Lawfare Daily: Recent Elections and the State of Democracy in Tunisia

[Intro]

Sabina Henneberg: The opposition, and this has been true for a long time now in Tunisia, was so divided that they couldn't execute anything that would really even demonstrate that there was a certain amount of objection to Saied.

Scott R. Anderson: It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Lawfare Senior Editor Scott R. Anderson, with Sarah Yerkes, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Sabina Henneberg, the Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Peace.

Sarah Yerkes: He's not actually doing what he should be. I mean, the economy has just fallen apart under his watch. He's done very little. And I think a lot of Tunisians are finally starting to realize that maybe Saied isn't actually good for them. And so we'll see, you know, in the second term, if he's able to turn any of that around and start addressing the actual challenges the country is facing.

Scott R. Anderson: Today, we're talking about the recent elections in Tunisia and what they tell us about the decline of democracy there and potentially elsewhere across the region.

[Main Podcast]

So Sarah, let me start with you with a little background for listeners who may not have been following events in Tunisia. Over the last decade and plus at this point, that has been fairly tumultuous. I think some people might still recall the central role Tunisia played in kicking off the Arab Spring at the beginning of the last decade in 2010 and 2011. And for a long time had a vision of it as kind of the standard bearer for the idea of where we might see a new democratic moment in the Middle East.

That's a vision that has faded a bit in the last few years. Talk to us about where that began to change and set the stage for us for the current political moment Tunisia is in. You know, when do we begin to see that constitutional moment that arose I think in the 2014 Constitution, if I recall, after the Arab Spring, when do we begin to see that system break down, and why?

Sarah Yerkes: Sure. I mean, the breakdown really started with the election of President Saied in 2019 but went into full force in 2021 when President Saied initiated a self-coup on July 25th. And he did this in the context of three interrelated crises that allowed him to not only carry out what we consider a self-coup, but also to do so with tremendous popular support.

And so one of these crises was the COVID-19 pandemic, which was raging in Tunisia at the time. Tunisia in 2021 had the highest level of COVID cases per capita in Africa. So, it was not just bad cases there. I mean, it was really a horrible situation, medically. Also, they were suffering from the same sort of economic challenges that we've seen plague countries around the world related to the pandemic, and then finally a political crisis.

And so, President Saied was overseeing this country that was really sort of falling apart. The parliament was the most divided it had ever been, where you not only had this kind of traditional parties that had been in place since the revolution in 2010, 2011. But you also had, for the first time, a party that was actively seeking the end of the transition. You also had a Salafist party that was unhappy with the way the Islamists were trying to take the country. And so you had people that were literally in fistfights in the halls of parliament. And as you can expect, the Tunisian people were not very happy about this. Nothing was getting done. Laws were not getting passed. Nothing was being done to address the pandemic or the economic situation.

And so, on July 25th, 2021, President Saied seized power, first by freezing the parliament, putting tanks in front of the gates of Parliament and preventing its members from entering and then firing most of his government. He, over the next two years, dismantled a decade's worth of democratic progress. In part, you know, really culminating in creating a brand new constitution that was written by his allies and really overseen by him, that consolidated almost all of the power in the country into his own hands and set him up for the election that just took place just a couple of weeks ago.

Scott R. Anderson: So Sabina, Sarah described what President Saied did as a self-coup which I think is a useful descriptor, but flesh that out for us a little bit. What are the big changes that we saw implemented in, I guess, first 2021, then 2022 in the new constitution? And what does it mean for the office of the presidency he inhabits versus the other branches of government? You know, before we even get to this election, what does it mean to be elected the president of Tunisia now versus 2019 or earlier?

Sabina Henneberg: Sure. Well, as you laid out Sarah and Scott, the self-coup took place on July 25th, 2021. In September of that year was when Saied decreed that all the powers that had been once distributed across government, basically, that he should be able to rule by decree. And as Sarah mentioned, the parliament had been frozen. Also, Saied’s coup, he justified as being an action in the face of imminent danger that was authorized under the previous 2014 Constitution. But according to that article, Article 80 of the previous Constitution, that decision was supposed to be taken in consultation with parliament, which it wasn't done and it was only supposed to last for 30 days, those extreme measures. So, Saied as Sarah mentioned, took steps to increasingly, basically give himself authority.

