John Villasenor on the Threat of Counterfeit Electronics

National security discussions often focus on identifying—and hopefully countering—threats posed by those who would launch attacks on American interests. But there is another threat as well: counterfeit electronics components placed into the supply chain by unethical companies trying to turn a quick profit, without regard for the downstream risks faced by people operating systems built using their components. I’ve teamed with Mohammad Tehranipoor of the University of Connecticut to publish an article in the October 2013 issue of Spectrum on this topic. As we explain in the article:

The global trade in recycled electronics parts is enormous and growing rapidly, driven by a confluence of cost pressures, increasingly complex supply chains, and the huge growth in the amount of electronic waste sent for disposal around the world. Recycled parts, relabeled and sold as new, threaten not only military systems but also commercial transportation systems, medical devices and systems, and the computers and networks that run today’s financial markets and communications systems.

A few years ago, a Senate Armed Services Committee investigation documented counterfeits in the supply chains for onboard systems in the CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter, the C-17 military transport aircraft, the P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine/reconnaissance aircraft, and the F-16. Fortunately, those counterfeits were identified and replaced, and screening requirements for parts destined for DoD systems have been tightened in recent years. But the counterfeiters are getting much more sophisticated. Clearly, there are a lot of counterfeits slipping through the defense supply chain undetected—and even more in the commercial supply chain where screening is less rigorous. Solving the problem will require not only improved detection technologies, but also international cooperation to crack down on the counterfeiters. The full Spectrum article can be found here.