Lawfare Daily: The Fallout from the French Elections

[Intro]

Tara Varma: What we saw on the evening of July 7th was also an upending of the French political landscape in that now, this French system is basically divided in three blocs.

Natalie Orpett: It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Natalie Orpett, Executive Editor of Lawfare, with Tara Varma, a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Tara Varma: Are we looking at a government whose aim is to last until the next presidential election in the next three years? Or are we looking at a government that would be so weak that they might just fall in a year's time? And so, what kind of policy propositions and bills can you pass when you're so weak? When you know that there might be votes of no confidence that will come up? And so that there's also a big question there.

Natalie Orpett: Today we're talking about the political drama of the French elections, which took place about five weeks ago. It started with President Macron's surprise decision to call a snap election and ended with an unprecedented divide in the Assemblée Nationale. France is currently operating with no governing coalition and no prime minister. As we wait for negotiations that are supposed to happen next week, we thought it was a good time to sort out what happened and what's next.

[Main Podcast]

So the Olympics have just wrapped up in France and I promise this has to do with what we are going to talk about today, which is the French elections of several weeks ago, and the melodrama that it involves. And the very strange state that we find ourselves in now. And in particular, because it seems that there was sort of a truce in the chaos that is French politics during the Olympics. And now we're going to have to go back to it. So as we're doing that Tara, I wanted to speak with you to just start with what happened? Where are we? And then talk about the implications for going forward. So can you start us off in early June with a very important election in the EU Parliament? What happened?

Tara Varma: Absolutely. So, the EU Parliamentary elections, they take place every five years. Last time was in 2019, this year 2024, over the course of four days, because it spans over 27 countries inside the European Union. The general assumption was that the far-right was going to gain a lot of seats, and that was partly true in some countries, a bit less true in others. But in the case of France, my country, it was definitely true. The far-right, Rassemblement National Party, came in first with 30 percent of the vote share. And Emmanuel Macron, the president's party, came in second, far behind, with only 14% of the vote share.

And so, much to the surprise of voters and observers, Macron decided on the evening of June 10th, when the results of the European parliamentary elections came out, to dissolve the French National Assembly. So basically, transposing a European election result to a French national political situation. And this dissolution of the National Assembly that he decided on his own led to the organization of snap parliamentary elections and French parliamentary elections take place with two rounds as do the presidential elections. And these snap parliamentary elections took place a bit less than three weeks after Macron's decision, so on June 30th and July 7th.

Natalie Orpett: The portrayal of this move by Macron in the U.S. press was that it was completely shocking and such a maverick move and there was all sorts of speculation about what he could have possibly been thinking. Is that an accurate portrayal? Was it being explained differently in the French press?

Tara Varma: I think that's an accurate portrayal. And it's interesting that you used the word maverick, Natalie, because this is one of the words that's been used to qualify him ever since he's been running for elections. And the first time that he ran was in 2017 for the presidential election and he was really compared in that sense in a way to Donald Trump. They're very different personalities, they come from very different backgrounds. But the idea that someone you know, who was not a political leader, who was really an administrator, a senior civil servant inside the system, decided for the first time in his life to run for office, and that to be president was quite surprising, and he ultimately won that election, so that was, I guess, even more surprising.

But he has been making these unexpected moves for the French political system, and generally, these bets are bets that he's won, not in local elections but in a number of other cases, he's won them. And the big question after that decision was, was he going to win this bet, which was really shocking for a lot of people?

And so in the first round, the far-right comes ahead, really far ahead of all the other parties and that creates a shock. It was really assumed by pollsters and announced by pollsters that they would come in first. But I guess there was a sense of realization for the French public that the far-right had really made such headway in these past few years that they had become the alternative to the center-right that Macron represented. And so I think that was really striking.

The campaign between the two rounds lasted only one week, and the main policy propositions that the Rassemblement National came up with at the time was that they would ban from certain strategic positions inside the administration people who held dual citizenship. And you know, in the past five years, in the past 15 years, sorry, Marine Le Pen has been quite adept at normalizing her party. She's changed the name. The name initially was Front National, represented by her father, Jean Marie Le Pen, founded by neo-Nazis, people who supported the Waffen SS, so really extreme right.

And she's worked quite a lot to say that she's distanced herself from these people. Her father was removed from the party's instances. As I said, she changed its name, and focused very much on what she considered to be more social issues. So, poverty, social inequalities, talking to the average French person. And I think she's done that quite well if we look at generally the scores that she's been getting and the perception that people have of her. You know, a lot of people who were interrogated during the campaign said that she was not from the far-right and that her heir basically who was meant to become the prime minister if the Rassemblement National won, Jordan Bardella, this 28-year-old man who comes from the French suburbs. He doesn't have a higher education degree. He appears to be more normal, if I say, at least more closer to the average French person. And so, she's done that, unfortunately, remarkably well.

But then the fact that during these two rounds, the first policy proposition that they came up with was a racist, xenophobic policy proposition, I think put again very clearly to the French public that they hadn't changed so much. And in the end, the foundational basis of this party, despite the name change, despite the leadership change, remains the same, which is that it is a racist and xenophobic party. And I think that was really a massive strategic mistake on their part. They kind of lost the campaign there.

