Today's Headlines and Commentary

Raffaela Wakeman
Thursday, June 2, 2011, 2:48 PM
This is the first in a regular series in which I will  collect and disseminate headlines and commentary of interest to Lawfare readers. I can't promise that this will be a daily feature, but will do my best to post multiple times a week.  I encourage Lawfare readers to email me relevant content at wakeman.lawfare@gmail.com. The security breach that Google announced on its blog yesterday appears to have been focused on stealing passwords and monitoring email accounts of senior U.S.

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This is the first in a regular series in which I will  collect and disseminate headlines and commentary of interest to Lawfare readers. I can't promise that this will be a daily feature, but will do my best to post multiple times a week.  I encourage Lawfare readers to email me relevant content at wakeman.lawfare@gmail.com. The security breach that Google announced on its blog yesterday appears to have been focused on stealing passwords and monitoring email accounts of senior U.S. and various Asian countries' government officials, Chinese political activists, members of the military, and journalists. The press has extensive coverage of this matter, including on the Google blog, in The New York Times and in The Washington Post. It appears that the hack originated in Jinan, where last year's attack on Google also began. A computer science vocational school is located in Jinan, and was believed to be involved in last year's attacks. David Ignatius' column discusses how the CIA and the military's roles in the war on terror became blurred:
Rumsfeld was creative in expanding his turf to fight a global war on terrorism. He installed Stephen Cambone in the new post of undersecretary of intelligence in 2003. He also authorized forward-deployed Special Forces units overseas. These became known as “Military Liaison Elements,” or MLEs, since part of their mission was to work with local special forces. But the MLEs also conducted what was known as “operational preparation of the environment” in countries that weren’t war zones. CIA and State Department officials worried that the Pentagon was creating alternative intelligence platforms. “We went nuts,” recalls McLaughlin. Rumsfeld cooperated in working out rules for coordination with local station chiefs and ambassadors, but the foray left scars. Former intelligence officials recall sensitive “preparation of the environment” missions inside nations such as Iran. I recently reviewed an August 2006 “SAP Action Memo” from Cambone to Rumsfeld requesting an extension of a “commercial covert operative” in two volatile Arab countries. The military isn’t authorized to conduct “covert” activities, so a senior Defense official says this may simply be “sloppy writing.” It could also be something inappropriate. Long skeptical of the CIA bureaucracy, Rumsfeld wanted his own options. In late 2001, he set up his own “Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group” reporting to Undersecretary Douglas Feith. According to Bradley Graham’s 2009 biography of Rumsfeld, the Pentagon’s inspector general concluded in 2007 that this push for “alternative intelligence assessments” had been “inappropriate.”
Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) has introduced a bill (and is also circulating a petition) which would require high-value detainees to be held at Guantanamo long-term, and would prohibit their transfer to other countries or to facilities in the United States. The Daily Caller interviewed Senator Inhofe and others on this topic. The bill defines those individuals who would fall under this requirement:
High-Value Enemy Combatant Defined- In this section, the term `high-value enemy combatant' means an enemy combatant who--
    (1) is a senior member of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or any associated terrorist group;
    (2) has knowledge of an imminent terrorist threat against the United States or its territories, the Armed Forces of the United States, the people or organizations of the United States, or an ally of the United States;
    (3) has, or has had, direct involvement in planning or preparing a terrorist action against the United States or an ally of the United States or in assisting the leadership of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or any associated terrorist group in planning or preparing such a terrorist action; or
    (4) if released from detention, would constitute a clear and continuing threat to the United States or any ally of the United States.
The Boston Globe editorialized on the revised AUMF in the NDAA, which was passed last week by the House:
The new language approved by the House last week removes any reference to 9/11, granting the president the authority to use whatever military force he considers necessary against those “who are part of, or are substantially supporting, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces.’’ The authorization also moves America away from preventing attacks toward a full military engagement with terrorist groups, even those who may not target the United States. It would permit military action if a terrorist’s “associated force’’ targeted America’s “coalition partner.’’ Neither term is defined. Such broad language is unnecessary. Neither President Bush nor President Obama has felt constrained by the language in the 2001 resolution. If military action needs to be taken unrelated to 9/11, then a president can seek new authorization. That’s what Bush did in the runup to war in Iraq. How to interpret and amend the 10-year-old authorization-of-force measure should be a matter of serious debate — one that should focus on what the president needs to protect against real enemies — not on an indefinite untethering of presidential authority. The recent House language gives a dangerous new life to the war on terror, rather than putting it to rest. Senate debate on the bill, set for later this month, must excise the language.

Raffaela Wakeman is a Senior Director at In-Q-Tel. She started her career at the Brookings Institution, where she spent five years conducting research on national security, election reform, and Congress. During this time she was also the Associate Editor of Lawfare. From there, Raffaela practiced law at the U.S. Department of Defense for four years, advising her clients on privacy and surveillance law, cybersecurity, and foreign liaison relationships. She departed DoD in 2019 to join the Majority Staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, where she oversaw the Intelligence Community’s science and technology portfolios, cybersecurity, and surveillance activities. She left HPSCI in May 2021 to join IQT. Raffaela received her BS and MS in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2009 and her law degree from Georgetown University Law Center in 2015, where she was recognized for her commitment to public service with the Joyce Chiang Memorial Award. While at the Department of Defense, she was the inaugural recipient of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s General Counsel Award for exhibiting the highest standards of leadership, professional conduct, and integrity.

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