So How <em>Does</em> Vladimir Putin Feel About Cyber, Anyway?
Two days ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a significant cybersecurity speech to Russia’s Security Council. For all you Russian speakers, the original text and video can be found on the Kremlin’s website here. For everyone else, I have translated the speech and posted it below.
Though the speech is interesting for all sorts of reasons, three of its features warrant special emphasis. First, while Putin never mentions the United States by name, his speech is filled with veiled references to it and its intelligence agencies.
Published by The Lawfare Institute
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Two days ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a significant cybersecurity speech to Russia’s Security Council. For all you Russian speakers, the original text and video can be found on the Kremlin’s website here. For everyone else, I have translated the speech and posted it below.
Though the speech is interesting for all sorts of reasons, three of its features warrant special emphasis. First, while Putin never mentions the United States by name, his speech is filled with veiled references to it and its intelligence agencies. Alleged cyberwarfare by the United States against Russian entities and institutions forms the foundation of Putin’s argument that the Russian government needs to strengthen the security of vulnerable domestic websites.
Secondly, Putin invokes several multilateral organizations, including the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, India, South Africa) group, the United Nations, and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization, as being essential to settling modern cybersecurity disputes. It is no coincidence that Russia wields great institutional power in all three; nor is it coincidental that two do not include the United States.
Third, Putin identifies the Kremlin’s four pressing cybersecurity priorities. Briefly, they are: 1) increasing the security of domestic communication networks, 2) ensuring the stability of the Russian segment of the Internet, 3) developing domestic technologies and cyber techniques (an issue stressed by Chinese President Xi Jinping quite recently), and 4) establishing the UN as a place to set cyber regulations and settle disputes. #2 is the most important: Putin suggests that the Russian government has an interest in ensuring the stability and security of the “Russian segment of the Internet,” a phrase much at odds with the “open ideal” principle that currently underlies most international Internet organizations. Furthermore, while he emphasizes that the Russian government will not seek to put the Internet under total governmental control, the insinuation is that it could if it wanted to, and that some intrusion is necessary in order to confront modern risks.
With no further delay, here is the speech in full:
Good day, respected colleagues… Today, we, respected colleagues, are discussing issues connected with the security of the informational space of Russia against modern threats. This is one of the priority areas of ensuring national security. The reliable working of informational resources and command and communication systems is of paramount importance to the defense capabilities of the state, for the stable development of economic and social spheres, and for the defense of Russia’s sovereignty in the widest meaning of the term. The current epoch is rightly named the “information age.” New technologies and global communication networks cover practically all fields of human activity and society. They are visibly changing people’s quality of life, and promoting economic globalization and the humanitarian space. Together with this, it is necessary to account for the risks and threats existing in the informational sphere. We see how certain countries try to use their dominating position in the global informational space to achieve not just economic, but also military-political aims. They actively use informational systems as a tool of so-called soft power to achieve their interests. Our relevant agencies are tracking a constant growth in computer attacks on Russian informational resources. I must say that recently, in the last six months, the quantity of attacks has increased significantly, and is simply incomparable even with last year. The methods, tools, and tactics of said attacks are improving, and their intensity is directly dependent on the current international situation. In the global network, terrorist and extremist materials are openly spread. The quantity of crimes committed with the use of informational technology has increased; for example, illegal penetrations of financial institutions’ corporate networks. Of course, over the past few years, different steps were taken to ensure the security of Russia in the informational sphere. The Informational Security Doctrine operates as a strategic, integrated document. Since the beginning of last year, we have formed a governmental system for detecting, preventing, and eliminating the consequences of computer attacks on the informational resources of Russia. We have created modern, secure networks and systems of communication for the needs of national defense and security, and for the effective operation of law enforcement agencies. We actively cooperate with partners in ensuring international informational security, including in the context of the UN, BRICS, and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization. Thus, in the last BRICS summit, the leaders of our countries decisively condemned the mass electronic surveillance and collection of data on our civilians, which is carried out by some of the special forces of well-known countries. We consider this a direct violation of political sovereignty and of human rights, especially the right to privacy. With this, it is obvious that today we must work on and realize a complex of additional measures in the field of informational security. First, we should qualitatively increase the security of domestic communication networks and informational resources, especially those that are used by governmental institutions. We must strive to eliminate unlawful interference in their work and leaks of confidential and personal information. Second, it is important to ensure the stability and security of the Russian segment of the Internet. Here, I would like to emphasize: we do not intend to limit access to the network, to put it under total control, to governmentalize the Internet, to limit the lawful interests and opportunities of people, social organizations and businesses in the informational sphere. Media freedom, the right of citizens to receive and impart information – these are basic principles of any democratic power, of any democratic government and society. It is necessary to strictly comply with them, and we will do exactly that. I want to emphasize this again: there will be no unfounded restrictions, and certainly no “total” ones. We are not even considering this. But we are obligated to protect our citizens from risks, which I have already mentioned, including using those practices that are already employed in many other countries. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that many sites have terrorist or extremist propaganda, xenophobic or religious hatred, that the global network contains child pornography and details on how to make narcotics or commit suicide. I repeat, all over the world they are fighting with these kinds of materials, and fighting actively. Distributors are punished, all the way up to criminal cases. We will act in exactly the same way, consistently and strictly with regard to the law, to close these sites. Nobody should have any doubts about this. And, of course, we should continue to operatively stop attempts to destroy the stability of the Russian segment of the Internet. In June of this year, we held interagency training sessions meant to prevent these kinds of attempts. In light of the results, the government developed suitable measures, which should hopefully help us to ensure Russian sovereignty in this sphere. The third area of our work is the development of domestic technologies, techniques, and informational products. To accomplish this, we need to effectively stimulate their usage by governmental agencies and our companies. Appropriate tasks have been laid before our agencies. I would like today to hear the opinions of the members of the Security Council on priority measures in this area. Finally, the fourth area is the extension of cooperation with global and regional organizations in ensuring international informational security. I believe that one of the sites for risk assessment, development of joint actions in the sphere of informational security, and analysis of the legal consequences of decisions taken, should be the UN, its relevant groups, and its specialized structures.”
Ben Bissell is an analyst at a geopolitical risk consultancy and a Masters student at the London School of Economics. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa from the University of Virginia with majors in political science and Russian in 2013. He is a former National Security Intern at the Brookings Institution as well as a Henry Luce Scholar, where he was placed at the Population Research Institute in Shanghai, China.