But there was still a sense of massive anxiety for the French public, French voters, and of course from our European partners too. Because the perspective suddenly of having France, one of the founders of the European Union, having, you know, as a majority of far-right parliamentarians inside the National Assembly would really upend how France would be perceived inside the European Union, but also the role that France would play in terms of putting forward policy propositions. So I think there was a general sense of panic.

And so, much to the surprise of observers and voters, what happened in the second round was that the left came ahead, and the Rassemblement National came in third, with Macron's party actually not losing as much ground as they thought they would. So they were still second, but compared to the gains of 2017, when his party had just been founded, were looking at 60 percent of seat loss. So it's quite a lot still. But what we're seeing, what we saw on the evening of July 7th was also an upending of the French political landscape in that now this French system is basically divided in three blocs. The left and the far left on the one hand, which in the July 7th elections got the most seats, 178. Second, the center block, if I may say, with center-left and center-right voters and basically Macron's party, 162 seats. And the far-right, which came in third, but still has 143 seats.

And so, you know, they did come in third, but I think there's a cautionary tale for France there, which is that before June 10th, they had 89 seats in the National Assembly. So they gained almost 50 percent new seats, which means more public funding for them, more seats of course, more collaborators and assistants and researchers inside the National Assembly. And so, potentially, which is also something that Marine Le Pen said, an even greater professionalization and normalization of that party for the French public because they would appear just, you know, more numerous and more powerful inside the system. So yes, they came in third, but it's still a win for them.

They were very disappointed that they didn't come in first, clearly, I mean, they were kind of expecting, people were prospecting, thinking about who would be, so the prime minister, we knew it would have been Jordan Bardella. But, you know, there were many questions about who would be the defense minister, the foreign minister. They were already projecting themselves in that role, and not just them. And so I think they were very disappointed by that but they're also already now saying, you know, we'll professionalize even more and now our target is 2027 with a presidential election and new parliamentary elections if they don't happen before that. So, they're already kind of projecting themselves in the future.

But what we found ourselves in was a stalemate because with these three blocs, it became very difficult to form a coalition government. I mean, I say that. Most of our European partners actually have coalition governments. They're used to this, to compromising, to organizing themselves. They don't have this majoritarian rule system and, but we're not used to it. And so when the Fifth Republic was founded at the end of the 60s, the idea was precisely to fight against what Charles de Gaulle at the time had seen as really the shortcomings of the Fourth Republic, which were these coalition governments that kept falling and being reinstated and falling again. So he was looking for stability. The constitution of the Fifth Republic really has the stability at its core as its main goal.

But people change. I mean, we did the, the alternative system for 60 years, the right for the longest period, then the left, then again, the right. And clearly there was a dissatisfaction with this as there is, I guess, in most democracies. And so France finds itself in a situation today where it will have to compromise and several names have been put forward. We can discuss this also a bit later. But, we’re in a situation now where the Olympic Games have happened and we didn't have a proper formal government in France.

Natalie Orpett: Yeah, and I want to pause for a second on these three parties, because as you say, it's, it's a very interesting development in French politics, particularly because none of them represents a majority and so the parliament will, the Assemblée Nationale will function quite differently. But it is, of course, unusual for, from an American perspective where we're used to a very, very stable two-party system. So, I'm wondering if you can tell us just a little bit briefly about what the sort of major policy positions are of each of the three parties. You know, I suppose for a Lawfare audience, particularly as it pertains to national security, foreign policy, international alliances, and that sort of thing. But also when we say the Rassemblement National is a far-right, you know, populist party, do we mean the same thing when we use those descriptors as we do when we're talking about the far-right in the United States or in other countries? Or are we sort of missing a nuance by assuming that those are the same things?

Tara Varma: Sure. And it's interesting that you ask about national security because this has been very much an object of contentious debate inside these three blocs. One of the reasons why the left didn't present a common list for the European parliamentary elections was that there were disagreements, particularly on Israel-Gaza and on the Ukraine aid coming from the far left and the left. I would say the left and center-left had a fairly similar position to that of Macron, a more powerful Europe, definitely aid to Ukraine, military aid, but also humanitarian material aid, aid for reconstruction.

The far-left is generally much closer to Russia, feels like it's not Europe's or the member states’ responsibility to help Ukraine. You know, I'd say would give some credit to Russia's claim that it invaded Ukraine because of NATO enlargement and that there is an American responsibility in this form of destabilization of Eastern Europe. So, real disagreements between the far left and the left. And so they didn't manage to form a coalition for the European parliamentary elections, but they did manage to form one called the Nouveau Front Populaire, the New Popular Front in reference to the Popular Front of the 1930s, which came out with the strongest social equality propositions that we know of France today, in particularly the five week vacation, but that, but also the 40-hour week at the time. So, so a reference that's very positive to a lot of people.

Natalie Orpett: And the Front Populaire at the time was a very anti-fascist party, I believe, right?

Tara Varma: Absolutely. Very anti-fascist party. They were also formed after the 1934 far-right demonstrations in Paris. So, you know, kind of absolutely anti-fascist. And one of the major points of contention, again, while forming the Nouveau Front Populaire coalition, were these foreign and security policy issues. And they came up with a compromise, which was that in the manifesto, they said that they would support Ukraine, they would support Ukraine's accession to the EU, that the war should end, and that peace should be in favor of Ukraine's terms. So, and Israel-Gaza, that there should also be a ceasefire in Gaza and to find a way towards the two-state solution. So, a form of compromise there, and it was the major point of contention.

