule, which involves health data. We are a small and mighty group in DPIP. It's under 50 people. That's lawyers, we have technologists, investigators, and other staff also on the team. I know you have advocated in your writing for more resources for the FTC. Thank you. When you look at our resources compared to our European counterparts, we are quite small.

How has DPIP's role changed over time? I think it's obvious that over the last 20 years, we've seen incredible technological developments and changes, and DPIP's role has really evolved with those changes. Our Bureau Director, Sam Levine, has spoken about the institutional advantages that we have at the FTC to address emerging threats. And one of those is the FTC Act itself, which is this really broad and flexible statute. So, in enacting the FTC Act, Congress gave the FTC this broad authority to combat unfair and deceptive trade practices. And that broad authority has really allowed the FTC, over time, to adapt and change as technology has changed and adapt, and that's what we've done in DPIP.

So, whether it was the, initial growth and start of the internet, which led to DPIP's creation, whether it's been the sort of increase in data breaches we've seen and the sophistication in data breaches over time, the sort of incredible transformation brought upon by mobile phones and applications, which really led to a rise in commercial surveillance as the default online business model, or as we're seeing today, the increasing use of AI and automated decision making in our lives, DPIP and the FTC has been on the front lines and we're constantly adopting new strategies and tools to address emerging threats that we see in the marketplace.

Justin Sherman: That's perfect. Cause let's walk through each of those kinds of things. You mentioned the piece about authority. So one of the FTC is core authorities, as you said, is the power to enforce against unfair and deceptive business practices. What does that mean in practice when it comes to cybersecurity and privacy? And how should listeners understand that distinction between the idea of unfairness versus the idea of deceptiveness?

Ben Wiseman: Section 5 of the FTC Act, which is the primary statute we enforce broadly prohibits deceptive, unfair, and anti-competitive trade practices. I will not get into anti-competitive behavior. I am not an antitrust lawyer. I know enough to be dangerous. It's a whole different side of the agency. And I'm sure I'll get something wrong.

Let's start with deceptive trade practices. It's what it sounds like. It's not providing truthful information. It's statements that are misleading. It's making misrepresentations of material facts. For example, when a photo storage company online says, we'll delete your photos and videos when you deactivate your account. But then they don't delete those photos and videos. In fact, they hold them indefinitely. That would be deceptive conduct. And that's actually an example from one of the commission's cases, the Everalbum case in 2021.

Unfairness is distinct. Unfairness is defined in the statute as a practice that causes substantial injury that consumers cannot avoid and where the benefits don't outweigh the harms. Whereas deceptive conduct is largely focused on statements that are made by companies concerning their goods and services or what's disclosed or what's not disclosed, unfairness is really focused on the harm to consumers.

I'll give another example. In our lawsuit against Epic Games, the maker of Fortnite, which came out last year, we alleged that the deployment of a default privacy setting, which allowed minors to communicate freely with adults and led to issues such as stalking and harassment of kids and teens, we allege that the deployment of the default setting was unfair. So our allegations didn't turn on whether or not the company disclosed the setting, but rather it was the substance of the practice itself that was alleged to be harmful. So when we bring unfairness claims, we are really calling out specific harms to consumers from certain business practices. And the remedies we seek in those cases are designed to stop those harms and address the incentives that lead to those harms in the first place.

In DPIP, we have been bringing unfairness cases for a while, particularly in data security. I do think since I joined the Commission in 2022, I have seen unfairness being used more and more to address privacy harms that consumers can't reasonably avoid. So you have a number of cases, including the Epic Games case, I Just Matter, on some health privacy cases, in a recent lawsuit we, that the Commission filed in 2022 against a data broker named Kochava, all involved allegations of unfair trade practices. And I think it's notable that in those cases, the support for those unfairness claims was bipartisan. There were four votes from Commissioners to advance the cases that I just mentioned.