The next thing he did after the September 2021 decree was to lay out a roadmap in December of that year that was supposed to reshape government and that's what it did. It declared that a constitutional referendum would be held the next, July 25th, 2022. And it was supposed to be a consultative process to get to that new constitution. But most observers agree it wasn't at all because he sort of handpicked a committee to help him, and even the kind of lead of that committee disagreed with the process and disagreed with the final product. He held a popular consultation online, but a lot of Tunisians couldn't even access it because it was online and it wasn't very transparent in terms of how it was presented or discussed.

And then the new Constitution, yeah, has been described as hyper-presidential because, for example, the judiciary, one of the main branches is sort of, demoted from, I think a power to an authority or something, Sarah can remind me of the terms. The president has most of the powers to introduce laws, so basically weakens Parliament a lot.

So what does it mean to be the president of Tunisia now? Yeah, it's also a question because even under the new 2022 Constitution, the president is only supposed to serve two terms, but the president has so much power, even that, you know, is sort of in question. It was also in question leading up to these elections, whether Saied’s first term was kind of considered a complete term, given that the constitution changed in the middle. So, it leaves a lot of things open, basically.

Scott R. Anderson: So, a big part of the changes in the 2022 constitution, as I understand it, relate to the process of an election: the idea about who has you know, the presidential role in establishing committees to oversee eligibility for office, eligibility for standing, these things that we've seen pop up. So Sarah, let me ask you to walk us through that a little bit.

Who has kind of defined the parameters of this election that just happened in the last few weeks? Obviously, President Saied played a dominant role in that. But what are the mechanisms he used to do? What authority does he have? Why is it so many people are pointing out that this really wasn't an open and fair election, that it was something he exercised kind of a dominant hand in setting the parameters of?

Sarah Yerkes: Yeah. So the main body that actually oversees the elections is called the EZ, it’s a French acronym. But it is the national, it’s supposed to be the Independent National Elections Commission. One of the changes that Saied has made in the wake of the self-coup was to make it not independent anymore. He replaced all the members with loyalists. He gave himself, first of all, the power to appoint the members. That did not used to be the president's prerogative. So now, you know, he makes sure that the people who are in charge of the elections, who set the elections calendar, who help draft the electoral law, who oversee the various procedures, that these are people that are loyal to Saied. And this actually came to be very important during this election cycle.

First of all, you know, there, there's a variety of different legal mechanisms that are used around the election. One is for most elections, they come up with actually a new electoral law. They have been doing this throughout the democratic transition, a different electoral law for the first municipal elections, for example, or for the parliamentary elections for the presidential election. They didn't actually come up with a new law this time around.

So, they were relying in part on old laws from old elections, but then also just on the sort of decrees that this electoral commission came up with and then also decrees that Saied himself put forward. And some of that is related to like the penal code. Some of it's related to also another, really important law is Decree 54, which is a decree, presidential decree that punishes with up to 10 years in prison anyone who commits fake news, you know, who basically defames someone. If it's a government official, you get up to 10 years in prison. This has been used to put in jail a whole slew of Saied’s opponents. Some of them are people that ran against him in the election, and then others are journalists and others who were not actually playing a role in the election itself, but it helped create this sort of chilling effect around the election.

But so this elections commission, you know, on paper is supposed to be independent. They're supposed to ensure that there isn't political meddling in the system, but that didn't actually happen. And, you know, in the process of applying, just even applying to run was incredibly cumbersome. They added new requirements requiring 10,000 signatures from Tunisian citizens in order to be able to run. And then there's some other intricate details that I won't go into, to bore everyone, but basically, you know, a bunch of people who tried to run couldn't even make it past the first hurdle. So they couldn't even submit their paperwork. They also are required to submit another document that shows their criminal record. They need to have a clean criminal record. So, you know, I mentioned this people going to jail for fake news. If you're in jail for any reason, you're not going to get a clean criminal record, so you're not going to be able to run.