On the far-right Rassemblement National, we've seen positions much, much closer to that of Russia. Marine Le Pen used to say that she wanted France to withdraw from NATO. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, what they said is we won't withdraw from NATO while the war in Ukraine is ongoing, but we're not withdrawing that policy proposition once the war ends and there is peace. So I think that is something that's still very much on their radar. The Front National at the time, but Rassemblement National as well, actually got a number of loans from Russia, from the Federation of Russia so they're quite beholden to Russia. And we've seen a lot of admiration for autocratic leaders, a lot of admiration for Vladimir Putin. Again, giving credit to his claims on Ukraine, you know, questioning whether Ukraine is a country in itself, whether it doesn't make sense for it to be attached to Russia. So, a clear sense as well that if they had gotten a majority inside the parliament, they would have wanted to have a much greater role in foreign policy.

I'm just going to remind our listeners that in the French system of the Fifth Republic, the French president has a lot of leeway when it comes to foreign policy. He can basically make foreign policy decisions on his own. They then have to be voted in the budget. But until now, the president has had a majority in Parliament, and so the majority would just basically apply and implement the decisions that the president has made. I know that it comes as a huge surprise generally for a lot of people who observe France that the president can decide on a military intervention on his own without a parliamentary debate without a parliamentary decision, without parliamentary oversight.

So it really is quite a special system, and they would have wanted to contest that. If we had had the far-right with a majority in parliament, we would have been in a situation called cohabitation, meaning the president and the parliamentary majority with the prime minister are from different parties. This has happened in the past in the French Republic, a president from the left, a prime minister from the right, or vice-versa. But on foreign and defense policy, while there have been some disagreements, they always managed basically to find a compromise because it felt like it was raison d'etat and something, you know, a higher purpose for French national interest.

So we saw, even though they were from different parties, we saw generally a way to find a compromise. And even looking at the European foreign policy of these two of a prime minister and president coming from different parties, the European partners had accepted basically that it would be alternatively the French president and the French prime minister who would represent France at the European council meeting. So there was a lot of coordination between the prime minister's office and the president's office.

In the case that we mentioned earlier, the hypothesis where the prime minister would be from the Rassemblement National party and the President Macron from the center party. This would not have been possible. Their positions on foreign and security policy are diametrically opposed. So we would have found ourselves in a situation where the Prime Minister would go to Brussels at the European institutions meeting to say something representing the position of France, and the Prime Minister would go and say something that would have been basically the exact opposite, creating total confusion, of course, for France itself, but also for our partners in terms of who was representing France.

I think leading to a situation of immediate blockage. You know, impossibility to take decisions foreign policy decisions at the European Union level require unanimity. If you have France, you know, just being basically bicephalic and totally divided not only is that a problem in itself, but it can lead also, I would say, other European Union member states to come up with less support to Ukraine, for instance, that's one proposition. So I think there was a lot of risk there.

And Macron doubled down at the time where, when the far-right was still ahead in the polls before the second round, saying, I will still be in charge of foreign and security policy. This is my interpretation of the constitution. It's been the interpretation of the constitution for the past 60 years. There is no reason to move away from that. But it was interesting that both Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella were quite clear that they would have an ambition there. And they also said they would have had an ambition to propose to put forward a name for who would be France's nominee inside the European, the College of European Commissioners at the European Commission. So that's, that was one perspective that we're not dealing with right now, but it took a lot of energy and focus of foreign policy observers because we would have been in a totally unprecedented situation there.

And when we look at Macron's party, they actually didn't really come up with any policy propositions on national security and foreign policy during this campaign except to say there will be continuity on our part. So, you know, European strategic autonomy, European sovereignty, a greater European role in the world. So, more defense and security instruments and budget for the EU, which is something that Macron pushes for a lot. But also European sovereignty in the trade and investment realm, as well as in health, building instruments, tools that the European Union has to fight against economic coercion coming from China amongst others. So, a focus where Europe is more politically coordinated, that is a big issue for him.

The way they portrayed the fight was mostly against Macron being able to maintain stability and the far-right that would provoke a total chaos in France. And so, it was not so much about the issues, but really about the future of France, I guess, which is where there is a bit of similarity with the situation in the U.S. where, when President Biden was still the presumed nominee of the Democratic Party for the upcoming election, the way he portrayed the upcoming election was very much, you're either for the future of democracy or you're going to be voting for the end of democracy.

There was something similar there, I would say, as you know, in June, Joe Biden was also in France for the celebration of the eighty-year anniversary of the liberation from the Nazis. And so, he gave this big speech about democracy on June 8th, just basically two days before Macron's dissolution of the National Assembly, about what it means to be a democracy today, what it means to fight for democratic values free press, free elections. So I think there was an echo also for Macron of having followed all these discussions and celebrations. You know, the more I think about it, the more I realized that I think this 80th anniversary of the liberation was clearly, I guess, something that played in his mind when he took the decision to dissolve the National Assembly.

