The United States Should Not Ignore Kuwait’s Democratic Backslide

In May, Meshal al-Ahmad al-Jaber Al Sabah, the emir of Kuwait, suspended the country’s National Assembly. This was a striking move against one of the more powerful legislative bodies in the Middle East. Unlike most other regional legislative bodies, Kuwait’s National Assembly had real legislative functions and powers, which garnered popular legitimacy and made it a source of national pride.

Meshal has claimed the suspension was for the country’s well-being and suggested that without the legislature he will be able to reform and improve Kuwait’s economic and security situation. This is wrong—Kuwait’s problems run deeper than the jockeying between the emir and the assembly that has typified Kuwaiti politics in recent years. Meshal’s actions will not improve Kuwait’s economy or security but will have the effect of undermining Kuwait’s most democratic institution—contributing to the international trend of democratic backsliding.

The United States has been a proponent of Kuwait’s National Assembly—in fact, its modern existence is largely due to the United States’s successful post-Gulf War efforts to bring back the also-then suspended legislature. Its current suspension violates the Biden administration’s efforts to protect democratic institutions from autocratic erosion. However, the United States has still not put pressure on Meshal to revive Kuwait’s legislature.

The Most Powerful Legislature in the Gulf

Kuwait’s 50-member National Assembly was unique among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries because it had a legitimate legislative role and could resist the executive’s—Meshal’s—policies. The assembly was empowered to pass legislation, investigate and remove cabinet ministers, reject the budget, and approve treaties. Members of the assembly were democratically elected, with all Kuwaiti citizens (both men and women) eligible to vote, and observers largely considered Kuwaiti Assembly elections to be free and fair.

The unequal division of power between the executive and legislature led to intense gridlock in Kuwaiti politics. The assembly was not like the parliaments of Europe: It could not appoint the prime minister or cabinet ministers, which remained the emir’s prerogative, and the emir could veto legislation. Since assembly members could not appoint cabinet ministers but had the ability to remove them with a simple majority, they constantly threatened to remove ministers to signal their displeasure with the government. In practice, this led to the frequent turnover in the Kuwaiti cabinet—with some ministries changing leadership repeatedly in a single year—because the assembly often had enough votes to remove the ministers. Though frustrating and at times disruptive, this tactic enabled the Kuwaiti legislature to pressure the emir to prevent him from unrestricted exercise of power. 

The emir is allowed to dissolve the National Assembly, but according to Kuwait’s constitution, the emir is obligated to hold new elections within 60 days. Meshal instead ignored the constitution, even suspending parts of it. Instead of promptly reinstating a newly elected assembly, Meshal has stated that the assembly could remain dissolved for as long as four years.

Avoiding the Real Problems

Meshal has called for local experts to study Kuwait’s democratic process during the suspension and said that he would accept recommendations for legislative reform that he deemed appropriate. Meshal’s inclination will probably be to adopt recommendations that make the assembly a perfunctory advisory body, following the model of the other GCC countries. Meshal has close ties to Saudi Arabia, which had been putting pressure on Kuwait to curtail its vociferous democracy. The move would also have the support of the small minority of Kuwaitis who do not support democracy, which would provide some domestic cover for Meshal’s reforms. 

In the speech in which he suspended the assembly, Meshal lambasted legislators for intruding on areas outside their purview, such as cabinet appointments, and called out assembly members’ threats to question cabinet ministers preemptively before they were appointed. Meshal expressed frustration with Kuwait’s political gridlock and blamed the assembly for hindering his government, fostering corruption, preventing economic reform, and risking Kuwait’s security. Meshal asserted that his decision to dissolve the assembly would remove the impediment preventing the government from improving the country’s economy and security environment. 

Meshal is blaming the assembly for long-standing challenges beyond its purview that his own government ministers have failed to address—primarily Kuwait’s economic diversification and privatization. Oil exports comprise about 90 percent of government revenue, making Kuwait one of the least economically diversified countries in the Middle East. About 85 percent of Kuwaitis work for the government, and corruption is pervasive in the country’s security and judicial ministries, which has been detrimental to Kuwaiti national security. During the periods of gridlock, the government never proposed substantial reforms that addressed these issues. Since the assembly suspension, they still have not. In fact, one of the only things the government and assembly passed in 2024 was a $160 million annual salary for Meshal. The government is unlikely to substantially change economic policy now. In fact, Meshal may increase social benefits to Kuwaitis to minimize possible opposition while ignoring larger structural problems. 