But in the end, you know, what really mattered was that the elections commission ended up overriding the courts. The courts ended up ruling that a couple of the people, three different candidates who tried to run, that they refused permission to run, disqualified by the electoral commission. The court said that was wrong, they needed to be reinstated and Saied ended up having the Parliament change the law and say, you can't listen to the administrative court anymore. They're not the arbiters of this.

And so it's, he is a constitutional law professor. You know, he is using the tools that he knows in doing so. You know, a lot of people kind of trust him and think, well, he probably knows law better than I do so maybe what he's doing is okay. There's also a lot of people who don't trust him and have been protesting against what he's doing. But I'll have to say, you know, the legal environment has been incredibly important in this election and just completely clearing the playing fields, at the end of the day, there was only one other candidate in reality. I mean, there were two on the ballot. One was in jail and then another one who ran against Saied who, you know, had no chance of winning.

Scott R. Anderson: So that, of course, sets up parameters for a very sort of constrained political contest, if you can even really call it a contest. Obviously, there is extremely limited field of candidates, but then there is political dialogue that happens outside of the election. We know there were some substantial protests, some other dynamics going on that were kind of, coinciding with the election, relating to election, even though they weren't specifically related to backing one candidate or another, or perhaps more about opposing one candidate or another.

Sabina, tell us about what the dynamics of this campaign, if we can call it that, was between in the last few months leading up to the election. What were the big political forces, the big political questions to the extent there were any, and what were the reactions to some of these measures that we saw being rolled out in the lead up to the election?

Sabina Henneberg: Sure. I guess I'll reinforce what Sarah mentioned that the EZ, the Independent Electoral Commission, played a key role, first of all, because it ended up being, rather than an electoral law, the body to issue the conditions for becoming a candidate, which were more restrictive than previous elections, and which were the reason that a lot of people's intention to become a candidate didn't sort of play out in reality.

Sarah described this resulted in three particular would-be candidates contesting the EZ's refusal of their candidacies and basically a tug of war between the courts and the EZ and then the Parliament got involved. So this standoff ended up bringing, as you noted, I think, Scott, some people to the streets and kind of the second half of September you saw some regular protests, not massive, but bigger than any protests in the previous years. Also, a lot of criticism from civil society, from the legal community, for example, against, as Sarah described, some of these legal manipulations that the president was using. This is despite this Decree 54 and this, yeah, more chilled environment, I guess.

Among the opposition, there was something of a call for a boycott, but there was also something of a call for a protest vote for this candidate, Ayachi Zammel, who was in jail because the third candidate on the ballot, Maghzaoui, was seen as, as close to Saied or very similar to Saied. But at least from my perspective, the opposition, which this has been true for a long time now in Tunisia, was so divided that they couldn't execute anything that would really even demonstrate that there was a certain amount of objection to Saied.

So as a result, he won with 90 percent of the vote that was cast. The official numbers are about a 30 percent or slightly less than 30 percent of voters turned out. So, a clear victory, but with a lot of contention around it. Yeah, in the context of relatively low turnout.

Scott R. Anderson: So I want to zoom in on one particular part of the opposition or the Tunisian political scene, because of course, folks who've been following it for the last decade-plus know one thing that's particularly unique about Tunisia is the role of the Ennahda Party, an Islamist party that's pro-democracy or historically pro-democracy. You know, Rached el-Ghannouchi, you know, fairly prominent leader of the movement. That's a notable figure and was, again, played a central role in what made Tunisia for a long time such a point of hope in terms of democratization in the Middle East.

And of course, that party has fallen, is in the opposition, has fallen kind of out of favor, it's really out of power. How have they been reacting to this whole period of President Saied’s authority and particularly the lead up to the election? What role have they played if any? Sarah, I'll come to you on this.

Sarah Yerkes: Sure. So, Ennahdha has really been the main target of President Saied since he came to office. I mean, they were the party with the largest number of seats in parliament when President Saied was elected in 2019, but still only held just about a quarter of the seats, so they didn't have any sort of clear majority.

