The Foreign Policy Essay: Much Ado about Ukraine
Editor's Note: Russian support for separatists in eastern Ukraine and the civil war that has ensued have raised fears of a new Cold War. Indeed, many senior American and European officials have called for arming Kyiv against the Russian threat. Carol Saivetz of MIT explains why Russia is fomenting strife in Ukraine and calls for more support to bolster Ukraine’s fledgling democracy.
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Published by The Lawfare Institute
in Cooperation With
Editor's Note: Russian support for separatists in eastern Ukraine and the civil war that has ensued have raised fears of a new Cold War. Indeed, many senior American and European officials have called for arming Kyiv against the Russian threat. Carol Saivetz of MIT explains why Russia is fomenting strife in Ukraine and calls for more support to bolster Ukraine’s fledgling democracy.
First, Russian president Vladimir Putin has made creation of the Eurasian Union, supposedly a customs union and common market, a priority of his third term. (The three original signatories—Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus—have been joined within the past few months by Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan is finalizing its accession.) Indeed, as the second-largest economy in the former Soviet space, Ukraine would seem to be vital to the success of any integrative process. Russia, using both carrots and sticks, tried to lure Kyiv into the union and sought to prevent Ukraine from acceding to the European Union’s Association Agreement. The latter would allegedly hinder trade within the post-Soviet space and would flood Russia with re-exported European goods.
Second, Putin fears the so-called color revolutions—Rose (Georgia, 2003), Orange (Ukraine, 2004), and Tulip (Kyrgyzstan, 2005)—and the massive demonstrations of people power that swept the Middle East. Each of them in turn represented populations rising up to overthrow corrupt, undemocratic regimes. In this context, the EuroMaidan (the almost four-month long demonstrations on Maidan Square in downtown Kyiv) that began in November 2013 was not only emblematic of the power of the street, but also ultimately overthrew a corrupt pro-Russian ally of Vladimir Putin’s. One can only guess that Putin saw in former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich’s overthrow what might await him. Indeed, this fear is reflected in the latest Russian military doctrine: at the top of the list of domestic threats is “violent attempts at changing the constitutional system.”
Third, status considerations seem to underlie Putin’s calculus. More than 15 years ago, Sergei Karaganov, allegedly one of Putin’s muses, argued that for Russia to be a great power, it first needed to be a regional hegemon. (See the discussion in Carol R. Saivetz, “Making the Best of a Weak Hand: An Assessment of Current Trends in Russian Foreign Policy,” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2, April-June, 2006) And Dmitry Trenin, well-known commentator and head of the Moscow Carnegie Center, wrote three years ago that “Russia has been trying hard to establish itself in the top league of the world’s major players and as the dominant power in its neighborhood.” One could of course wonder whether Russia can ever achieve these goals as corruption runs rampant, the economy stagnates, and it has now used persistent brute force against a neighbor.
These drivers of Putin’s policy help to explain what has transpired since February 21, 2014, when Yanukovich fled. The appearance of the “little green men” (actually Russian special forces in camouflage and without insignia) and the annexation of Crimea—a long standing issue in and of itself—was revenge for the end of Yanukovich’s regime. Yet it was also a preemptive move: with an unfriendly government in Kyiv, Russia apparently feared losing its naval base in Sevastopol. That base is vital to Russia’s global aspirations, as it supports the Mediterranean fleet and its loss would have had implications for Russia’s policies in Syria and beyond.
The war in the east can be explained by the same combination of Russian motivations. Russia clearly instigated the supposedly indigenous revolt in the east, with the help of “little green men” and Russian arms. When, in late summer 2014, Ukrainian forces, aided by unofficial militias, turned back the separatists, Russia intervened more directly to prevent their defeat. As casualties mounted, Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko and Vladimir Putin met in Minsk to negotiate a ceasefire. The resulting accords promised a decentralization of power in Donetsk and Luhansk, securing the Ukrainian-Russian border, and the removal of militias and military hardware. Equally important, in the background of the Minsk negotiations, Poroshenko agreed to delay implementation of the EU accord, thus mitigating the worst economic implications for Moscow for at least a year.
