Water Wars: Glimmers of Hope Alongside Further Tensions in the Indo-Pacific

While the recent film “Civil War” reflected in generic terms American anxieties about the risk of heightened political violence, a trailer released in late July for the upcoming Taiwanese TV series “Zero Day” gave even more explicit expression to Taiwanese concerns about Chinese aggression. The trailer depicts tactics by Beijing explored in mock exercises that Taiwan and others have conducted to prepare for potential aggression—including a blockade of the island and cyberattacks. Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture provided funding for the project, and Taiwan’s diplomatic posts around the world published articles highlighting the trailer. One of the directors was quoted as saying: “[O]ur homeland is the most likely next flashpoint” after the war in Ukraine.

Earlier in July, geopolitical analysts made similar connections between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s increasing assertiveness in the Taiwan Strait in the context of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea’s attendance at the NATO summit in Washington. Meanwhile, the Philippines continued its own diplomatic efforts in the region. 

China and the Philippines: Provisional Agreements and New Controversies

Provisional Agreement on Resupply Missions

On July 21, Manila announced that it had “reached an understanding” with Beijiing concerning the Philippines resupply of its troops stationed at the BRP Sierra Madre in the Second Thomas Shoal. The statement from the Philippines’s Department of Foreign Affairs did not elaborate on the interim pact but explained that the provisional agreement was the product of a series of consultations that ensued after “frank and constructive discussions” during the 9th Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea in Manila on July 2. On July 22, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China disclosed additional details regarding the “provision agreement with the Philippines on humanitarian resupply of living necessities.” In referring to the Second Thomas Shoal by its Chinese-recognized name, Ren’ai Jiao, the spokesperson reaffirmed China’s claim to the island as part of the country’s “Nansha Qundao,” China’s name for the Spratly Islands. They explained that China would permit the Philippines, upon advanced notice, to send humanitarian resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre “between now and when the warship is towed away.” The spokesperson also made clear that China would not accept—and, in fact, would prevent—any effort by the Philippines to build “fixed facilities” on the shoal.

As reported in previous editions of Water Wars, China and the Philippines have been engaged in a tense standoff over the BRP Sierra Madre for more than two decades. The vessel is a World War II-era ship built for the U.S. Navy that the Philippines intentionally grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal in 1999. Since grounding the ship, the Philippines has maintained a regular garrison of military personnel to reinforce its claim of sovereignty over the shoal, sending routine resupply missions to the vessel. China contests the Philippines’s claim to the shoal and has called repeatedly for the Philippines to remove the ship and employed aggressive tactics against the resupply missions, including blasting water cannons and ramming into resupply ships earlier this year. The announcement of the provisional agreement comes a week after media reports that the Philippines and China agreed to open a new direct hotline between the offices of the two countries’ leaders to prevent an escalation spiral in the disputed South China Sea. On July 27, Philippine forces transported food and supplies to the BRP Sierra Madre for the first time since the provision deal’s announcement. The voyage was completed without incident. According to a top Philippine security official, the Chinese and Philippine coast guards had communicated for coordination of the transport. Their ships also did not issue two-way radio challenges demanding that each other’s ships leave the Second Thomas Shoal, which had occurred during previous transports to the BRP Sierra Madre.

Doubts about the agreement surfaced shortly after its announcement. According to the U.S. Institute of Peace’s (USIP) analysis of the provisional agreement, the only detail that both Manila and Beijing appear to mutually acknowledge is that the agreement is merely an interim one. For one, the two sides disagree over each other’s characterization of the agreement. According to some analysts, Beijing appears to be framing the provisional agreement to suggest that the Philippines conceded to its demands, which the Philippines denies. Brian Harding, a senior expert at USIP who formerly served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon as country director for Asian and Pacific security affairs, described the agreement as “a win” from Manila’s perspective, one that validated the country’s proactive approach of defending Philippine claims in the South China Sea. The two sides also disagree over the Philippines’s obligations under the provisional agreement, particularly regarding any advanced notice and on-site verification the Philippines is responsible for, as well as limits on the Philippines’s ability to transport construction supplies. China has also accused third-party countries of “meddling” in its negotiations with the Philippines over the BRP Sierra Madre and the Second Thomas Shoal after bilateral talks between Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China in Vientiane, Laos, on July 26.