And, you know, despite the fact that Saied himself is quite conservative and actually quite religious, they did not get along. Particularly, Rached Ghannouchi, who was Speaker of the Parliament and President Saied, just were not, did not see eye to eye. But what, after this, the self-coup, you know, Saied really blamed all the political problems as well as the economic problems and a lot of other issues on Ennahda.

The Ennahda members have been, you know, sort of on balance, the largest group that has been targeted, that has been put in jail. A lot of Ennahda members are now either in exile or sitting in jail, including Ghannouchi, who is quite old and, you know, has really been suffering in prison because of, you know, these really just political charges put against him.

But so, Ennahda didn't really have any, official role during the elections, but I think one thing that's important is that all of the political parties that were in existence during the transition were really discredited. You know, Saied himself does not have a political party. He didn't in 2019. He still does not today. This is really unique. And the other candidates, you know, who ran, were at one point affiliated with political parties, but parties were not really a part of this election. And we saw the same thing in the legislative elections that happened back in December of last year. Where parties were really sort of hamstrung by the new regulations put forward that, you know, Tunisian, the Tunisian public has really turned against kind of the status quo and against the parties.

So, Ennahda as a political party has not been very active. I mean, as an opposition movement, they have been quite active in pushing back against Saied and in leading some of the protests. And in joining with some other secular opposition, with some secular opposition groups in those protests and in some of the movements to push back against Saied. But a lot of the Tunisian public has turned against them and blamed them because they are the one group that has been around since the beginning of the transition. And even though it's certainly, they're not the only party to blame you know, they do, a lot of the blame has fallen on them, both from Saied, but also from the secular opposition who really, you know, just puts a lot of the fault in their hands.

Sabina Henneberg: Yeah, Scott, and I'll just add that those trends, so Saied blaming Ennahda, as Sarah mentioned, that's because he was capitalizing on the real public fury with Ennahda, along with, yeah, other members of the opposition. And some of the other trends that Sarah touched on, like, the fact that parties were becoming more and more discredited. I think even as going as far back as the 2018 municipal elections already had a higher proportion of independent candidates succeeding.

So Saied has really capitalized on those kinds of trends and I think that's also why Ennahda has had a hard time being, mobilizing anything. Now, in addition to the fact that it I think has imploded or come close to imploding, it's suffered from a lot of internal divisions as have other parties.

Scott R. Anderson: So I think that leads to another question. I want to follow up with you on, Sabina, which is insofar as President Saied has been able to carve out some sort of coalition to advance these changes to the Constitution, to the referendum process. I believe there were parliamentary elections last year, was it? Where there's been a sustained ability to advance an agenda. I mean, he is both exercising dictatorial authority, authoritarian authority substantially, but also doing it in part through legislative process and legislative measures in addition to sort of diktat.

What is the agenda that's bringing those parties to fore? What is the justification and the organizing principles that's bringing these people into government? And the organizing mechanism, you know, is it really a coalition of folks? Is it a central policy platform? You know, what is the source of the strength of Saied’s agenda, his ability to exercise the self-coup, if you will?

Sabina Henneberg: So his agenda is a typical populist agenda. I would say not from because I'm an expert on populism, but because it's kind of clear, for example, that he uses a lot of rhetoric against kind of unnamed external enemies. Those kinds of things have helped mobilize people and especially, particularly going back to the July 25th self-coup. The parliamentary elections you mentioned were December 2022 but they were also kind of marred by record setting low turnout.

But yeah, Saied has, in addition to kind of targeting Ennahda and the political landscape in general for all Tunisia's problems, has really railed against corruption and has kind of revived attempts of some of his predecessors to reclaim some of what banalities, cronies, and other corrupt politicians have stolen from the state. This seems to have galvanized a lot of people, even though it doesn't seem to have yielded a lot of results. But now that it has been three years since his self-coup, I think people are starting to wonder if, I guess that people are starting to doubt his agenda and doubt his ability to carry out these kinds of promises.

Sarah Yerkes: Yeah, and I think like one of the clearest cues to like sort of what his agenda might look like in his second term is his own remarks like right after he was elected, or when he was declared the winner, he said, quote, this is a continuation of the revolution. We will build and will cleanse the country of the corrupt traitors and conspirators.

