Bangkok Blues III: Thailand's Impossible Military
Yesterday, Thailand saw its twelfth successful coup d’état since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932. After almost half a year of escalating political turmoil in the country, about which I have written, the Thai military finally intervened in the current political crisi
Published by The Lawfare Institute
in Cooperation With
Yesterday, Thailand saw its twelfth successful coup d’état since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932. After almost half a year of escalating political turmoil in the country, about which I have written, the Thai military finally intervened in the current political crisis---a disappointing, but relatively unsurprising move considering the military’s frequent and blithe resort to such measures. There have been more military coups and coup attempts in Thailand than any country in modern history. Once again under martial law, Thailand is seeing civil liberties and media freedoms severely curtailed in an effort to control debate. Army Chief Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha insisted up until the last minute that the army was not going to stage a coup, and was only going to bring the warring factions to the negotiating table in an effort to end the crisis. He then reneged on that promise with a suddenness that would have caused mass whiplash were everyone not suspecting it anyway.
Military rule in Thailand never lasts for very long. The coups are relatively bloodless. And Thailand seems to have an extraordinary ability to muddle through them. But the country’s inability to break its coup cycle is indicative of a nation that has been unable to make a full transition to democracy---and one that has major systemic problems to resolve.
The cycle for the last decade has gone as follows: An election produces a leader who is unpopular with the Bangkok establishment but has a political base in the provinces. Political turmoil between the elites and rural Thais ensues. The military steps into the fray in an effort to bring order back to the country. And the world wags its finger disapprovingly until an election is scheduled, at which point the cycle repeats because the underlying political dynamics have not changed.
The Thai military is addicted to extra constitutional interventions, and there is no civilian institution in the country powerful enough and prestigious enough to prevent it from indulging the addiction. Thailand’s coup cycle can only end if the role of the military in Thai politics fundamentally, and permanently, shifts. Unfortunately, it's not at all clear what the mechanism of that change would look like.
Historically, the military has wielded enormous political power. And it is actually huge in terms of raw numbers. As one commentator aptly put it, "Thailand’s military is particularly bloated with senior officers who are not needed for defense and war-fighting. . . . Thailand has over 1,700 general and admirals---proportionally a vastly higher percentage than in the U.S. military. Most of Thailand’s senior officers have no real jobs. Instead, they have come to believe they can gain prestige, work, and money only by intervening in politics."
The Thai military also continues to masquerade as the country’s saving grace, its mediators, its heroes---and this time, as “the national peacekeeping committee.” The many Thais who support consistent military intervention to oust inept and corrupt civilian governments need to see that they are doing their country a lasting disservice by undermining formal transitions.
Moreover, the relationship between the Thai military and the royal family is also convoluted. The ailing King, who enjoys prestige in Thailand that is hard for Westerners to understand, has been largely absent from this recent political crisis. There has been speculation about his role behind the scenes, but his lack of open involvement---unlike in previous crises---could actually have exacerbated this situation. The monarchy and the military have been intricately tied together for decades, and the King has supported many of the coups that have plagued Thailand. At the end of the day, what the King wants, goes. Thais who believe that the King's playing puppet master to the country is preferable to the machinations of inept politicians, again, do not see the long-term erosion of democratic institutions that this induces.
The Thai military’s adventurism in its country’s politics---and the popular support for it---demonstrates how complicated the problem of extricating the military from politics still is in many developing countries. Thailand is not alone here. It is one of the biggest hurdles to a democratic transition in Pakistan, Egypt, and other countries as well. If the role of the military and people's attitudes toward it don't change, the endless cycle of coups won’t change either.
Ritika Singh was a project coordinator at the Brookings Institution where she focused on national security law and policy. She graduated with majors in International Affairs and Government from Skidmore College in 2011, and wrote her thesis on Russia’s energy agenda in Europe and its strategic implications for America.