Thinking about MH370

Fools, they say, rush in where angels fear to tread.  Proving that I am less angelic than foolish (and confident that the blogosphere will quickly forget these musings), I thought I'd offer a few Homeland Security-related thoughts on lessons learned from MH370.   Of course this speculation can be utterly overtaken by events, but even at this point it seems that we can identify both some gaps and some opportunities in the area of aviation security -- factors that will probably outlast whatever ultimately is concluded about this particular flight:

• Passenger screening remains a work in progress.  Even though it has become clear that the two passengers flying on stolen passports were unlikely to have a link to whatever has happened, it still remains puzzling that 13 years after 9/11 the world does not have a cooperative, functioning, name-check system to verify passport authenticity.
• Likewise, reports are that various intelligence agencies have, ex post, cleared their citizens of potential terrorist connections.  This, too, suggests a gap in passenger screening -- though a much more difficult one to fill, as most countries are unlikely to agree to ex ante information sharing on a global basis (would the US share its terrorist watch list with Russia?  With Malaysia?  Would China share with anyone?).  Still, it does point to the positive benefit of increased sharing of intelligence with our partners who we trust -- steps that have been markedly slowed in the post-Snowden world.
• Flight crew screening is also underdeveloped.  Lately suspicion has focused on the pilot and co-pilot of MH370, as potential causes of the disappearance.  Yet little is known about them.  In the United States we've embraced a screening system for all transportation workers, because we see this as a sensitive area of employment.  But even that screening is static, done on a periodic basis.  If you're serious about security you need to move to a continuous monitoring system, intended to pick up changed employee behavior patterns, and such.  But even before that, it would be nice if all the airlines of the world had a "know your pilot" program.
• We have not yet seen any film from the checkpoint screening in Kuala Lampur.  I don't know why.  Did they not do it?  At a minimum, a review of KL screening procedures is in order -- even if no passenger is implicated in the plot.
• It's outside my expertise, but I am surprised to learn that in this day and age there are gaps in radar coverage of the world where planes are not under the positive observation and control of a ground station.  That seems an easy fix -- at least anywhere near a coast line.  I guess it will be hard mid-Pacific, but that isn't where MH370 was.
• Nor is it clear why the transponder should be capable of being turned off by the pilot and co-pilot.  Perhaps I'm missing something but while the plane is in flight, I can't conceive of a legitimate, positive reason for that capacity to be enabled.  I'd be interested in information from any pilots on the blog who can enlighten me.  Ditto for the ACARS plane equipment diagnostic system -- why does it have an on/off switch at all?  Why isn't it enabled whenever the plane is in flight?
• On the other hand, I was also pleasantly surprised to learn that there are a number of previously unexplored avenues for tracking flights -- ranging from ACARS to navigational satellites.  I would think it worth while to put some money into further developing those capabilities so that in the next emergency we have some standard protocols for collecting this data.

Finally, for those who want to see a bit of what worst-case scenario planning looks like from the DHS perspective, this blog post by former TSA Administrator Kip Hawley gives you a good idea of what must be going through the minds of DHS and national security officials right about now.