So this goes exactly to what Sabina was saying that, you know, he's been on this bent of anti-corruption. He hasn't actually done anything, though, to address corruption, but this idea, this is like right out of the populist playbook of blaming others, these unnamed scapegoats for the country's problems. And I think, as Sabina rightly said, you know, people are starting to catch on that a little bit. He's not actually doing what he should be. I mean, the economy has just fallen apart under his watch. He's done very little. And I think a lot of Tunisians are finally starting to realize that maybe Saied isn't actually good for them.

And so we'll see, you know, in the second term, if he's able to turn any of that around and start addressing the actual challenges the country is facing. No one was in the streets protesting for a new Constitution, you know, in 2021, no one was calling for these sort of legal changes he's put in place. This is something that was his project that he'd been talking about for decades, but the things they are, were, actually upset about the political polarization, the lack of economic performance. He hasn't actually done anything to address any of that.

Scott R. Anderson: Another aspect of the 2014 Constitution that was a major pillar of that hopeful moment for Tunisia, you know, a decade or so ago, was the fact that Constitution really ensconced certain civil liberties, principles, about speech, about freedom of exercise, to some extent, a bunch of other aspects. What has been the fate of a lot of those principles? How has President Saied's time in office impacted not just political movement and political opposition, but civil society and the ability of people to, you know, express views, express opinions, organize themselves in a different way, that may not have a political axis to it. And I guess to the extent that we've seen pushback on that, what has the reaction been? How has that impacted Saied’s political fortunes and the general perceptions of him?

Sarah Yerkes: Sure. I mean, what we've really seen is the dismantling of all of these freedoms. I mean, on the one hand, you still do have a relatively free media, although there have been attempts at handcuffing certain outlets and journalists have been thrown in jail, including, you know, live on television. So you do have certainly this chilling effect around the media. But I, you know, the media has done an incredible job at, a very brave job at continuing to report on some of these issues.

You know, for sort of the average Tunisian though, the situation is very scary that you don't know. I mean, you could go to jail for anything. So one of the craziest cases, four people were arrested who worked for the National Railway Company because they accidentally put the Turkish flag up instead of the Tunisian flag. The two flags look really similar. It's an easy mistake and it was not intentional. It was not a political move by any means. But you know, by making this mistake, these people are now in jail. These are Tunisian citizens, again, just, you know, made a mistake, but Saied, for whatever reason, was so offended by this, you know, thought this was such an egregious error that he ended up putting them in jail. So this just goes to the broader picture that this is not just political activists who are getting thrown in jail. You know, this is people just, you know, everyday citizens for making an error.

What we have not seen is these mass protests that we saw during the Arab Spring, you know, where people, you know, you had a similar situation under Ben Ali, where it was a very constrained environment for civil society, for free expression, and you ended up with the Arab Spring. You ended up with these massive protests that ended up unseating Ben Ali.

We haven't seen that yet, and in part because Saied has commanded a lot of popular support, but also in part because people just don't have the energy and they don't know what else to do. I mean, there's, they've tried democracy. That didn't work. They've tried autocracy, that didn't work. You know, it's a question of, you know, who would, if Saied were to step down tomorrow, who would fill in? There's no clear successor to him. And then people are, you know, they're suffering. The economy is just so horrible that in surveys, you know, people basically say they're not paying attention to politics. They don't care. And I think a lot of that shows up in these really, really low turnout numbers, you know, that Sabina mentioned earlier.

Sabina Henneberg: Some of the other things you mentioned that have been kind of, yeah, held up as models in the 2014 Constitution that have come under attack. So you mentioned civil society, some Tunisia watchers know that the law governing civil society since 2011 has also been held up as a model. Kind of one of the best ways to guarantee a free and democratic civil society, but without kind of going overboard, has come under attack, or sort of there have been rumors or draft laws circulating to replace that law.

It's actually even starting since before Saied, but then kind of on two separate occasions, there were rumors that that 2011 decree was on the brink of being replaced, and it hasn't been yet. But people are still very afraid, and people still seem to expect that it's going to be replaced any moment. And one of the big changes it would make, basically, is to restrict foreign funding for associations, which is their everything. I mean, there just really isn't much domestic funding for civil society, but to restrict it on the grounds that it can bring in kind of terrorist funding and funding for illicit things.