Natalie Orpett: That's very interesting. So has the rhetoric been from the left and from the center that we are sort of all in this together to fight against the descent into fascism, the decline of democracy, et cetera. Has that been an explicit rhetorical tool in trying to convince the electorate or is it a little more subtle than that?

Tara Varma: No, you're right. It has. And so it's what we called in French, Le Front Républicain, the Republican Front, the idea that all parties except from the far-right are supposed to come together to fight the far-right. Which is really something that is emblematic of the 2002 presidential election, where much to the dismay of most voters, Jean Marie Le Pen, then the head of Front National, came in second after Jacques Chirac, when it was really expected that Lionel Jospin, who was the prime minister at the time, and there was a cohabitation. Lionel Jospin from the left was the prime minister. Jacques Chirac from the right was the president. It was much expected that Lionel Jospin, who was very popular, would be, would first of all come ahead and ultimately won the presidential election. And he was wiped out of it in the first round. And so the second round was between Jean Marie Le Pen and Jacques Chirac at the time.

And there were huge demonstrations in France, millions of people demonstrating for two weeks in between the two rounds to say that they were never going to vote for Jean Marie Le Pen. And there was this scare also, it was, it reminded people so much of the Second World War that the idea that the far-right could come to power was, it didn't put people in a state of paralysis, but it was actually quite an object of political mobilization. And so all parties on the left evidently voted for then right-wing President Jacques Chirac. And so he won overwhelmingly the second round with 82 percent of the vote, if I recall. And so, this idea of a Front Républicain is something that has been very present in French politics since then.

But what we've seen since Macron has arrived, gained power in 2017 is that he's wanted to change that narrative. One of the things that he said when coming into power in 2017 was that he wanted to go beyond the traditional left-right divide in French politics, that he didn't really believe in that. It was mostly a division between people who wanted chaos and who were, you know, incompetent and those people who would be competent.

And in the competent box, you could put people who were on the left and the right, but who wanted basically for government to function, for people to have access to, generally public services, but also to rationalize the economy and to go towards you know, more trade and exchanges. And so, he kind of said, I don't think the left-right divide is adequate to the 21^st-century world and globalization. We need to move towards something different. And we need to move to a state where it's people who defend national interests but are interested in global interactions and those people who really don't, reject globalization and don't want interactions with the rest of the world. And so he's tried to change the divide in that sense and basically to build a very large center, center-left, center-right, with his party. And the alternative to that would be the far-right.

And his ambition at the time was to say, I'm going to wipe out the far-right of the French political map because we'll be, because our stipulation is that we're going to be the competent ones beyond our political differences. People will see that there is no reason to vote for the far-right anymore. We will provide them with competent services. But of course, things are not so different. The reality of the matter is it's true, he completely upended the French political landscape at the time, effectively obliterating the left and the right, and his party, which was non-existent six months, you know, even three months before the election, came in first and that was very interesting with a much more dynamic, socially diverse, gender diverse National Assembly, a lot more women and younger people who were voted in, people coming in from civil society, not professional politicians. But it's been hard for him to uphold that ambition.

And so, election after election, particularly local elections, in the past seven years, we've seen the far-right gain a lot of ground. And he's been quite frustrated with that. I think not understanding why people have turned away from him. He's taken it very much to heart. His approval ratings were quite low. And, and I think he's used to people liking him and of course being very impressed he's erudite and brilliant.

But first of all, the French people always turn away from their political leaders. I think that's just something that happens. Charles de Gaulle writes about it in his memoirs and where he says that, you know, we're just really an ungrateful bunch of people. And so it's quite interesting and it's true, the French people ultimately kicked him out. Because after the 1968 protests, you know, people were feeling that Charles de Gaulle belonged to just a different world than the world that they were living in. And that has happened with François Mitterrand, Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy, François Hollande.

And Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande, Macron's two predecessors, only actually won elections for one mandate. They didn't manage to get re-elected. And Macron is the first president in 20 years to have managed to be re-elected as an incumbent, which is quite a feat. But he is feeling frustrated with the sense that things are not moving forward enough and so the Republican Front was deemed not to be able to work this time around because people, you know, what we've seen is the pollsters kind of got it right almost every time, except for the second round where they didn't plan for the left to be ahead.

But I think we're seeing this phenomenon in France, in the U.S. too. People are not ashamed, if I may say, anymore of saying that they're going to vote for the far-right. And now I realize that I need to get to your far-right question as well, so I'll do that in a minute. But we're seeing this phenomenon, also because Marine Le Pen has managed to get, to give people the impression that she, her party is not from the far-right. So people don't feel like they're actually voting for the far-right. They're saying I'm voting for a party which is a new party, you know, they've never been in power. Why not give them the opportunity to be? We've tried all the others, they've not managed to keep up with their promises they've compromised too much with the private sector or with corporate interests. We want someone who speaks more plainly, who seems more direct, who seems to be closer to our preoccupations, despite her being a millionaire and having hidden her money in safe havens and tax havens.

So, you know, it's, I think this impression is also, she's done it, she's been very good at it, but it's also totally detached from reality. And her family is a political dynasty. Yes, she moved away a little bit from her father, but it was her father's party. Jordan Bardella, who's her designated heir, is engaged to Jean Marie, one of Jean Marie Le Pen's granddaughters. So it's, very much a political dynasty there, though they've managed to make it seem like it's not. I have to say it still is.