Pro-Russian groups and the Russians themselves have repeatedly violated the September agreements. Most importantly, the failure of the ceasefire lays bare the fundamental question: if this was all about responding to NATO expansion, could Russia have forestalled Ukrainian entrance into NATO at a lower cost?
Those who talk about the neutralization of Ukraine should note that Putin hasn’t mentioned neutrality since March 16. Even his strident comments on February 7, 2015, in which he basically accused the United States of seeking world domination, did not include a reference to Ukrainian neutrality. It is also important to note in this context that even after the annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian neutrality remained official policy.
Others who urge the West to give Putin an “off ramp” must acknowledge that the Minsk Accords could have been that exit. They offered Moscow most of what it claimed to want, including autonomy in the east. Moreover, they prevented the defeat of Russia’s proxies. Maybe Russia violated the Accords because they also guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Apparently, the most recent Russian proposal for a renewed ceasefire enshrines the territorial gains made by the separatists since the Minsk Accords.
There seems little doubt that simple neutrality is not enough. Russia wants to destabilize Ukraine and may also hope that the costs of sustaining the fighting in the east will further weaken the central government in Kyiv. At the very least, President Putin seems to want a seriously weakened Ukraine over which Moscow has control. Perhaps the goal is to turn Ukraine into a failed state—and one that the European Union and the West will walk away from supporting. Any of these goals would go well beyond preventing Ukraine’s entrance into NATO. And, arguably, Ukraine as a failed state would demonstrate that people power always ends badly.
Given the complexity of Putin’s motivations, the United States should proceed cautiously. Sanctions have had an impact on the Russian economy and limited Moscow’s ability to deal with the precipitous decline in oil prices. But continuation of the sanctions must be coupled with significant non-military aid to Kyiv so that the new government can undertake painful economic reforms. Providing lethal weapons to Kyiv is potentially escalatory and only feeds Russia’s narrative that this is all about NATO looking to surround Moscow. In contrast, a successful democratic Kyiv would prove that people power can work. Unfortunately, the price for Ukraine’s success may well be the loss of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
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Over the past fourteen months, the confrontation in Ukraine has gone from a diplomatic standoff to a military conflict. The crisis has intensified in recent weeks as pro-Russian separatists, aided by Russian troops and heavy equipment, attacked and secured the Donetsk airport and generally expanded the territory under their control. In response to Russia’s escalation, the Obama administration is considering providing military equipment to Kyiv. What brought us to this point? NATO expansion—both the earlier inclusion of the Baltic states and talk of possibly including Ukraine and Georgia—was the “background noise” to the conflict. We saw this in Putin’s 2007 infamous Munich speech, in which he excoriated NATO for expanding to the Baltic states, and in the 2010 and 2014 Russian military doctrines. It was also visible after the 2008 Georgian war, when then-President Dmitry Medvedev declared the post-Soviet space a “zone of privileged interests.” But, by itself, NATO expansion does not explain why Ukraine and why in late 2013. There are several other drivers of Russia’s Ukraine policy.
First, Russian president Vladimir Putin has made creation of the Eurasian Union, supposedly a customs union and common market, a priority of his third term. (The three original signatories—Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus—have been joined within the past few months by Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan is finalizing its accession.) Indeed, as the second-largest economy in the former Soviet space, Ukraine would seem to be vital to the success of any integrative process. Russia, using both carrots and sticks, tried to lure Kyiv into the union and sought to prevent Ukraine from acceding to the European Union’s Association Agreement. The latter would allegedly hinder trade within the post-Soviet space and would flood Russia with re-exported European goods.
Second, Putin fears the so-called color revolutions—Rose (Georgia, 2003), Orange (Ukraine, 2004), and Tulip (Kyrgyzstan, 2005)—and the massive demonstrations of people power that swept the Middle East. Each of them in turn represented populations rising up to overthrow corrupt, undemocratic regimes. In this context, the EuroMaidan (the almost four-month long demonstrations on Maidan Square in downtown Kyiv) that began in November 2013 was not only emblematic of the power of the street, but also ultimately overthrew a corrupt pro-Russian ally of Vladimir Putin’s. One can only guess that Putin saw in former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich’s overthrow what might await him. Indeed, this fear is reflected in the latest Russian military doctrine: at the top of the list of domestic threats is “violent attempts at changing the constitutional system.”