Justin Sherman: The FTC has had several cases recently, you just mentioned one of them, involving data brokers and the sale of consumers’ location data, particularly, some of which are unfairness cases, some of which, as you said, also involve claims of deception. Talk to us more about this ongoing lawsuit against location data broker Kochava, As well as the two other settlements you reached recently with location data brokers.

Ben Wiseman: As you mentioned, Kochava is an ongoing lawsuit. The other two matters that you're referring to are recent proposed settlements against X-Mode and InMarket. Those are proposed settlements. They're working their way through our, to the commission's administrative process before they're finalized.

Let me backtrack and start with a broader lens on the issue of data brokers and location data in general. This is an area you've written a lot about or know a lot about. Location data is so sensitive because it reveals so much about us, where we live, where we pray, where we seek medical treatment, the groups we spend time with, where our kids go to school. And what has happened, I think, over the past decade or so is that as the commercial surveillance business model, has it become further entrenched as the norm or as the default location data has become even more valuable. And then as a result, there's been a rise in firms that as their primary business model, collect process and sell this information.

So there's this whole ecosystem of companies out there that consumers have never heard of, that collect and sell consumers’ geolocation information, often to within meters of where folks are present, along with, dozens of other data points about individuals that are put together into these curated profiles.

So the X-MODE case, X-MODE is a company that sits within this data broker ecosystem. We allege in the complaint that they collect precise geolocation information in a number of ways, through their own apps, through SDKs that are incorporated into other apps, and as well as through other data brokers. They have deals with other data brokers where they collect information. And these collection methods have allowed them to amass billions of location data points from all over the world. And they sell their data in two ways.

The first is as a raw data feed. Which has device identifiers for individuals, mobile devices, along with longitude and latitude coordinates for where those devices are located. So little pings that you can follow an individual device as it's out throughout the day. And the second category of data they sell are what is referred to as audience segments. These are when device identifiers are matched with certain locations or categories of locations to create these profiles. One profile of an audience segment could be veterans. You get a list of veterans. Or you get a list of people who visit certain churches. And it can get pretty granular.

So for instance, in X-Mode, one of the audience segments we alleged in our complaint was that they put together an audience segment of individuals that went to certain specialist medical practices in the Columbus, Ohio area. We alleged that the sale of location data that included visits to sensitive locations, like medical facilities, places of religious worship, domestic abuse shelters, we alleged that was an unfair trade practice. And we also allege that categorizing consumers into audience segments based on sensitive characteristics, based on sensitive locations, that too was unfair.

We also had an allegation in the complaint that the company was collecting data for certain purposes, namely to sell to government contractors for national security purposes without obtaining consent for such purposes. The proposed order, this was, this is again, is a proposed settlement, and the proposed order in the case I think is notable for a few reasons. One, it includes a ban on the sale or disclosure of sensitive location information. That's a first of its kind type of ban. And it also requires the company to develop what we're calling a supplier assessment program, which ensures that they, the company confirms that consumers have provided consent to the collection and specific uses of their location data. So that's the X-Mode case.

Kochava, as you mentioned, it's in litigation. I can't speak in too great detail about that case because of the ongoing nature of the litigation. But let me give you like a brief procedural history of where things stand there. So this was a case that Commission filed in 2022. The allegations there are similar to the allegations that are made in X-Mode. The company sale of precise geolocation information could reveal visits to sensitive locations. And we alleged that was unfair. We alleged that the sale harmed consumers in two ways. We said that one, it exposed consumers to potential harms like stalking, physical violence, and harassment. And two, we alleged that it was also an invasion of consumers privacy, and that was a stand-alone cognizable harm. The court required us to amend our complaint, which we did last year, and very recently, we got a decision from the court denying the company's efforts to dismiss the lawsuit. And so our case is moving forward in discovery.

I do want to highlight sort of one key aspect from the court's finding. In the denial of the court's motion to dismiss, for the first time, a court recognized that an invasion of privacy alone can be a substantial injury under the unfairness prongs in the FTC Act. So that even if that privacy invasion didn't lead to further harms or these secondary harms like stigma or harassment, or physical violence, that the invasion of privacy alone can constitute substantial injury. And that's significant, particularly as we are looking at some of the other harms that we're seeing in the data broker ecosystem.