Philippine Development Projects

On July 18, the Philippines revealed its current plans to develop a new airport on Thitu Island in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. According to the statement from the Philippine Presidential Communications Office, the country has started to procure land for a runway extension as part of the Pag-asa Island Airport Development Project. Pag-asa is the local name of Thitu Island, to which both China and the Philippines lay claim. Officially, the airport will provide an efficient mode of travel to and from the remote island, where Filipino civilians and military personnel live. Thitu is one of the largest of the Spratly Islands and sits on rich fishing grounds and near vital trade routes. It is also the only civilian-inhabited island of the Spratlys. The presence of Filipino inhabitants on the island is part of the Philippines’s strategy of asserting its sovereign territorial claims in the South China Sea. With Chinese vessels increasingly frequenting the waters around Thitu in recent years, a group of Philippine senators launched new infrastructure projects on the island in May. These projects include military barracks and a health facility, which is to be equipped with a laboratory and birthing facilities that are specifically intended to help deter China’s “illegal incursions.”

In the same statement, Philippine President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. announced that a military runway on Balabac, an island in the Philippines’s Palawan province near the South China Sea, was nearing completion. According to President Marcos, Palawan province, which is the largest province in the country, “will play a big role in national security.” Balabac island is one of four additional locations selected to host visiting U.S. troops under the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The other sites include the Naval Base Camilo Osias in Sta Ana, Cagayan; Lal-lo Airport in Lal-lo, Cagayan; and Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in Gamu, Isabela. The Balabac site is the farthest south and the closest to the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

Security Ties Deepen in the Indo-Pacific

Japan and the Philippines Sign Defense Pact

On July 8, Japan and the Philippines signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), a key defense pact allowing for the deployment of each country’s forces on the other’s soil for joint military exercises. The two nations signed the pact as their foreign and defense ministers met for a “2+2” meeting in Manila. A statement by the Japanese Foreign Ministry said that the RAA, which will “facilitate the implementation of cooperative activities, such as joint exercises and disaster relief between Japan and the Philippines and improve interoperability between the forces of the two countries,” will also “further promote security and defense cooperation between the two countries and firmly support peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.” In a joint briefing after the signing, Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo said the RAA brought the two countries’ defense partnership “to an unprecedented height.” President Marcos also called Japan “a partner in securing peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific” in a Facebook post.

This is the third RAA signed by Japan; the country signed RAAs with Australia in 2022 and Japan last year, and it is negotiating a similar defense agreement with France. Negotiations with the Japan-Philippines RAA began in November 2023, after Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited Manila.

Prime Minister Kishida’s government has overseen significant steps to bolster the country’s defense and security power. Japan doubled its defense spending in a five-year period to 2027, becoming the third largest military spender after the United States and China. The RAA is but another step in this trajectory, emerging from shared concerns over the security situation in the South China Sea. In a press briefing with the Philippines after the RAA signing, Japan’s foreign minister emphasized the importance of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and made clear that Japan opposed “unilateral attempts to change status quo by force and coercion.” In response to the RAA, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson told reporters that Japan was a colonial power responsible for the invasion of Southeast Asian countries during World War II and that the country should “seriously reflect on its history of aggression and be cautious in words and deeds in the field of military security.”

Trilateral Cooperation

According to the Department of Defense, defense chiefs from the United States, Japan, and South Korea convened a Trilateral Ministerial Meeting on July 28 in Japan for “the first time in history” to discuss their shared regional security concerns. The three leaders institutionalized a trilateral security cooperation framework, which involves three-way defense engagement, including senior-level policy consultations, information sharing, trilateral exercises, and defense exchange cooperation to “contribute to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, in the Indo-Pacific region, and beyond,” according to the joint press statement. The memorandum signed in Tokyo is not legally binding, but the three countries hope to solidify their trilateral ties in a way that would be difficult to later unravel. Japan’s defense minister said the move would make their cooperation “more robust and unwavering, even under various changes in the international situation.”