And another achievement that Tunisians really talked a lot about after 2014 was gains for women. Because the electoral code that was adopted, or in one sense, because the electoral code that was adopted helped guarantee a certain number of seats for women in parliament, and that was changed with the 2022 parliamentary elections.

Scott R. Anderson: So obviously a lot of these trends are pretty concerning, certainly for Tunisians, for folks who follow Tunisia are concerned about it. But a lot of our audience is Americans or people not living in Tunisia. So talk to us a little bit about what the ramifications have been for the region and for Tunisia's foreign relations, and particularly relationship with the United States. How have we seen Saied frame Tunisia's relationship with the United States, which once was relatively robust from a, certainly from a kind of foreign assistance and engagement perspective, particularly in those initial years in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and talk to us how the United States has handled this turn towards authoritarianism in Tunisia. Sarah, I'll start with you on that.

Sarah Yerkes: Sure. So yeah, the United States has really struggled, I think, with how to handle Tunisia in the wake of the self-coup. You know, as you said, there's, it's a long and important relationship between the two countries. The United States has invested over a billion dollars in the democratic revolution in the, you know, helping to build the political system and helping Tunisian civil society and economic development and all of that. And has a really, really robust relationship with the Tunisian military who has, you know, remains the most trusted actor in the country.

But, you know, Saied has not been particularly warm to the United States or to anyone, frankly, and they have had a really hard time getting through to Saied. There's been a lot of attempts, especially right after the self-coup, at trying to, extending high level visitors, trying to have phone conversations with Saied and none of that has really amounted to anything. You know, at the same time, Saied hasn't actively attacked the United States, in particular. The United States has been sort of swept up into his broader attacks against all sort of foreign intervention or what he considers attacks on Tunisian sovereignty.

And I think one of the ways we've seen this play out related to the election was that a couple of organizations who have been well known in Tunisia, Tunisian civil society organizations, that are election-observing organizations, were prevented from observing this presidential election because they received foreign funding. And they received funding from the United States, as well as from Europe. But this just, you know, it shows you again, like, the extent of how far Saied is willing to go to prevent this, what he perceives as foreign intervention.

So, the U.S. now is trying to figure out, you know, what does a relationship look like in the future? And I will say, like, I actually really applaud the U.S. response to the election so far, which has been silence. You know, there was some fear that they would congratulate Saied on his win. They have not done that. And I think that silence speaks volumes. They did congratulate President Tebboune next door in Algeria, who carried out a, also autocratic election, but they didn't do that with Saied, and I think that did not go unnoticed by Saied.

So, we'll see where things go. There are some members of Congress who would like to see Tunisian assistance cut dramatically, who don't think Tunisia is a worthy partner anymore. But Sabina and I have written multiple pieces, I encourage you to read, that talk about, you know, how that's not the best idea, and that we have made this investment in Tunisia. It's still an important partner. We do think there's actually some potential to help prevent Saied from acting on even further repression or, you know, carrying out violence against the Tunisian public, things like that, that if we cut off our relationship with Tunisia, that's going to be a lot harder to do.

Scott R. Anderson: So another aspect of this that comes in, it's hard to avoid in this region or any other region these days, it's this question of major power competition. The fact that by many accounts, by a lot of people's perspectives, the United States is to some degree always jockeying with China and Russia for some degree of influence. And obviously the divide between democracy and autocracy is a common aspect of that divide, the fact that Russia and China are often willing to be a backstop and source of support for regimes that don't have the commitment to democracy that the United States and its allies in the West often, if not, perhaps not always, push for or encourage to some extent. 

Sarah, tell us a little bit about how that aspect of major power competition that is so much more at front of mind these days than it used to be in the past, is playing into this debate around Tunisia.