Justin Sherman: Let's zoom in for a second on something you mentioned, which I think is really interesting. This idea of sensitive locations and in the proposed settlement with X-MODE, the scoping of some of the provisions around this idea of sensitivity when it comes to location data. How does the FTC think about that and how do you draw those lines, I guess in some cases literally, around what is sensitive and what is not sensitive?

Ben Wiseman: Let me start by explaining just generally, so each case is very different. The facts of each case are different. The business models involved in the companies that we are investigating or pursue are very different. And the relief we seek will depend on the facts of the case, as well as the specific harmful conduct that we investigated.

If you look at the definition of sensitive locations in the X-Mode case, many of the locations reveal information about an individual that the FTC has said in the past constitutes sensitive information. So whether it's health conditions, information about children, religious affiliation, those are areas where the FTC has spoken in the past about being highly sensitive information about consumers.

As to location information more generally, the Commission has made clear that precise geolocation, whether affiliated with sensitive locations or not, is sensitive. So if you look back at the 2012 Privacy Report, the FTC specifically called out, among other types of data, that precise geolocation data with sensitive data, because it can be used to re-identify people, it can be used to follow them around, and it can also be used to build extensive profiles about them. And we really made this case in the InMarket case, which is the other proposed settlement of a data broker that the Commission has recently come out with.

And I'll talk about that very briefly. Basically, InMarket is a data aggregator that collects precise geolocation and uses it to create audience segments to serve ads. Some of the audience segments were things like Christian churchgoers. In that case we brought claims similar to the claims in X-MODE, and the order we obtained included a ban on the sale of any precise geolocation information. It wasn't limited to sensitive location data. So what should be clear from InMarket, as well as X-MODE, Kochava, and, other FTC actions in this space is that we take the collection, use, and disclosure of precise geolocation information very seriously because of its sensitivity, and that we'll continue to hold players that act unlawfully in this ecosystem accountable.

Justin Sherman: Another significant area of work for the FTC, especially recently, has been health data. And let's get into some of the specific cases in a minute. But first, if the U.S. has HIPAA, which many often refer to as the federal health privacy law. How and why is the FTC involved in health privacy protection?

Ben Wiseman: There certainly is a myth that HIPAA covers the field when it comes to health privacy. The reality is very different. HIPAA covers only certain entities. And that leaves a whole host of companies that collect and use and disclose health information from consumers not covered by HIPAA. I think this really came to light in recent years where we've seen an explosion of health apps, of fitness trackers, telehealth companies, and many of those are not HIPAA covered entities. Those are entities that fall outside the scope of HIPAA. To be clear, even if you are a HIPAA covered entity, the FTC Act still applies. So, we talked earlier about unfair and deceptive conduct under the FTC Act. Those prohibitions apply even to those entities that are covered by HIPAA.

Now, if an entity isn't covered by HIPAA, that doesn't mean there aren't any other privacy protections. You know there's the FTC Act. And in addition to the FTC Act, there's also the Health Breach Notification Rule, which is a rule that we enforce in DPIP. The Health Breach Notification Rule, we call it HBNR, it's a rule that Congress directed the FTC to promulgate in the High Tech Act in 2009. It requires certain entities to notify individuals, the FTC, and in some cases, the media, if there is a breach of unsecured health data. A breach of unsecured health data, importantly, doesn't just mean a cybersecurity incident, it can also mean when a company discloses health information without authorization from consumers. And when companies violate the rule, when they fail to provide that notification, they can face significant penalties.

We just, in May of last year, we proposed amendments to HBNR through a notice of proposed rulemaking to, among other things, just make clear that the rule applies to health apps and other similar technologies that aren't covered by HIPAA. So HBNR is just another tool that we have and use to protect consumers health data for those entities that aren't covered under HIPAA.

Justin Sherman: What are some of the most recent FTC cases and actions involving Americans’ health information? What kinds of claims is the FTC bringing in those specific instances?