But the Front Républicain won, which I think is one of the big surprises of the second round. People still thought the main fear for us is for the far-right to come. And so, but we saw divisions. The far-left is very much an object of controversy as well in France. La France Insoumise has a number of leaders who have pronounced anti-Semitic statements you know, statements that make them, I think, quite close to Russia. They've trying to, sown dissent and disorganization inside the National Assembly. They're really seen by a lot of people as unconstructive partners.

And there's been a lot of reproach to the left that they've included the far left in the larger coalition because they don't seem like worthy partners. And so a lot of people on the right were saying if we find ourselves in a race where it's going to be the far-left against the far-right, we might just abstain and not go vote because we're putting them on par, the far-left and the far-right. And they have similarities, but I should say they're still not the same. And so, in the end, the, the left came in first, but they're still stuck right now and there's a stalemate.

But let me go to your far-right question briefly. Is the far-right the same in the U.S. and France? So, as you said earlier, Natalie, we're a multi-party system in France. The U.S. is a two party system, so that's a bit different. But we do see similar issues that mobilize voters who say or don't say that they're voting for the far-right. Immigration is a big one, but social inequalities, and some might not call them social inequalities, but the idea of having others pass you through in terms of getting what you rightfully deserve.

And, and we're seeing that in the U.S. and in France. It was quite striking to me that, you know, at some point Donald Trump was asking for more social benefits in the campaign. He was saying some American people deserve to have more. This was not just a neoliberal candidate saying we just, you know, we should just deregulate the economy and the market will regulate itself and everyone can pull themselves up by their bootstraps. He was saying American people actually deserve more and more help. He was talking about the health system, something that is very similar to what Marine Le Pen has done.

She's actually stolen, if I may say, a lot of the narrative from the left and the far-left saying that she's the one defending the French people. And she succeeded in giving that impression. So typically, when there are, when there have been factories’ foreclosures in France, most of the party representatives were not there. The only party represented with the workers and the unions in the past five to ten years have often been the Front National people. And so, the impression that it gives is that a lot of the mainstream parties, if I may use that expression, have kind of abandoned their voters on the ground and the ones who are present are generally the far-right. And so it has given that impression that they're really not the far-right, they're a different kind of party.

As I said, the main policy proposition that they came up with in the second round of this election was to ban certain French people from acceding to a number of positions, so that is clearly racist and anti-Semitic. And I think it is, it remains the foundational basis of that party. But they do have given the impression that they are fighting for the people. Something that I've seen a lot in Trump rally, you know, in some of his rallies, campaigns

Originally, as well the Front National, which was founded in 1972, really was inspired by American neoliberalism. And so, there was really the sense that the economic platform of the Front National in the ‘70s was very much in favor of total deregulation of the markets. And what we've seen is a 180 turn now. They're asking, you know, for again, more social benefits, but excluding a number of people from the social benefits. You know, who, is it going to be reserved only to French people? Is it going to be reserved to French people who have had the citizenship for more than 10 or 15 years? Are immigrants going to be excluded from that?

So, one big issue of contention is getting medical health from the state, which in a number of cases in France is free. One of the policy propositions that the Front National has come up with is that people who are not French should not have access to that. So again, we're looking at a change in economic and social policies. But yet what remains a priority for them is to make sure that not everyone has access to it. There's no equal access to these public services and rights. They want certain categories of citizens to have access to it and other categories of citizens to be excluded from it, and there's a similarity here in the U.S. too.

But what we've seen is a lot of people from the far-right, voters, but thinkers too, saying, you know, why are we calling this the far-right? It's a kind of nomenclature that belongs to the 20th century. You shouldn't name and shame people. These are just rightful citizens who want to fight for what they believe in. It's unkind to call them to say that they're from the far-right, something that I've seen a lot in the U.S. but I do see in France as well. And so, a lot of questioning of that.

And again, I think contributing to the normalization of these parties and you see that intellectuals from the right, I would say the far-right saying let's not call people from the far-right. That's not the reality there, and so I think this creates a state of confusion because it is important to name things as they are and to explain what is the Front National, today called the Rassemblement National? Where does this party come from? And even I would say as a voter, if you believe that it's not a racist and anti-Semitic party today, its foundations were definitely racist and anti-Semitic, so you need to think about that. What does it mean? What is the evolution there? Who are the people who belong to that party?

And one more point on this. As the campaign was ongoing and we saw these policy, really racist policy propositions come in, we also, of course, observers and journalists can, through social media of a number of candidates from the Rassemblement National, sorry. And of course, a lot of them on their social media had racist comments, anti-Semitic comments, homophobic comments, xenophobic comments. And they came up and the official line of the Rassemblement National was that these were just, you know, one or two black sheep and that the snap elections, being snap by nature, they put all the parties in kind of pressure points and they just had to find candidates and they went to the first person who was available. But you know, this was just one or two black sheep.

