House-Senate Side-by-Side of NDAA Provisions: Part I
Published by The Lawfare Institute
in Cooperation With
AUMF Reaffirmation
Both bills contain some form of reaffirmation of the AUMF, but they differ in important ways. The House version (Section 1034, pp. 570-571) is cast as a broad reaffirmation of the conflict itself and clarification of the parameters of that conflict:- Congress affirms that--
- (1) the United States is engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces and that those entities continue to pose a threat to the United States and its citizens, both domestically and abroad;
- (2) the President has the authority to use all necessary and appropriate force during the current armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note);
- (3) the current armed conflict includes nations, organization, and persons who--
(A) are part of, or are substantially supporting, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; or
(B) have engaged in hostilities or have directly supported hostilities in aid of a nation, organization, or person described in subparagraph (A); and
(4) the President's authority pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) includes the authority to detain belligerents, including persons described in paragraph (3), until the termination of hostilities.
The authority to detain here is a feature of the larger authorization. By contrast, the Senate version (Section 1031, pp. 426-428) casts the reaffirmation more narrowly as an affirmation of the authority to detain itself. The Senate bill is more concerned with spelling out detention authority than with authorizing the conflict:Congress affirms that the authority of the President to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40) includes the authority for the Armed Forces of the United States to detain covered persons (as defined in subsection (b)) pending disposition under the law of war.
The Senate bill, in fact, clarifies that it is not intended either to limit or expand the authority to wage war under the AUMF (See subsection (d)). With this important caveat, the substantive scope of the reaffirmations are similar and both based on the administration's litigating positions. The Senate bill defines those subject to military custody as:(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks.
(2) A person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.
Unlike the House bill, the Senate also spells out (Subsection (c)) the lawful dispositions under the laws of war. These include (1) detention until the end of hostilities, (2) trial by military commission, (3) trial by an alternative court or other competent tribunal, including implicitly federal courts, and (4) transfer to some other country. And it contains a disclaimer (see Subsection (e)) that it should "not be construed to affect existing law or authorities, relating to the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens . . . or any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United States." To put the matter simply, there's going to be some kind of reaffirmation language in the final bill; the question is what sort. The House bill is the better model. The Senate bill is confused and needlessly complicated, and these provisions are inextricably tied into the noxious mandatory detention language I discuss below. The House bill, by contrast, has raised the ire of civil libertarians and human rights groups. But from the administration's point of view, it should be understood as doing no harm, merely as authorizing what the administration claims is already authorized. Legitimate questions have arisen about aspects of its wording, but these are nothing that can't be fixed in conference. In my view, at least, the administration should push for inclusion of a modified version of the House language, which it can reasonably interpret as merely a codification of existing policy.Mandatory Military Detention
The House bill no longer contains any explicit requirement for military custody of terrorist suspects--though it does contain several other provisions (which I will describe in my second post) that militate strongly in that direction. The Senate bill, however, still does--to wit, Section 1032 (pp. 428-432). As we have discussed many aspects of this provision at great length, I'm going to be brief on the subject here: The provision needs to go. Full stop. It doesn't need to be caveated. It doesn't need further explication of legislative intent. It doesn't need a few more pages injecting a little more flexibility. It is a bad idea and it needs to die. While Bobby and I have both suggested potentially viable work-arounds for an executive that actually has to live under this provision, neither is adequate. If the President signs a bill that contains anything like this language, he deserves to have to live under it. His successor, however, does not. Barack Obama has a duty to his office to veto any bill that contains this provision in any form, and the administration needs to continue to make crystal clear to the conference committee that he will do so.National Security Protocol Requirement
The House bill contains (Section 1035, pp. 571-573) a requirement that the administration develop a "national security protocol" for each detainee to govern his communication with the outside world. The provision responds to suggestions that attorneys for detainees have brought them inappropriate materials and facilitated inappropriate outside contacts. Each protocol, under the terms of the proposal, must contain a description of:- The authority of the individual to have access to counsel and any limits on access to that lawyer;
- What items are forbidden and allowed to that individual;
- What sort of information the individual is not allowed to discuss with outside parties;
- The nature of and controls on the outside communications allowed to the individual; and
- The nature of any monitoring of legal materials to which the individual may have access.