Ben Wiseman: The past year has really been, I think, one of the most significant in terms of advancing the commission's health privacy work. We've had a number of cases in the health privacy space. We have a team of fantastic attorneys that are experts in this area and have been working on these cases. There are cases, and I'll talk about a few of them, but just run through them quickly cases include GoodRx which was the first time the Commission alleged a violation of HBNR. BetterHelp the first time the Commission returned funds to consumers for health privacy violations. Premom, the second time the Commission alleged a violation of HBNR. And then there were two significant cases involving genetic data, Vitagene. And the other one is CRI Genetics, which was a case that was brought by our Seattle office along with the California Attorney General.

There are a lot of takeaways from these cases. I, there is this fantastic blog post that an attorney in DPIP put together called “A Baker's Dozen of Takeaways from Health Privacy Cases.” You can find it at the FTC website. Quick tangent, just want, just incredible kudos to our Division of Consumer and Business Education who puts out a ton of resources on the FTC's website that are digestible for businesses and consumers to really understand the work we're doing. An incredible amount of work goes into those resources and it's just an incredible part of the FTC having these resources and guidance available. online for the American public.

So back to the health cases. I'll focus on a trio of cases which are the BetterHelp, GoodRx, and Premom cases. So each of these cases involve sharing sensitive health data. In the case of BetterHelp, it was mental health information. In the case of GoodRx, it was medication data. In the case of Premom, it was reproductive health information, it's a fertility app. And they were sharing the sensitive health information through tracking pixels with advertising platforms like Google and Facebook. And this sharing was happening without consumer's authorization and contrary to the privacy representations that these companies were making. All three of those cases included allegations of unfair trade practices. So we had unfair counts as well as deception counts. In particular, with respect to the unfair counts, we allege that the company's sharing of health data without authorization was an unfair trade practice. And we also allege that the failure to institute policies to protect consumers health information was also an unfair trade practice and that it caused substantial injury to consumers.

A few takeaways from the cases. First, that, health information is quite broad. It's not just a medical diagnosis. It can be, also be we've set forth in these cases information from which you can infer health information. And health information goes beyond just diagnosis or treatment. It really is quite broad. And then the second takeaway is, the orders we obtained in these cases were intended to provide real protections for Americans health data. We notably didn't just require that consumers consent before the companies could share sensitive health data for advertising purposes, but rather we ban the practice entirely. So, all three cases include a prohibition on sharing health data for advertising purposes.

Justin Sherman: And of course there's overlap in these two areas but the use of children's data has been another important point of focus for the FTC recently, just based on all of the public matters. What has the FTC been doing with respect to the use of children's data and are there any similar takeaways that listeners should have for what it means about FTC action and what it also means about the U.S. regulatory landscape?

Ben Wiseman: So I know I said it was a significant year for health privacy. I also think the last 18 months or so have been incredibly significant with respect to kids privacy and teen privacy. So, protecting the privacy of kids has long been a top priority of the Commission. It continues to be to this day, in the past 18 months, some of the most significant actions have been the Epic Games Matter, which I referred to earlier. Epic's the creator of the Fortnite game. This was a COPPA case in which the commission obtained the largest civil penalty ever in a COPPA case, $275 million. The Commission also brought enforcement action against Amazon concerning its Alexa product, making clear that under COPPA, companies cannot retain children's information indefinitely. A case against Microsoft for the Xbox platform, another COPPA case, finding that the company didn't properly obtain notice and consent as required under the COPPA rule. And another significant case was the Edmodo case. Edmodo is an edtech provider. And that case made clear that, COPPA applies in the edtech context, and also that edtech providers can't outsource their COPPA obligations on to schools and teachers. At the end of the day, it's the edtech companies that are responsible for their COPPA obligations and will be held accountable.