While Meshal has accused the assembly of jeopardizing national security, it is far more likely he suspended the legislature because he was angry at assembly dissent. In his inaugural speech as emir in December 2023, Meshal complained that the previous government made a mistake when it tried improving relations with the assembly by pardoning opposition figures in exile. Some of those pardoned were former lawmakers arrested during the Arab Spring for storming Kuwait’s assembly building and calling for the removal of the allegedly corrupt prime minister. But since the arrests in the 2010s, these prisoners’ supporters in the assembly acted according to the constitution and did not harm Kuwait’s security. Since the assembly’s suspension, Meshal has arrested some prominent former lawmakers and candidates who criticized the emir’s decision and advocated reforming the system. The suspension and subsequent arrests do not seem likely to have any meaningful effect on Kuwait’s corruption issues or national security.

So far, the Kuwaiti public generally has been quiet about the suspension. In an Arab Barometer poll fielded in spring 2024, 66 percent of Kuwaitis thought that the National Assembly slowed down government action. Kuwaitis were becoming more dissatisfied with democracy in general, too—41 percent of Kuwaitis in 2024 agreed that “democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems,” an increase from 27 percent in 2018. However, this increase most likely reflects public frustration with the gridlock and Kuwait’s lack of economic progress compared to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Arab Barometer poll also shows that an overwhelming majority of Kuwaitis—85 percent—remain supportive of democracy relative to the alternatives. Given this popular preference, dissent will probably build if Kuwait’s economic malaise is not fixed by Meshal—as has happened in the past when the legislature was suspended. The assembly provides a space for Kuwaitis’ voices to be heard, and without it they may decide to turn to more radical options, undermining the country’s security and stability. 

A U.S. Policy Response to Arrest Kuwait’s Democratic Backsliding

The United States should act to prevent the possibility of Kuwait’s long-term security deteriorating. Washington should press the emir to reestablish the assembly and imbue it with powers to make meaningful reforms. The United States maintains significant influence in Kuwait because of its large military presence in the country, which Meshal and the rest of the ruling family view as the most important guarantee of their security. Kuwait still has a border dispute with Iraq, and large numbers of Kuwaitis view Iran as the country’s greatest threat. The United States could use Kuwait’s security dependence as leverage and threaten to downsize its presence in Kuwait if Meshal does not revive the assembly. 

Washington has pressed Kuwait’s rulers to democratize and return to Kuwait’s roots on several historical occasions. In 1986, the emir suspended the legislature because of tensions between the government and assembly and overall regional security concerns—similar to the present. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the emir and his crown prince promised to once again follow the constitution and restore the assembly as part of their effort to gain U.S. military support. Following the Gulf War, the United States repeatedly pressed the emir to democratize and reinstate the assembly, which he did in 1992.

The United States should once again encourage Kuwait to restore its democratic assembly, but will be most effective if it also takes into account the emir’s concerns. Although Meshal is wrong in his assertions about the sources of Kuwait’s economic and security issues, he is correct that there was extreme gridlock between the government and legislature. The United States should privately press Kuwait to make three changes to the assembly, so it becomes a more effective body once it returns: 

First, the United States should press Kuwait to legalize political parties, which are currently illegal. Without parties, independent legislators in the National Assembly have been incentivized to focus on criticizing the government and securing as many public-sector jobs as possible for their constituents rather than governing. If political parties were allowed, legislators would be judged by their parties’ policies and actions rather than individual benefits doled out to constituents.

Second, the United States should encourage the emir to delegate responsibility for appointing the prime minister and cabinet ministers to the assembly. Then legislators would feel responsible for the country’s overall trajectory. Additionally, this reform would prevent the gridlock of the previous assemblies because ministers would have majority support.

Finally, the United States should encourage Kuwait to establish a minimum quota for women legislators. A large contingent of legislators in previous assemblies have supported curtailing women’s rights. This proposal would ensure women’s voices are not suppressed and would make them a vital part of any coalition government. 

With these three reforms, Kuwait’s assembly would function more effectively and start addressing the country’s economic and security challenges. However, Meshal would likely be sensitive about relinquishing the executive’s foreign policy and security portfolios. As a compromise, the ministers of defense, interior, and foreign affairs could be constitutionally mandated to be from the ruling family.

Kuwait has had a National Assembly since 1963 and tried even earlier to establish an assembly until the British squashed it. The United States’s encouraging Meshal to bring back a reformed, more powerful legislature stays true to U.S. and Kuwaiti ideals. Democracy in Kuwait is not some Western imposition. It’s core to Kuwaiti history—and, hopefully, its future.