Sarah Yerkes: Yeah. I think it's been interesting to see how Saied has approached both Russia and China and sort of, in an odd way, he has been kind of less courting of China than the democratic governments were. I mean, there's always been this real interest in China, increasing Chinese tourism, increasing Chinese business investment. And so, Saied on the one hand has not really been reaching out much to China. On the other hand, there is a lot of fear that if the United States and Europe or, and/or Europe, were to really back away from Tunisia, that China could come in and fill in the gap. They're very much interested in, you know, the Tunisian coastline, the ports, infrastructure, all of that.

And then there's also the role of Russia. I mean, Russia conversely to China, Saied has very much been trying to cozy up to Russia. You know, right after the war between Russia and Ukraine was started, when like the whole world basically was turning against Russia, Saied was planning a state visit to Moscow, which is very ill conceived, and so it ended up not happening. But it just kind of shows you that, you know, he has been, unlike his predecessors has been sort of willing to cozy up to the countries that the United States is not particularly friendly with, and has not been warm with the United States.

So when you sort of add all the data together, it's not a great sign for the United States. But at the same time I do think sometimes the fear of Chinese intervention, in particular, in Tunisia can be overblown. I don't think that China is actually that interested in Tunisia. And Russia certainly is very much preoccupied with its own domestic issues and with the war in Ukraine. It's not, you know, that interested in Tunisia either.

Sabina Henneberg: Yeah, I would say Tunisia's vulnerability and its emphasis on sovereignty, particularly under President Saied are both like a risk in terms of Russian and Chinese influence and a deterrent because, you know, China seems to recognize that Tunisia is kind of a basket case and it's hard.

It's not really the right place to do a lot of investment. And yeah, as Sarah said, Russia is also aware. And on the other hand, Saied has done some cozying up, but also was more about kind of demonstrating that he'll talk to whoever he wants rather than, you know, going to suddenly become the best friend of China or Russia. It's really emphasizing that, you know, Tunisia is okay on its own.

Scott R. Anderson: What do we expect to happen in this second term, both for the good and for the bad, to some extent? You know, what has Saied he intends to do? What does it seem realistically he will be able to do? And are there signs of problems on the horizon, weaknesses, points of opposition, the potential of change in the political scene, or is it really at this point a little bit of a waiting game to see when the current array of factors allowing him to retain his position begin to crack a bit? Sabina, I'll start with you on that.

Sabina Henneberg: Saied hasn't promised to do much, you know, specifically. It was a strange campaign in terms of what, yeah, what he said he would deliver. He has spoken a little bit about kind of helping ensure certain services are there, but mostly just continuing the rhetoric of, yeah, promising to root out foreign enemies and things like that.

So it seems to me the key factor to watch in the second term is the economy. And whether he kind of recognizes, as other Tunisian officials do, some of whom are still working with him, and some of whom have been removed, but yeah, sort of a recognition that something needs to be done on the economy, that it can't go on kind of teetering on the brink like this.

And then, like, for example, those officials who do recognize that Tunisia will need help from its partners recognize this history of support that it received from countries like the United States. Sarah noted that the U.S. government so far, at least the Biden administration has refrained from making a statement about Saied because in the past such statements, he has used as kind of fodder for his rhetoric that the West is trying to control Tunisia or others are trying to control Tunisia. And he's used that also against the IMF. So there's some possibility that there may be space for him to look to kind of more sustainable sources of, yeah, economic support in the next term.

But in the other direction, yeah, things could get worse, especially as kind of the economic environment, the global economic environment shifts. So yeah, a lot of things to be seen.

Scott R. Anderson: So you mentioned some of the writing you've done on this together, as well as independently, Sarah, and one piece I thought was pretty interesting you all published, I guess a few months ago now I think through the Washington Institute, if I recall correctly, you talk about the election error and the need to avoid it in approaching Tunisia, particularly, I think, It's fair to say aimed at the United States, but not just the United States and how they approach this sort of question.

Talk to us about what you think the right policy was, both leading up to and in the aftermath of this election. What would you recommend or what have you recommended to policy folks? And what do you think the right way to look at this, the election and the current state of Tunisia for outsiders trying to determine what their policy toward Tunisia and the region need to be?