And several newspapers realized that actually in terms of the whole candidates, we were talking about 108 candidates who would be qualified as black sheep and who had openly, you know, condemnable comments on their social media. So, things I guess that they were proud of or that they were assuming. And out of these 108, 38 are today members of parliaments in the National Assembly of France. So that is quite a lot, you know, and so these are not black sheep. Again, I think it is the profound nature of that party and not being able to have a conversation on this, I think is really problematic. And not trying to think about the effects that these 38 people will have in the debate at the National Assembly, but also at a larger level in terms of the French political debate, I think is a bit delusional because evidently they will have an impact. They are saying and writing things that were considered until a few months ago totally unacceptable.

And now they're just, you know, there is something to be said for the fact that they're representative, I guess, of what French voters want today. And so there's a big question there also about how democracy works. What do we want out of this democratic system? Is democracy intrinsically apt at hurting itself? So how do you combine that? The necessity of representation, but also, I guess, the dangers that it includes, I think, and you know, I don't have the answer to that. That's a huge question for all democracies. How do you remain resilient in the face of this rise of populism or far-right, however you want to call it? But I do think it's important to call it out because it does exist today.

Natalie Orpett: Yeah. So, let's talk a little bit about that influence, and I mean, as you were saying earlier, it's so hard to know exactly how it will play out because we are at this moment of stalemate in the current parliament and Macron has not yet decided on who the prime minister will be. And it's not clear how a system that is not accustomed to working across coalitions and non-majority situations will function.

But I'm wondering what you think, and actually before we go to what you think for what it will look like going forward. I think it is interesting to, to hear a little bit about what it has looked like because despite this sort of political truce for the Olympics, it's now been, you know, over a month since this strange stalemate of a system has been in place. So, what has happened during this time that may have been escaping notice as everyone was celebrating the Olympics?

Tara Varma: Yes, I think that's a big issue. So it's been five weeks, which, you know, I guess is both a lot and not too much. A lot of European partners do mention that sometimes it takes weeks and months for them to come up with a government. Some of those are a federal system, and so they have regional governments who do manage to get the day-to-day affairs going. But one thing that has happened, and I should say I, there were no special national security and defense propositions coming out of Macron's party during the campaign. But actually he did come up during this Olympic truce with one major foreign policy shift, which is that on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the King of Morocco's accession to the throne, Macron sent him a verbal note acknowledging Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, thus angering Algeria. That's another issue.

But, he decided this again. There was no parliamentary debate, by definition. It wasn't really explained. It came out in the press and, of course, was widely covered in North Africa and in a number of other places. But, you know, apart from that, didn't particularly make a splash even in French politics. It was covered, but I think a lot of people were surprised that this major policy shift happened in the middle of the Olympics and there was no particular explanation also coming from Macron. He didn't speak out on it, except to announce it.

So that was very surprising, but in a way, I guess also characteristic of Macron, who is very much the kind of person who wants to decide things on his own time. And so he had apparently made that decision. I don't know whether he had, maybe this, you know, the 25th anniversary of the King of Morocco acceding to the throne was a date that wasn't going to change whatever happened inside French politics. So maybe this is something that had been planned for months and it's just that the French political situation was such that he decided to go ahead with it.

But he really does want to give the impression that he's not ceding to any form of media or political pressure. He is the one deciding. And maybe that was a message also, by the way, to whomever his future prime minister and government members are going to be, which is that when it comes to foreign and security policy, he remains the prime, sole decision maker and people are there inside his system to implement his decisions. So I think that, you know, that was just that.

And yeah, as I said, I guess it's very surprising generally, but also I do feel like it's a confirmation of who Macron is as a political leader. And, you know, he still has three years to go. What I read in the U.S. press, but not just in the U.S., in the European press as well as, you know, is he going to be a lame duck president? And I was thinking, but you know, we're in 2024, the next presidential election is 2027. Three years is a long time. I mean, he's not even halfway through the, his second mandate. So there is a lot, a lot that he can do still now.

The question of course now is the question of his stature vis-à-vis other European leaders. He, you know, was really seen as one of the people who put a lot of ideas forward in terms of structuring the European system, making it stronger, more in capacity to resist pressures from China and others, in a way also more in capacity to resist some pressure from the U.S. And now, I don't know that he's going to be able to keep that stature. He needs a government, first and foremost. He needs a National Assembly that's working. And he needs to be able to pass a budget, because that's the big, big issue in France right now.

Negotiations for the national budget will be happening at the end of September for a formal adoption the first Tuesday of October. This is happening, you know, in seven weeks. So again, you need to have a functioning government, you need to have a coalition with compromises, because that is quite essential, especially at a time where the European Commission put France under an excessive deficit procedure. And so, France will have to formulate and to find a new budget to be able to respond to the questions of the European Commission, because actually life goes on for the rest of Europe and for the rest of the world.

So I think we do, we do need to find ourselves. You know, the Olympic truce is done. And that appears quite clearly because we're seeing a number of op-eds in the French press and a number of articles now saying, well, somehow we managed to get through the Olympics without a government, that is quite a feat, but there are so many pressing issues, plus an extremely volatile situation in the Middle East. And so, we've seen Macron you know, talking on the phone with Benjamin Netanyahu, the new Iranian president, the Israeli president as well, plus coordination with U.K., Germany, other European leaders, and of course Joe Biden, the U.S. President. So there, you know, life somehow is ongoing for him. But he does need to be able to dedicate some time now to finding a solution to the French situation because this stalemate, which has been ongoing, is not tenable anymore. And I do fear that if he is not seen as being capable of providing a solution, that will be problematic.