And so it's just, we've had several very significant COPPA cases over the past 18 months. And this was capped off in December when the commission announced a notice of proposed rulemaking on the COPPA rule. The COPPA rule was last updated in 2013. As you can imagine, there have been several advances on technology, particularly technology focused on children over the past 10 plus years. And so the amendments put forth by the Commission really look to strengthen protections for children in light of those changing circumstances and developments in technology. Children's privacy has long been a priority and will continue to be.

Justin Sherman: Stepping back now a little bit and thinking more about as you touched on at the outset, the role of the FTC generally in the space. One of the frequent criticisms, of course, of a fine or penalty-based approach to privacy or cybersecurity, issues are now with AI, is that companies will pay a sum of money and then, in some cases, it appears continue business as usual. And so are there measures that the FTC has at its disposal if a company is engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice with consumers data and do those measures include anything beyond fines?

Ben Wiseman: For starters, the Commission's ability to obtain monetary relief in cases was severely curtailed by the Supreme Court's decision in AMG in 2021. That decision took away what was the most powerful tool that the Commission had to return money for consumers. There are certain circumstances, particularly where we have violations of rules like COPPA, where we can obtain civil penalties and or redress for consumers, but the AMG decision was a very significant decision in taking away what was the most effective tool for the commission to return money for consumers.

The most significant tool that we often rely on to stop ongoing unlawful conduct is our ability to obtain injunctive relief or conduct relief. And when we think about remedies and we think about injunctive relief in particular, we're thinking carefully about designing remedies that don't just effectively address the harms to consumers, but also address some of the structural incentives that enable the unlawful conduct and enable those harms.

For example, in a number of our data security cases, as well as privacy cases, but in a number of our data security cases, we have secured requirements that companies minimize the data they collect and retain it no longer than it's reasonably necessary. That is a relief provision, an injunctive provision that goes directly to some of the incentives that we think are driving some of the harms, the massive overcollection of data, the less data that is collected and retained, the less data that can be compromised or misused.

Another thing we look to do when we're crafting remedies is to create substantive protections for consumers. So I spoke a little bit about this earlier with respect to our health cases. You've heard several of the commissioners speak at length about some of the real limitations of the current notice and consent regime. Notice is really a fiction if it means reading thousands of pages of privacy policies. I think research has shown that is just impossible. It's impossible for a consumer to read all the privacy policies of all the companies they interact with on a daily basis. And consent is really a fiction in these circumstances, particularly where it's just checking a box.

So in crafting remedies, we want to establish substantive protections for consumers data. And here's what I mean. In the health privacy cases in GoodRx and BetterHealth and Premom, our orders didn't allow sharing of sensitive health data, so long as consumers consented to it, the orders banned it altogether. In X-MODE and InMarket, the orders didn't allow those companies to sell or disclose precise location information so long as they obtained consumer's consent, it was banned. And then in another case, our recent RiteAid matter, a case in which we alleged that a company had recklessly deployed facial recognition technology, the order we obtained included a five-year ban on the use of any facial recognition or surveillance system.

When we're crafting remedies, we look to injunctive relief to stop unlawful conduct, but we're also looking at injunctive relief to address some of the broader problems we're seeing in the marketplace and some of the incentives that are driving the harmful conduct.

Justin Sherman: Can you talk to us a little bit more about, you mentioned, Rite Aid, there have been, of course, FTC cases recently with AI. Some of those have required deletion of AI models. And so why has the FTC pursued this kind of remedy? And, you, like in practice what does that actually mean for a company?

Ben Wiseman: That's right. There are now eight cases in which the Commission has required companies not only to delete data that was unlawfully obtained or unlawfully used, but also to delete any models or algorithms developed with that data. Everalbum is one of those cases. I mentioned that earlier as a case. In which that type of order relief provision was included. How that process works is going to depend on the facts of the case. Again, each case is different. I think the main takeaway is that even if there isn't a monetary payment or a civil penalty involved in a case, violating the law can still be an expensive proposition for a company.

