U.S. Criminal Investigation and Prosecution of Mexican Cartels: Lessons from Operation Luz Verde

William Booth and Nick Miroff have an interesting article in this morning's Washington Post concerning Operation Luz Verde, which was a criminal investigation focused on an effort by the Fernando Sanchez Organization ("FSO," a spin-off of the Tijuana Cartel) to establish a relatively-substantial base of operations in San Diego.  The investigation made the news back in July, when a massive racketeering indictment was unsealed against 43 defendants--including  the Baja California Attorney General's Office's Director of International Liaison.  The story is back now, with Booth and Miroff using the investigation to emphasize the increasing disjunction between international borders and the geographic space in which cartels operate.  Four takeaways from their account: 1. Expansion Into the United States: Some U.S. officials worry that the FSO's attempt to institutionalize a substantial and sustained managerial and operational presence in San Diego may be part of a trend toward an expanded U.S. presence for some cartels.  The story suggests that intensified competition among cartels and within fracturing cartels may contribute to such innovations. 2. Surveillance, Technology, and Geography: Booth and Miroff write that

[t]he case shows that as the border becomes less of an operational barrier for Mexican cartels, it appears to be less of one for U.S. surveillance efforts. Because the suspects' cellphone and radio traffic could be captured by towers on the northern side of the border, U.S. agents were able to eavesdrop on calls made on Mexican cellphones, between two callers in Mexico - a tactic prosecutors say has never been deployed so extensively.

3. Relationships Among Cartels and U.S. Street Gangs: Booth and Miroff note that the FSO's San Diego operation "recruited from U.S.-based Latino street gangs." 4. Operational Security, Surveillance Challenges, and the Need for Roving Wiretaps: Booth and Miroff also describe the investigation as a paradigm case for the need to have roving wiretap authority.  They explain that the targets of the investigation "bought and quickly discarded the phones. Top lietuenants often employed 'alineadores,' personal assistants who juggled a dozen phones and took messages so that the boss would not be heard on the line." In response, "the FBI secured hard-to-get 'roving' wiretaps for 44 individuals that allowed investigators to track their movements via global positioning satellites."