And what we've seen is a left that was quite divided, also, after the results in the second round. Despite their victory, we saw Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the far left candidate, basically being the first to speak as if he represented the coalition. He didn't represent it. He was one of the party leaders of it, but not the sole party leader. And it took them over ten days to come up with a name of whom could be their prime minister, which, you know, meant that all the political leverage that they had was totally lost.

Then suddenly the right started saying, well, you know, we actually want to be able to form a coalition government with Macron's party, but they didn't have the majority. And so they've been trying to look at how to do it. Is it possible to have a coalition of center-left to right parties to the exclusion basically of the far left and the far-right? Something that again, a lot of our European partners know how to do and have done and something that France hasn't done until now.

But even with the name that the left ultimately came up with, Lucie Castets, who is today the head of the financial department at the city of Paris. And they came up with that name just before the beginning of the Olympics. He said no, saying this is not the time to nominate a prime minister, which seemed a bit strange, you know, just hours before the beginning of the Olympics. But so he said no to that proposition and he has been quite clear that he would much prefer to have a known political figure from the right.

So, the names that we've been hearing are Xavier Bertrand, who's the head of the region in the north of France Michel Barnier, who's a former European Commissioner representing France; Bernard Cazeneuve, who was prime minister under Hollande, so the left-wing president; as well as Jean-Louis Borloo, who was one of Sarkozy's ministers, someone on the right, but I would say compatible with the center-right, center-left. So his priority, I would say, and preference go to someone who would come from the right, a man. Again, I don't think he wants to nominate a woman.

But also there hasn't been any personality appearing you know, so obvious in the system, someone who would be able to bridge divides, political divides. Someone who, you know, is also kind and intelligent enough to be able to form these compromises. And I think he's been a bit stuck because he had hoped that that personality would somehow emerge out of this mess. And that hasn't been the case, but I guess this also speaks to the novelty of the situation that we're in. And so it will have to be someone who's a bit different.

Can it be someone who's out of the foray of politics? I'm not so sure. That's also one of the issues with the name that the left came up with. The fact that Lucie Castes, in a way, has quite a similar profile to Macron. She's a senior civil servant. She went to the National School of Administration like Macron. She hasn't been into politics that much. You know, I think he liked that profile when it was him running. He doesn't seem to like it so much when it would be someone else. And so I don't know, he's, I guess, struggling with also what that government would look like. Is it a left-wing government, a right-wing government, a technocratic government?

And the fear now that a lot of people have is somehow we have overcome a little bit, the mess at the beginning. But Macron can dissolve again the National Assembly in a year's time. He can do it once a year. So there are many questions for the upcoming government and prime minister, whomever they are in the next few days, which is what is their viability? Are we looking at a government whose aim is to last until the next presidential election in the next three years? Or are we looking at a government that would be so weak that they might just fall in a year's time? And so, what kind of policy propositions and bills can you pass when you're so weak, when you know that there might be votes of no confidence that will come up? And so that there's also a big question there.

If one of the parties comes up with a vote of no confidence, will the far-right and the far-left go vote together to topple the government? And so we're, I think we're in the premise of possibly a lot of political instability. And the question for Macron is, does this play in his favour or not? Is it better for him to appear ahead of all this mess? He's the president, a decision-maker in national security and foreign policy, above the foray basically. Or is he knee deep in the discussions and compromises and wants to work this out? Because the French people have decided that they don't want to give a majority to any one party and they are pushing for all these parties to work together to face this unprecedented situation.

And so, I think it's also not easy for him to see which of these two scenarios works better for him. He cannot be re-elected in 2027 at the next presidential election because the French Constitution now says that you're allowed only two consecutive presidential terms. But he could think of representing himself once again in 2032, for instance, because there's no limit to the two terms. They have to be consecutive, that's it, but it doesn't say that it's only two in your lifetime. So, I think he'll be fairly young at the end of 2027, and so I guess he's still thinking about the future of his political career. But I think the immediate future should be his main preoccupation, because there is no easy way out right now.

Natalie Orpett: As France is sort of experimenting, perhaps unintentionally with this new structure in parliament, do you sense that there’s any pushback on the power of the presidency that Macron has been asserting here? And, you know, it sounds like he has taken advantage of the ability to act somewhat unilaterally in foreign policy matters. And it sounds like you're describing a little bit of flexibility, actually, as to what his role needs to be in the sort of domestic mess. Although clearly he is responsible for initiating the elections that got us here. But are you seeing any pushback on that structure, the sort of expansion of the presidency, which, as you know, has been a, a topic of conversation in the U.S. for many decades?

Tara Varma: So, you know, in the 2012 presidential election, there was a lot of debate about the need for constitutional changes and the possibility to put forward a Sixth Republic. Because precisely there was a sense that the Fifth Republic wasn't adequate to the needs of the 21st century anymore. And was really inadequate compared to our European partners as well where, you know, we have this one system which is such an outlier compared to the, at the time, 27 others and now 26 others with the departure of the U.K. from the EU.