This is also an area where having technologists at the agency has been tremendously helpful. In 2023, the Commission, under Chair Khan's leadership, created the Office of Technology. They have 12 technologists now on staff who come from an array of backgrounds with different expertise. These are some of the best technologists, not just in government, but in the entire country. And having and working with those technologists day in and day out on things like crafting appropriate remedies is just tremendously helpful. It's another one of the tools we have in our toolbox to make sure that we're doing all we can to protect consumers’ privacy.

Justin Sherman: So related to that then, and this has come up Rite Aid, the FTC had an order with the company to prevent the use of facial recognition going forward. So, can you talk to us more about what happened in the case that, or, what was Rite Aid doing that prompted that? And then what were the terms that the FTC was able to secure?

Ben Wiseman: The Rite Aid case has drawn a lot of attention and I think for good reason. There have been lots of conversations. I'm sure you've had them. I've been at conferences on hearing panels about some of the theoretical harms from AI and from facial recognition technologies. But this is a case that really grounded those harms in reality. I'll give a brief overview of the case.

Around 2012, we allege that Rite Aid introduced facial recognition in stores to identify folks that it had previously identified as shoplifters or engage in some other wrongful activity. Essentially, what would happen is writing employees would take photos of individuals in stores who are engaged in shoplifting, or they'd use camera footage from those stores to capture photos, and they'd enter those photos into a database. And then when consumers enter the store, their face would be captured through the facial recognition software, and they were run against this database for a match. When Rite Aid employees were informed that there was a match against someone in the database when a consumer was in the store, they were given sort of a series of options to choose from, depending on sort of the score that was provided by the facial recognition technology system, and these different options included things like approaching the individual or following them around the store, asking the individual to leave the store, and in some cases, calling the police.

We allege that the deployment of this facial recognition technology surveillance system wasn't just unreasonable, that it was really reckless. One, it was deployed in stores that are in largely plurality nonwhite locations, even though most Right Aid stores are in plurality white locations. The company also tried to hide it from the public. We allege that it didn't tell consumers about facial recognition and in fact, instructed employees not to tell consumers or the media about it. And we also allege that it just failed to take even the most basic measures to ensure that the technology was accurate, and that it wouldn't harm consumers. So it regularly used low quality images, we allege that it didn't test the technology pre deployment or during its use, and we allege that it didn't appropriately train employees. And so guess what happened? The system didn't work. There were thousands of false positives, consumers were in stores were falsely flagged as wrongdoers. And this is where you really see the severity of when these technologies can go wrong. The cases are extremely telling. Rite Aid employees stopped and searched an 11-year-old girl. Her mother was so distraught that she had to take off work, understandably so. Rite Aid employees called the police on a black woman who was falsely flagged by the system. And when employees went to look back at the database of the picture that, caused the flag, it was actually a white woman with blonde hair.

So you really see the severe consequences when companies really fail to take proper measures before deploying these systems. The complaint in that case, we allege that their failure to take reasonable measures to address these risks and these harms to consumers was unfair. It was an unfairness case again. The order we obtained, Rite Aid's banned, as I mentioned, from using any facial recognition surveillance or security system for five years. And significantly in the future, if they decide to implement any type of biometric security or surveillance system, they have to maintain a very robust monitoring program.

It requires testing and training and significantly, if the testing identifies risks the company can't mitigate, it needs to shut the system down. So, Rite Aid is a very significant case. It's the first time that the commission has alleged that a company's use of AI and use of facial recognition technology was unlawful.

Justin Sherman: Looking now, both ahead and then at processes that are ongoing, the FTC is in the middle of a lot of rulemaking right now. That's on commercial surveillance and data security, on the health breach notification rule, which you spoke a lot about, and most recently on COPPA, the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act. So, first of all, what does it mean for the FTC to be engaged in rulemaking? And then what compelled the FTC to initiate these processes? What changes might they bring to our current landscape?