Third, status considerations seem to underlie Putin’s calculus. More than 15 years ago, Sergei Karaganov, allegedly one of Putin’s muses, argued that for Russia to be a great power, it first needed to be a regional hegemon. (See the discussion in Carol R. Saivetz, “Making the Best of a Weak Hand: An Assessment of Current Trends in Russian Foreign Policy,” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2, April-June, 2006) And Dmitry Trenin, well-known commentator and head of the Moscow Carnegie Center, wrote three years ago that “Russia has been trying hard to establish itself in the top league of the world’s major players and as the dominant power in its neighborhood.” One could of course wonder whether Russia can ever achieve these goals as corruption runs rampant, the economy stagnates, and it has now used persistent brute force against a neighbor.
These drivers of Putin’s policy help to explain what has transpired since February 21, 2014, when Yanukovich fled. The appearance of the “little green men” (actually Russian special forces in camouflage and without insignia) and the annexation of Crimea—a long standing issue in and of itself—was revenge for the end of Yanukovich’s regime. Yet it was also a preemptive move: with an unfriendly government in Kyiv, Russia apparently feared losing its naval base in Sevastopol. That base is vital to Russia’s global aspirations, as it supports the Mediterranean fleet and its loss would have had implications for Russia’s policies in Syria and beyond.
The war in the east can be explained by the same combination of Russian motivations. Russia clearly instigated the supposedly indigenous revolt in the east, with the help of “little green men” and Russian arms. When, in late summer 2014, Ukrainian forces, aided by unofficial militias, turned back the separatists, Russia intervened more directly to prevent their defeat. As casualties mounted, Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko and Vladimir Putin met in Minsk to negotiate a ceasefire. The resulting accords promised a decentralization of power in Donetsk and Luhansk, securing the Ukrainian-Russian border, and the removal of militias and military hardware. Equally important, in the background of the Minsk negotiations, Poroshenko agreed to delay implementation of the EU accord, thus mitigating the worst economic implications for Moscow for at least a year.
Pro-Russian groups and the Russians themselves have repeatedly violated the September agreements. Most importantly, the failure of the ceasefire lays bare the fundamental question: if this was all about responding to NATO expansion, could Russia have forestalled Ukrainian entrance into NATO at a lower cost?
Those who talk about the neutralization of Ukraine should note that Putin hasn’t mentioned neutrality since March 16. Even his strident comments on February 7, 2015, in which he basically accused the United States of seeking world domination, did not include a reference to Ukrainian neutrality. It is also important to note in this context that even after the annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian neutrality remained official policy.
Others who urge the West to give Putin an “off ramp” must acknowledge that the Minsk Accords could have been that exit. They offered Moscow most of what it claimed to want, including autonomy in the east. Moreover, they prevented the defeat of Russia’s proxies. Maybe Russia violated the Accords because they also guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Apparently, the most recent Russian proposal for a renewed ceasefire enshrines the territorial gains made by the separatists since the Minsk Accords.
There seems little doubt that simple neutrality is not enough. Russia wants to destabilize Ukraine and may also hope that the costs of sustaining the fighting in the east will further weaken the central government in Kyiv. At the very least, President Putin seems to want a seriously weakened Ukraine over which Moscow has control. Perhaps the goal is to turn Ukraine into a failed state—and one that the European Union and the West will walk away from supporting. Any of these goals would go well beyond preventing Ukraine’s entrance into NATO. And, arguably, Ukraine as a failed state would demonstrate that people power always ends badly.
Given the complexity of Putin’s motivations, the United States should proceed cautiously. Sanctions have had an impact on the Russian economy and limited Moscow’s ability to deal with the precipitous decline in oil prices. But continuation of the sanctions must be coupled with significant non-military aid to Kyiv so that the new government can undertake painful economic reforms. Providing lethal weapons to Kyiv is potentially escalatory and only feeds Russia’s narrative that this is all about NATO looking to surround Moscow. In contrast, a successful democratic Kyiv would prove that people power can work. Unfortunately, the price for Ukraine’s success may well be the loss of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
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Carol R. Saivetz is a research affiliate in the Security Studies Program at MIT.
Carol R. Saivetz is Senior Advisor in the Security Studies Program at MIT.