Sarah Yerkes: Yeah, I think, you know, first of all, it's, we're in this sort of ironic position of talking about the election and telling people not to pay attention to the election at the same time. But, you know, the point is that this election was not anywhere close to free and fair, and Saied, I mean, the result has been known for months and months, if not years.

I mean, Saied did everything he could to make sure there was no chance. I mean, he won with 90 percent of the vote, which is just ridiculous. That's not a number you ever see in an actual democratic election. So, you know, what we've sort of been arguing to, and trying to convince policymakers, and I think U.S. policymakers are in agreement with this, is like, don't focus on this event. Except as one more data point in just how bad Saied’s repression has gotten.

And I think, you know, if you look at the lead up and all the things we've been discussing, the arrests of candidates, you know, the different legal mechanisms Saied has been using, what this really signals is that he is far less confident than I think any observers had thought. And so what that means is he has the potential to take a much more repressive path going forward.

So recommendation for policymakers is really to keep an eye on Tunisia. You know, often we think an election happened. Okay, done. Let's move on. That should not be the case here. This shouldn't be seen as the end or really the beginning of anything. I mean, this should just be seen as, again, another data point in the continuation of his increasing repression. And so, the United States, and Europe, and others need to keep watching Tunisia to make sure Saied doesn't increase his repression or even continue the level of repression that he's undergoing right now.

I mean, one of the big fears I think is that as the public, as the economy doesn't improve, you know, unless Saied does something miraculous and different and turns things around, which I don't think he will, the economy is going to get worse, not better. And so, you know, that could bring more people into the streets, that could lead to further repression. The more that people are critical of him, the more likely he is to lash out. And he's sort of running out of ways to do that.

You know, and so I think it's important for the international community to keep an eye on Tunisia and to keep both quietly sort of making it clear to Saied that we are paying attention, but also continuing to work with Tunisian civil society actors, whether that's people in Tunisia or in exile, who are really committed to democracy.

I mean, even in the wake of all of this destruction that has happened, you know, you still do see that there's an active and vibrant civil society who's willing to take the risks and wants to return Tunisia to a democratic path. So we've been advocating for the United States and others to continue their relationship with civil society groups.

And then finally, I mean, I think something that's important to remember is Saied, according to Saied’s own Constitution, you know, he only has two terms. He should be done in five years. So that might seem like a long ways away, but in 2029, there should be space for a brand new political actor to take the scene.

And so I do think there's also room for the United States and Europe and others to try to help cultivate more trust in the political class. You know, there's a lot of young Tunisians who could potentially form new political parties or new political movements, you know, doing so in a way that doesn't interfere in Tunisia's politics, but it helps, you know, rebuild the trust between the Tunisian public and the political system, I think could be really beneficial to help Tunisians get their voices heard and help sort of counter some of the repression that we've seen.

Sabina Henneberg: Another recommendation that Sarah and I have written about and kind of discussed is for the United States and Europe, I guess, or yeah, the EU and some of its member states, to take advantage of the fact that there are a couple international leaders that Saied does seem to at least sometimes listen to.

They may not always have the exact goals in mind, you know, exact same goals as the United States, but Giorgia Meloni of Italy has had some success in being received by Saied and giving some support because they share the goal of kind of controlling migration and without necessarily a lot of concern for human rights. So, Italy, you know, also wants to maintain its relationship with the United States. So hoping that we can dialogue as much as possible. And I think this is already happening with our Italian counterparts to try to both pay attention to human rights and hopefully steer Saied away from a more repressive path.

Yeah, the other leader that we identified who may be able to, you know, have some influence is Abdelmadjid Tebboune of Algeria, which is very interested in not seeing Tunisia collapse. So we hope now that our relations with Algeria over the last few years, especially, have been kind of ramping up, I guess you could say hoping that could be another way for the United States to, yeah, at least try to tamper some of the repression we've been seeing in the lead up to these elections.

Scott R. Anderson: Well, I think that is an appropriate note to end on. Sarah Yerkes, Sabina Henneberg, thank you so much for joining us here today on the Lawfare Podcast.

Sarah Yerkes: Thanks for having me.

Sabina Henneberg: Thank you.

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