Ben Wiseman: What is rulemaking? Under, so under the FTC it's, it's a process and that's what it means to be engaged in rulemaking. The FTC Act, empowers the Commission to prescribe rules that define acts or practices as unfair or deceptive. And so that's one method of rulemaking that the Commission can engage in. Congress has also granted the Commission rulemaking authority in a number of other statutes, COPPA being one of them. And the COPPA rule being the implementing regulation. And so to be engaged in rulemaking means that there is a process that we follow before we can promulgate a final rule and a final trade or final trade regulation.

For rules under the FTC Act, its a little different than rules that we are promulgating under other statutory authority. The first step under the FTC Act is we have to issue what's called an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. Essentially, these are questions that we ask the public in advance of any rulemakings. The public then provides comment. Following that comment period, if the Commission elects to proceed with a rule, it will issue a proposed rule in a notice of advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. And then after that step, the public will have a further opportunity to comment. And then the final step in the rulemaking process is the issuance of a final rule. I think you're right to note that there's been an increased amount of rulemaking under Chair Kahn. And, I think it reflects two things. First, as I mentioned, the Supreme Court's AMG decision was incredibly significant in taking away the most effective tool to return money for consumers. Essentially what it's meant is that absent a rule violation, it's much more challenging to obtain monetary relief in cases. Where there are rule violations, however, the Commission is empowered to obtain redress as well as civil penalties.

And so by enacting rules that set out unfair and deceptive trade practices, one example would be the recent rulemaking that was finalized on government impersonator scams. The FTC now is able to obtain penalties and redress for that unlawful conduct. That rulemaking, the type of impersonation scams that were addressed by in that rule have always violated the FTC Act, and the FTC has brought a number of cases over the years addressing those violations of the FTC Act, but now that there's a rule in place, the FTC can seek consumer redress, and it can seek civil penalties in those cases. So that, I think, is one, one piece that has driven rulemaking.

I think a second piece is that there is a recognition that case by case enforcement alone sometimes might not be enough to address broader problems that we see in the marketplace. So along with rulemaking, what you're seeing at the Commission is using all the tools in our toolkit to protect American consumers. So it's rulemakings, the use of notice of penalty offenses, conducting industry studies on our 6B with our 6B authority. These are all other methods in which the Commission is making sure that it's using all the tools that we have that Congress has granted to us to protect the American public.

Justin Sherman: Looking then at the future of FTC cases and regulatory matters, recent focus areas, as we've said, have clearly included health information, genetic information, location data about children and teenagers. Do you expect that to continue? And what do you see as the FTC, and also DPIP's biggest priority area is when it comes to privacy and cyber security.

Ben Wiseman: That's a big question. We've talked about a number of themes today that are really focus areas in DPIP and at the FTC. Recognizing the limitations of notice and consent and moving towards substantive protections for people's data. Stopping the sharing of sensitive data like precise location data, health data. Protecting data from abuses, requiring firms to minimize the data that they collect and they retain. Making sure firms aren't training models on illegally obtained data. Those are all some of the themes of the enforcement cases that we're bringing and some of the focus areas when we're bringing enforcement cases. You raise some substantive areas that have been and continue to be priorities in our privacy work, health data, location data, those priorities continue. Areas of sensitive data, we are looking to provide substantive protections to limit some of the harmful and unlawful commercial surveillance practices that we see with a collection, really the over collection of sensitive data. Kids and teens, our robust COPPA enforcement seeking to address some of the unique privacy harms that kids and teens face remains a priority.

AI is a space where, in order to recognize the benefits of the technology, we really think it's important to understand and take a close look at some of the emerging threats we're seeing, particularly as to privacy. I think what you're seeing in the AI space, I've previously spoken about this as, some of the same incentives that have driven harms in the commercial surveillance context, the over collection of consumers data, are some of the same incentives that are driving AI business models. Many of these models rely on collecting as much data as possible. So that's another area of focus.

Data security has been a pillar of DPIP's work for many years and continues to be. Looking for ways to limit the collection, use, and retention of data, to reduce harms of data breaches when they do happen. And another area that I spoke about recently is worker surveillance. Gig work is on the rise. It's increasingly becoming a greater proportion of employment in the United States. AI is on the rise, as we all know. And surveillance is now impacting consumers more and more, not just in their homes, but when they're also on the job. And that's an area that we are focusing on.