The commitment builds on the three countries’ joint military exercises in the past year, which have included air, sea, and cyberspace drills. RAND political scientist Naoko Aoki said the deal is “substantial because it will deepen cooperation in important, material ways, and symbolic because it sends a message to potential adversaries about the closeness of the three countries’ cooperation.”

Blinken and Lloyd to Visit Japan and the Philippines

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin are also set to meet their counterparts in the Philippines and Japan the week of July 29, to discuss regional security issues. Blinken and Austin will meet with the Philippine secretary of foreign affairs and secretary of national defense in Manila for the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, where they plan to discuss strengthening defense ties and the increasingly precarious territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea.

NATO Emphasizes Ties With Like-Minded Partners in the Indo-Pacific

After defense analysts’ attention trained on Singapore in early June for the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, that focus shifted to Washington in July as NATO leaders met to celebrate the 75th anniversary of their alliance. But the Indo-Pacific was not out of the spotlight, with four major Indo-Pacific countries (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, the so-called IP-4) attending the summit for the third year in a row. Leaders this year also focused more explicitly on connections between the challenges North Korea’s and China’s threats pose to the international order and Russia’s challenges in Europe.

“Institutionaliz[ing]” the NATO/Indo-Pacific Relationship

During the NATO summit, Australia announced a nearly $250 million package of military assistance to Ukraine—its largest single package of military assistance to the country, bringing its total assistance to over $1.3 billion.

Otherwise, the IP-4’s participation in the NATO summit appeared relatively light on concrete deliverables, though both NATO and Indo-Pacific leaders indicated their desire to deepen engagement. The official declaration issued during the summit noted that NATO and the IP-4 were “strengthening dialogue” and enhancing “practical cooperation,” including on “Ukraine, cyber defence, countering disinformation, and technology.” Japan announced plans to conduct joint exercises with NATO in the Euro-Atlantic region later this year and to strengthen classified information sharing with the alliance. Meanwhile, NATO and South Korea signed an airworthiness certification agreement that the official in charge of defense acquisitions for South Korea expects will boost Korea’s airplane exports to NATO countries.

Finally, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told a Korean news agency that the United States wants to “institutionalize” the IP-4, remarking: “I think you'll be hearing more in the coming days” about the grouping. He did not specify what he meant by “institutionaliz[ing]” the IP-4, but the comment echoes the U.S. State Department’s recent efforts to craft partnerships narrowly tailored to solving specific problems—what Secretary of State Blinken called “diplomatic variable geometry.”

Interregional Threats by China and North Korea

China’s and North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia served as the strategic backbone of that growing eagerness for NATO collaboration with the IP-4. After first recognizing in 2019 that China’s growing influence presented “challenges,” NATO’s statement this year was the first to highlight in specific terms the direct threats that China poses to Europe. The statement described China as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine” and called on China to end that support. It also called out North Korea and Iran for “providing direct military support to Russia” and “noted with great concern” North Korea and Russia’s “deepening ties.” A joint statement by the IP-4 echoed NATO’s concerns about North Korea’s relationship with Russia but notably did not mention China.

China’s Foreign Ministry shot back at NATO, calling the alliance’s declaration “scaremongering” and arguing that “NATO’s reach into the Asia-Pacific ... disrupt[s] peace and stability” in the region. A Foreign Affairspiece written ahead of the summit by one Delhi-based and two Washington-based analysts made a similar point, arguing that NATO is not the right forum for confronting China and that its further involvement in Asian geopolitics will alienate South and Southeast Asian partners hoping to avoid picking sides between the United States and China.

A commentary in War on the Rocks before the summit made the opposite case, however, arguing that the IP-4 and NATO should “think big” about their relationship, moving beyond cooperation on lower-hanging transnational challenges (for example, terrorism, climate, and so on) to collaborating on bigger-picture deterrence efforts. Similarly, a Hudson Institute analyst writing after the summit connected the IP-4’s support for Ukraine (summarized by the White House in a fact sheet released during the summit) to their own anxieties about China’s potential aggression in the Indo-Pacific.