But somehow this has not featured as much in this debate, which has been fairly surprising to me because it does appear that there is an inadequacy here, you know, we're really struggling. And even younger politicians are also struggling with this idea of compromise. You know, a lot of leaders from the left, despite coming in first, they were, you know, the three blocs are still very real, so they didn't have the majority to be able to form a government on their own. And they immediately said, we would never form a government with Macron's parties.

And that, at the time, I thought, well, I understand why you wouldn't want to form a government with the far-right, because you're saying that you're, you know, really opposed to their ideas and their ideology. I think that's fine. But again, the French people sent a message that is quite clear, which is that they want neither of these three blocs to come in first and they want some form of compromise. And so even for, I guess, younger, more globalized politician, the idea, this idea of compromise is really a struggle, something that I guess they don't know how to do. And that's fine. We are, you know, life is a learning process. So I guess we're still in that learning process.

But very few people have said we seriously need to think about constitutional changes. That's also due to the fact that you need a majority in the Senate and the National Assembly. to pass constitutional changes, and I'm not sure that even the French population wants that debate right now, to be honest. I've been surprised that it's not come up, but, but the makeup of the Constitution also makes it difficult if there's no majority to actually have that debate. And you know, some debates are necessary to be had just for the sake of having them, even if you can't pass them through, just getting into citizens mind, the idea that maybe there's a change to be made here, at least we need to discuss it. How do we make this more representative, more engagement from parliament, moving away from this majoritarian rule?

But this hasn't been a discussion. And I'm not sure why because I think one of the elements also I'm talking about what the French citizens who won because the turnout at this election was very high, as high as for presidential elections, which is generally the highest. And so we were around 66 percent of turnout, which means, you know, two citizens out of three. That's quite a lot. So, there was a determination from the French population that this election mattered to them and that they wanted to participate. But I think they're expecting a change in how politics happen, but they're not I guess, for now, expecting a change in, a constitutional change. That might happen in the next few months, maybe political parties will come up with that, or civil society, saying we need a different system. Because you're right, I mean, Macron called for these elections, he decided this on his own, without consultation from the President of the National Assembly or the President of the Senate, without consultation.

There's this very famous photograph that came out of from his official photographer's Instagram account where it's a black and white photo and Macron is, his back is facing the viewer. But then you see the head of the National Assembly, the head of the Senate, his prime minister, and his interior minister just looking completely in disarray and panicked after his decision, and so the idea that he made his decision on his own. You know, it carries a number of problems.

And I think that is also what scared a lot of people in terms of forming the, the Republican Front, is that suddenly the idea that a, potentially a far-right president would also be endowed with this freedom to decide for things on her own is something that I guess scared a lot of people. Because we realized, and even I myself, as someone who's been following French politics for a long time, I think I took the measure of how expensive these powers, are the president's powers are according to the French Republic. I took the measure of that, I think, this year. It's something that I've studied, that I've known, but to experience it as a citizen was something that was very different and to think, okay, actually, we don't experience it so much in our daily lives, but in this case we did. And, and this person whom, you know, we voted president and who's won the last two presidential elections could decide this on his own.

He used the Constitution. He didn't bypass the Constitution. He just, made use of the constitutional rights that he had. And so, I think that put a lot of questions in people's mind. But he's not really blamed for the situation either right now, which, which is interesting. I think he made his decision snap elections were organized, people turned out to vote, and now they want an outcome that works. And if it doesn't work, I guess the idea is the government might fall and you might have to go through this process again. But it does feel like there'll be a bit of instability for the next few months, which does question France's ability to conduct major policies, major policy changes.

As we've discussed, in foreign policy, Macron might be able to pursue foreign policy shifts on his own. But I think typically in terms of the issues that matter to people, climate, immigration, job opportunities, the preservation of France's social system is also a big issue, you need a majority in parliament. So I have yet to see how we see how all of this plays out. But also I think one thing that we absolutely need to follow is how the far-right and the Rassemblement National, sorry, how they behave in this new parliament. What is their strategy? What are the policies that they're going to put forward? Are they going to pursue this normalization process because they have 2027 in mind?

I think that will be key. And to see whether they make mistakes or not, this is one of the things that Marine Le Pen has been saying since they lost, if I may say, the second round, which is that, you know, we're learning from our mistakes and we're going to be better next time. And she's been very discreet compared to all other party leaders in the past five weeks, which I guess means that she's biding her time and is preparing for a comeback in the fall when, when all parliamentary activities resume. But this is something that we definitely need to keep an eye on.

Natalie Orpett: Yes, well, it sounds like we have quite a lot to keep our eyes on, but unfortunately, we're going to have to leave it there.

Tara Varma, thank you so much for joining us.

Tara Varma: Thanks for having me.

Natalie Orpett: The Lawfare Podcast is produced in cooperation with the Brookings Institution. You can get ad-free versions of this and other Lawfare podcasts by becoming a Lawfare material supporter at our website, lawfaremedia.org/support. You'll also get access to special events and other content available only to our supporters. Please rate and review us wherever you get your podcasts. Look out for our other podcasts including Rational Security, Chatter, Allies, and the Aftermath, our latest Lawfare Presents podcast series on the government's response to January 6th. Check out our written work at lawfaremedia.org. The podcast is edited by Jen Patja, and your audio engineer this episode was Goat Rodeo. Our theme song is from Alibi Music. As always, thank you for listening