We have quite broad jurisdiction at the FTC. Our mandate is quite broad. And it means that we have our hands full. It means that there's a lot of incoming when it comes to privacy and security. And all these are focus areas that we are committed to and think are necessary to remain committed to. As we look to do our best to protect the American public.

Justin Sherman: Currently, the U.S. legal and regulatory model for at least the consumer privacy component of what we're talking about is largely set up to have case by case enforcement or, in some areas, a focus just on certain practices within certain industry sectors. In the longer term, are there any legal or regulatory changes the FTC is supporting, or that you think would help improve on the privacy status quo?

Ben Wiseman: Yes, there's a big one, which would be passing a comprehensive federal privacy law. The Commission has for many years spoken about the importance of passing comprehensive privacy legislation that would provide baseline protections for all consumers across America.

Justin Sherman: The FTC has a proposed settlement very recently. with antivirus company Avast that I think cuts across and touches on a lot of the things we've been talking about on this episode. Can you tell us more about this case and what happened and what action the FTC pursued?

Ben Wiseman: Yeah, so Avast is a, it's a proposed settlement working its way through the administrative process. This is a company where we allege that it was providing antivirus software and browser extensions to really protect privacy. That was the purpose of this software. And that's why people downloaded the software and use the software, was to protect their privacy. As part of, that the software was collecting browsing information, consumers, individual browsing information, the websites they were visiting, and contrary to promises that it made, it then sold this browsing information on where ultimately it was used for advertising purposes.

So we have a proposed settlement with the company. It has some significant features in it. One is similar to the prohibitions I was discussing in some of the health cases and location cases. Avast is going to be prohibited from selling or licensing browsing data for advertising purposes. Similar to the model deletion provisions we were discussing earlier, Avast is going to have to delete the web browsing information, that was transferred on in that case, and it's also going to have to delete any algorithms that were derived from that data. And then the third piece is there's going to be notification to consumers. So Avast is going to have to inform consumers whose browsing information was sold to third parties without their consent. So it's a significant, it's a significant case. Again, it's a proposed settlement in the process, the administrative process that, that occurs at the FTC before cases are finalized.

Justin Sherman: Is there anything else you'd like to add?

Ben Wiseman: The one thing I'd like to add is we want to hear from folks. Please tell us about your privacy and data security problems. You can go to reportfraud at ftc.gov and we want to hear from you.

Justin Sherman: Thanks for coming on.

Ben Wiseman: Thanks for having me.

Justin Sherman: The Lawfare Podcast is produced in cooperation with the Brookings Institution. You can get ad free versions of this and other Lawfare podcasts by becoming a Lawfare material supporter at lawfaremedia.org/support. You'll also get access to special events and other content available only to Lawfare supporters.

Please rate and review the Lawfare Podcast wherever you get your podcasts. Look out for Lawfare's other podcasts, including Rational Security, Chatter, Allies, and the Aftermath. Go to lawfaremedia.org to see Lawfare's written work. This podcast is edited by Jen Patja, and your audio engineer this episode was Cara Shillenn of Goat Rodeo. The music is performed by Sophia Yan. As always, thank you for listening.


Justin Sherman is a contributing editor at Lawfare. He is also the founder and CEO of Global Cyber Strategies, a Washington, DC-based research and advisory firm; a senior fellow at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy, where he runs its research project on data brokerage; and a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.
Benjamin Wiseman is the associate director at the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection at the Federal Trade Commission.
Jen Patja is the editor and producer of the Lawfare Podcast and Rational Security. She currently serves as the Co-Executive Director of Virginia Civics, a nonprofit organization that empowers the next generation of leaders in Virginia by promoting constitutional literacy, critical thinking, and civic engagement. She is the former Deputy Director of the Robert H. Smith Center for the Constitution at James Madison's Montpelier and has been a freelance editor for over 20 years.

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