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Nobody But Us: The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age of Signals Intelligence

Ben Buchanan
Thursday, September 7, 2017, 10:30 AM

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The US cipher machine SIGABA, displayed at the National Cryptologic Museum in Fort Meade, Maryland.

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Traditionally, signals intelligence is neatly bifurcated into offense and defense: intercept adversaries’ communication technology and protect one’s own. In the modern era, however, there is great convergence in the technologies used by friendly nations and by hostile ones. I’ve tried to tackle some of this in a new paper, “Nobody But Us: The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age of Signals Intelligence.” It’s published as part of the Hoover Institution's Aegis Paper Series.

My animating idea is that signals intelligence agencies find themselves in a dilemma: they must penetrate the very same technologies that they also at times must protect. The United States perhaps feels this tension most acutely, for a variety of reasons. To resolve it, the United States and its partners have relied on an approach sometimes called Nobody But Us, or NOBUS: target communications mechanisms using unique methods accessible only to the United States. This approach, which calls for advanced methods, aims to protect communications from American adversaries, yet also ensure American access when needed.

But the NOBUS approach depends as well on a number of American advantages that are under serious threat. These advantages for a time enabled what many have called “the golden age of signals intelligence.” The decline of these advantages renews the tension between offense and defense once more. My paper examines how the NOBUS approach works, its limits, and the challenging matter of what comes next.

Nobody But Us: The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age of Signals Intelligence by Hoover Institution on Scribd


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Ben Buchanan is an Assistant Teaching Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, where he conducts research on the intersection of cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and statecraft. His first book, "The Cybersecurity Dilemma," was published by Oxford University Press in 2017. Previously, he has written journal articles and peer-reviewed papers on artificial intelligence, attributing cyber attacks, deterrence in cyber operations, cryptography, election cybersecurity, and the spread of malicious code between nations and non-state actors. He is also a regular contributor to Lawfare and War on the Rocks, and has published op-eds in the Washington Post and other outlets. Ben received his Ph.D. in War Studies from King’s College London, where he was a Marshall Scholar. He earned master’s and undergraduate degrees from Georgetown University.